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

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
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

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

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FURTHER REFLECTIONS

BY JOHN MURRAY, S.J.

THE fact that the focus of international attention during the past nine months has been the Far East must not let us forget that during this same period serious efforts have been made, and considerable results achieved, in the building up of a certain unity in Western Europe. I use the word " unity " here and throughout this article, not in the technical sense of a European Super-State or United States of Europe—a notion, debatable in character, in my judgment, and at the present moment of merely academic interest—but to express a much closer collaboration, in actual fact as also in more sympathetic understanding between all the countries of Europe which lie to the West of the iron curtain.

A whole string of names and agreements through the past two years shows us that much has been attempted and something done in this significant respect. The Atlantic Pact, the economic rapprochements, an Assembly of Europe meeting in Strasbourg, the conception of a Western Army with European and American contingents, more recently the Continental visit of General Eisenhower, defence budgets in Britain, Italy and France, a changed policy with regard to Germany, the alteration of the Western attitude towards Spain : all these are elements in the same large pattern of co-operation between the European Powers.

I

The question presents itself how far this is a short-term policy, inspired in the main by apprehension and dictated by the necessity of self-defence, and how far it ought to be expressed and interpreted in a long-term view. Is fear the cement which is slowly hardening between these countries ? Or is this rapprochement a natural development in harmony with the changed situation and the changing problems of European society, a development which will and must culminate in a transformed European pattern.

Seen from the former of these standpoints, what is the present situation in Western Europe ? The answer must be that it is still weak. If, as some experts consider, Russia intends to make war in the near future or to create a situation out of which war almost certainly would arise, then Western Europe can scarcely defend itself effectively in 1951. If, on the other hand, Russian policy remains what it has been since 1946 and 1947, that of attempting to secure the fruits of war without going to war, then

the new circumstances in Western Europe should mean a lessening both of the fear of Russia and of Russian influence and, on the positive side, a steady growth of military strength.

Let me deal first with negative factors. It would be foolish to underestimate Russian military and economic force. Russia has maintained large armies on a war footing since 1945 and has an immense reserve of man power. She has other sources of man power in the East European countries that she controls, but it is highly doubtful whether she could rely upon these sources in the event of war. It would be unwise to overestimate the superiority of technical skill and experience in the West: all available evidence suggests that the most modern Russian tanks and artillery, and perhaps also aircraft and submarines, are from a technical angle very efficient and advanced. But there is a big difference between a realistic assessment of an enemy and the invention of a legend or "bogey" around him. One line on which Communist propaganda has been working upon the Continent, and until recently with considerable success, is precisely to represent Russia as immensely powerful and with colossal resources. How could smaller countries, like France or Italy, hope to resist Russian might? The result of such propaganda—and what the propaganda intends—is a mood of helplessness; men become fascinated rabbits; they are bemused and dazed. The question, "What ought we to do about it" is answered in advance through this atmosphere of defeatism, "There is nothing we *can* do". The fact that all Russian moves and measures are shrouded in profound mystery adds to this reaction of confusion. *Omne ignotum pro invincibili.*

This line of propaganda has been intensified by an attempt to divide Western countries from one another. In January of this year there was grave danger of a drifting apart of the United States and Britain on the policy to be pursued with regard to China. The danger was fortunately recognized in time and dealt with. At the end of the same month came the—at least reported—offer from Russia to Italy and France of a guaranteed independence and neutrality in case of war. This proposal was made when the leaders of the French and Italian Communist parties were in Russia, and it was made to the two countries in Western Europe which have strong and firmly entrenched Communist groups. It would be rash to ignore the effect of such an offer on public opinion in those countries. The peoples of both are war-weary; politically they are sharply divided; their morale is not or not yet high.

During 1948 and 1949 wide support was given, especially in France, to the concept of a Third Force in Western Europe. Its function would be to balance the United States and Russia, and to act as a bridge between them. It would be neither outspokenly capitalist like the former nor Socialist like the latter, but something betwixt and between. The idea was that in time it would be sufficiently strong to create its own economic

system and to deter military aggression. The concept had the support of some British politicians, those who at heart dislike the partnership between Britain and the U.S.A., and these men would have liked Britain to be part of this neutral Third Force.

In point of fact, apart from the appeal this neutrality will inevitably have for individuals who only too humanly hope beyond all else that war will be avoided, the notion of neutrality cannot seriously be entertained, and it is no longer entertained outside of the Communist groups who employ it in Russian interests to undermine the character and morale of the West. There can be no *neutrality of spirit* when liberty, however imperfect may be certain of its manifestations, is confronted by massive tyranny in a most ruthless form. There exists a manner of thought, a way of life, that is definitely European. And Europe is not so much its cause as its product. It includes a recognition of the value of the human person, of a reign of law and justice, of certain fundamental freedoms, through which a man may express himself in his attitude towards God, in the intimate relationship of marriage and family and home, and on the wider stage of association and companionship. The peoples of Europe have, too, expressed themselves collectively, in language and in custom, in art and literature and science, until we have that immense European heritage, rich and generous in diversity, yet bearing throughout it all a common spirit which we acknowledge as specifically European. Can any genuine European be neutral when he is conscious of this spirit and this inheritance, when it is challenged, as to-day most surely it is challenged, by the denial of all its values, whether of God or human personality or family or law or culture, by the twentieth century Nihilism which blows icily against it from the Asiatic steppes?

Recent history has both narrowed, for the time being, and widened for ever the bounds of Europe. At present, the peoples of Eastern Europe—every bit, be it insisted, as European as those of the West—are under forced and alien control. A third of Europe's ancient territory has been seized by Russia. At the same time, there exists a Greater Europe, in Australia and in part in Africa, but most of all in the Americas, a Greater Europe that has been built by Europeans, and in the main in the European spirit. It is significant in more ways than that of military defence that the United States looks upon the maintenance of Western Europe as the key point in world strategy, and equally significant that the predominant power in this maintenance should be not one of the countries of older Europe but from the Greater Europe beyond the oceans. For many centuries, through the old Roman Imperium and indeed long afterwards, the Mediterranean was the central sea which held the European peoples together. To-day, that central sea is the Atlantic Ocean.

The question now presents itself, how strong are the various Communist parties in Western Europe. It is a problem that cannot be dis-

missed lightly; yet, on the other hand, it is wrong to make it another bogey. The countries in which Communists are strongest are undoubtedly France and Italy. In the former they have a large representation in Parliament and control a large proportion of the Trades Unions; in the latter their political representation is again formidable, while their influence in the Unions is less. There is no doubt that small groups of determined or fanatical men could do great harm through sabotage and treason in time of war. But still, it is reasonably evident that, in these two countries, the Communist strength and influence have declined considerably in the past four years. In either country normal government has been carried on without their help and in spite of their opposition. The attempts to provoke strikes in France on a large scale have always broken down, and this despite the powerful Communist hold upon the labour syndicates. The working classes have responded to these calls for strikes by continuing to work or returning to it. It is important to bear this in mind, that in these two countries, where they are strongest, the Communists have not been able seriously to interfere with ordinary democratic government. They provide an awkward element; they are an opposition, quite different from a normal Parliamentary opposition; their first loyalties, and maybe their last also, are to Moscow; they form a fifth column, actual and even more dangerously, potential. But both France and Italy have pulled themselves together since the war, both economically and politically, in spite of their Communist parties.

A valuable test is provided by the failure of all Communist attempts to demonstrate against the European visit of General Eisenhower in January of this year. The General visited Paris twice and Rome once. Orders to protest were issued from the Cominform; the party headquarters were busy for days beforehand, staging rallies and organizing strikes. Yet, in neither case, did any serious demonstration occur. A handful of Parisians shouting slogans, a few thousand comrades singing the Red Flag round the Roman Colosseum, and nothing more. A sorry fiasco after so much preparation, and it confirmed what is well known from other sources, namely that a large number even of the people who vote Communist—usually for negative reasons, *e.g., contre le patron,* or from class solidarity—are quite unready to go against their own interests in striking or in rowdy demonstrations or to be made the dupes of political leaders.

A further point to be registered occurred in Italy shortly after the General's visit. Two Communist members of Parliament resigned or were expelled from the party, because they publicly stated that it was the duty of Italian Communists to fight in their country's defence against any foreign Power, including Russia. Both these men, Magnani and Cucchi, had been leaders of partisan activity during 1944 and 1945, and this declaration of the duty of Italian Communists has, I understand,

received considerable support amongst their followers in Emilia, the region from which they themselves derive and incidentally the most definitely Communist province of Italy. Doubtless, this particular *deviation* will be denounced by the Cominform as Titoism or maybe as " Cucchism ", a new variant, as the crime of putting national interests before those of Russia. There is not sufficient evidence for guessing what proportion of Communists in any country is likely to be affected by this national spirit, but it is perfectly clear, from the many prosecutions of Communist leaders in Eastern Europe, that the danger is most gravely feared and violently dealt with by the Russian authorities.

These are some considerations of the present situation. Rearmament and union for defence have been forced upon Western European countries. Is this likely to provoke attack by Russia? *Quién sabe?* Russia, if she intends to wage a direct war, will choose her time. An aggressor State has this advantage that it can decide the place and hour, secure, unless Russia has befogged and bedevilled herself by her own propaganda, that the Powers it attacks will not themselves make war unless compelled. But you cannot defend yourself without weapons, and with a government such as Russia's you cannot argue except from strength. So, from either angle, it is better to grow towards strength than to lie inert and listless. What is required—and this has been emphasised in the United States—is a sense of urgency. A defence programme must not take second place to schemes of social welfare, however admirable, even on the grounds that agitators might find a pretext here to promote disaffection.

II

Now, is there evidence that the Western European countries are thinking of this closer association also in longer terms? Yes, certainly, on the economic plane. The different economic agreements, the proposal to pool iron and steel resources under the Schumann Plan—these are no mere short-term propositions. The danger is perhaps that the politicians will be content to envisage this association mainly, if not wholly, in economic terms.

An appreciation of Europe *qua* Europe is growing rapidly among Continental peoples. More so, I think, among Catholics than non-Catholics, and this is natural, for it was Catholic Christianity which made Europe what Europe was and still, in large measure, is. Not that differences are lightly glozed over, for the people of Western Europe who are constantly meeting one another are conscious of these real differences and realize that these differences are part of the rich variety of European culture; without them the life and civilisation of Europe would be immeasurably poorer. It is this sense of rich diversity that would prevent the Continentals from launching any facile scheme for a United States of

Europe. What, however, they are understanding more decidedly is that they, all ot them, have a great deal in common, and that the surer way to close collaboration is growing appreciation of this common heritage.

To give a concrete example of this development I should like to comment upon the Congress on European Unity—or, to give it fuller title, the fifth Reunion of the *Conversaciones Católicas Internacionales*, which took place in September 1950, at San Sebastian.[1] It concerned itself with three questions, here enumerated :—

1. In the present situation of Europe, can Christianity be a fundamental element of European unity or, on the contrary, must we try to reconstitute Europe on other foundations, purely cultural or economic? (The word "Christianity" here was originally left vague, and its meaning might range from a purely cultural notion of Christianity to the strictly religious interpretation of Catholicism and the Catholic Church). Must we abandon the effort to give back to Europe its spiritual unity in the Catholic Faith?
2. Whatever system be used to bring about an economic unity in Europe, what minimum conditions must we insist on from the Christian viewpoint in order that this unity be not achieved at the expense of and to the detriment of natural societies, of the dignity of the human person and of justice, or in defiance of those principles of social justice which the Catholic Church upholds? What moral principles need to be maintained by Catholics, when the question arises of realizing in the concrete the social and economic unity of Europe?
3. The Church has undoubtedly been in the past an element of the greatest importance and the highest inspiration in the development of European culture. Can she still bring her contribution to this culture or must the Church remain outside and above the problems such as this?

There was a general concensus, evident from the contributions, that Europe had been called into being or at least protected and inspired

[1] These *Conversaciones* were first held in 1946 at San Sebastian, at the invitation of Spanish Catholics. They have served to bring together Catholics from many countries, to whom Spanish Catholics have been most generous hosts, and they have done much to reknit the links between Spanish Catholics and Catholics from abroad. This was most gracefully acknowledged in a speech in December, 1950, delivered by the Spanish Foreign Minister, Don Martín Artajo, before a plenary session of the Cortès. Reporting on Spain's external relations during the past five years, he had occasion to refer to many friends of Spain in other countries, who had done what they could in Spain's troubled years to present a true picture of that country and to encourage personal relationships with Spaniards. Among the names mentioned by the Foreign Minister were several closely associated with the *Conversaciones* of San Sebastian.

The *Conversaciones* are genuinely what they purport to be. They are not congresses, with learned papers and addresses; nor are they lengthy. They are discussions on themes, and the value lies frequently more in the discussions than in any report or programme or resolution which may emerge from them.

throughout its formative periods by the Catholic Church, but that Europe was no longer identical with the Faith. In the first place, Europe was only in part Catholic ; and then the Church to-day was, in fact, more Catholic than ever in its geographical extent. Europe, however, must recover some spiritual principle of cohesion, and where could that be discovered outside the Catholic Faith ? It was noticeable that this assembly of Catholics, from Spain and France, Italy, Belgium and Holland, England, the United States, Switzerland and Poland, kept returning to the basic concept of Europe as a unity which embraced a wide diversity or as a rich variety held together by a common life and spirit. And, consequently, they were instinctively hostile to the notion of a Super-State, imposed upon the different peoples and flattening out their qualities as much as they recognized the danger of a certain national anarchism and disintegration. Nor could any European concept be tolerated which did not take full account of the human person and his personal rights. Neither peoples nor persons were to be subordinated and sacrificed to some totalitarian Idea ; indeed, that was precisely why and whence Europe was being so gravely challenged to-day.

These *Conversaciones* were certainly in a long-term perspective, and it was on occasions necessary to drag some of the delegates down to earth and back to the realities of 1950 and even to remind them, when they waxed too eloquent about the need of the Catholic spirit, that the two world Powers, most immediately concerned with saving Europe in 1950, were non-Catholic Powers. But they were always interesting, at times providing a new aspect or *aperçu*, and every now and then a real illumination. The spirit and friendliness with which the members worked together, for hours at a time, were admirable, and the week of the *Conversaciones* was certainly a European association in miniature.

The three questions, proposed above, were dealt with by three sub-committees, which ultimately referred their drafts to the full assembly, and then from draft and revision there emerged a statement. The statement of the first or religious sub-committee, as amended and circulated, is sufficiently striking and notable to merit full translation. It ran as follows :—

> Supernatural Faith constitutes for all Christians the supreme and transcendent principle of Unity. Stable and changeless in itself, it develops within us under the action of the Holy Spirit. It is directed by the teaching authority of the Church, which is the guarantee of this unity. It inspires a common conception of life in all.
>
> This community of supernatural doctrine and supernatural destiny gathers together, above all frontiers and all human divergencies, all Catholics in one and the same manner of thought and in one and the same rule of action.
>
> Faith, enlivened by Charity in the communion of one and the same Hope, teaches man the transcendence of the divine purpose which summons him. It teaches him to respect and appreciate the diversity of human forms, in which Catholics of each country and every period have endeavoured, under the

supreme teaching authority of the Church, to realize and to develop the riches of that patrimony that is entrusted to their charge.

Faith develops in us the most exact idea of the dignity of man and of his transcendental worth. Charity compels us to love our neighbour even at the cost of the sacrifice of ourselves. Charity is the most powerful force that exists for union. That is why Faith and Charity protect effectively the values of the Natural Order which associate men with one another and which, placed in their light, direct men towards their supernatural end. Throughout all the forms of civilization and of temporary unity, destined naturally to decay, the permanent values of the *family* and of those other communities in which man can express himself and develop, constitute those bonds of society that are most important for an effective Christian life and society.[1]

It is unfortunately beyond all need of proof that these values of the Natural Order are to-day exposed to the gravest dangers. Accordingly, it is necessary that they should be lived and implemented to the full, in accordance with the constant teaching of the Papal Encyclicals, if Europe is to attain that unity which she is seeking.

There is a solidarity in fact between supernatural values and these values of the Natural Order. When the former are denied, the latter are denied inevitably in their turn. It is therefore the duty of all Christians and of all men of good will who are desirous of making their contribution to the unity of Europe, to proclaim that this unity will never be realized except in the *reverence for and under the inspiration of all these values.*

Whenever the supernatural transcendence and Providence of God is repudiated *or* the final destiny of man *or* the significance of the values of the Natural Order is denied, then the world sinks into idolatry and engages in the search for false principles of unity.

European union must so be organized in its framework and its later development that it will be directed towards the common good of all its members—peoples, nations and communities—whatever their political significance, their territorial extent, their historical traditions, their cultural patrimony, their economic resources, whatever the material potential of any group.

This effort towards European unity should be directed by a genuine harmony of mind and by a joint effort.[2] It ought to be guided by a solidarity, based upon a respect for the Natural Law and directed towards the promotion of the basic rights of the human person and of those associations in which his personality is expressed. *And public and State authorities are bound to respect and adapt themselves to this fundamental human position.*[3]

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[1] . . . . This sentence has had to be translated somewhat freely. The French original is the following : " A travers toutes les formes de civilisation et d'unité temporelle périssables, les valeurs permanentes de la famille et des autres communautés où l'homme se développe, constituent des liens dont la rupture diminue l'efficacité du christianisme ".

[2] Here again it has been difficult to render the meaning of the declaration. The French text is this : " Elle doit être constamment guidée par le souci de la concorde des esprits et de la convergence des efforts ", and it continues : " Elle doit être régie par la solidarité fondée sur le respect de la loi naturelle, et ordonnée à la promotion des droits fondementaux de la personne humaine et des communeutés où elle s'intègre, *auxquels les pouvoirs publics eux-mêmes sont tenus de se soumettre.*

[3] Here is the focal point of Catholic psychology and sociology. The individual human being is the centre of Christian thought. He is God's creature ; his first and primal relation is to God ; relations to society are subsequent, and these are all conditional upon the reality that each member of human society has, first and foremost, a specific relation to God. In Christian thinking, man, as a creature of God—ultimately raised to an even higher dignity because of his connection with Christ, the Redeemer, may never be subordinated to any social or economic scheme. Here, again, is the fundamental issue between Christians and the totalitarian systems of this century.

> In order to preserve this unity on such levels, it is before all else imperative that Christians shall put their principles into practice with growing energy, and that all men of good will shall respect and appreciate their efforts, in both the national and international spheres. At the same time they must resist all and every attempt to delay or frustrate this union.

The declaration concludes with a number of practical suggestions, among them an exchange of information regularly, the co-ordination of programmes among various societies working towards this common end, the employment of a suitable, common technique.

Among those who took part in the *Conversaciones* were men with a large experience of international congresses. These all agreed on one point which may surprise the present reader. They had taken part in meetings with Liberals and Socialists, and their judgment was that Catholics failed to exercise a greater influence in such gatherings because they were not united. Despite the possession of a common faith and moral principles, they were too uncertain or too divided in their application of those principles. Some indication of this divided opinion emerged in the discussions of the second sub-committee at San Sebastian. On the one hand, were those who talked of Catholic social teaching as opposed to both capitalism and Communism, as though it were striving to steer a middle way between two extremes. To others it appeared old-fashioned and unreal to use such terminology, at least without a careful limitation of terms. The Communist condemned all capitalism, which for him included every form of private property and personal initiative. But when a Catholic rejected capitalism he did so in a wholly different sense, rejecting monopolies and trusts and the exploitation of man for gain. Much valuable thought emerged out of these discussions, in which there was naturally fundamental agreement on the central point, that any new social and economic order that would or might accompany a more closely united Europe, would have to rest upon the personal position and value of man.

The final statement was curt and said little in detail. It pointed to the fact that *l'Europe se fait*, that efforts here and tendencies there were all leading in this direction. It noted that this would eventually call for great alterations in the social and economic structure. Thus there arose for Catholics an opportunity, the proper use of which was a grave obligation, to give to this new structure as it developed a certain human, Christian form and spirit. This new social and economic order must envisage the human person as its subject and as its final purpose. The document uttered the warning that in this new order social justice must be reconciled and harmonized with fundamental freedoms in the economic sphere. One principle was added, namely, that of "*subsidiarité*," which meant that smaller firms, groups and societies should be allowed and encouraged to carry through work they were competent to fulfil, and that such work ought not to be given to larger societies or groups ; thus would the danger of centralization, of the placing of power in too few hands, be best avoided.

It was a plea for decentralization, so far as that is compatible with efficiency; it was an appeal for distribution.

Finally, the third sub-committee presented its lengthy report on culture. No need, here, to emphasise the immense contribution of the Catholic Church and Faith to European culture. Even in lands where the Faith is little known, there remains, as in England, the continuing evidence of Catholic culture. I quote the opening sections of this third statement:—

> The *Conversaciones* . . . express their firm hope that European culture will again possess a profoundly Christian spirit, in harmony with the teachings of the Catholic Church, and that it may become in truth *one*. Such a unity will then be achieved, when, behind the natural and desirable diversity in the purely human order, there shall exist a form religious *substratum*, integrated by the Faith and moral principles defined by the Catholic Church, and this will give to the peoples of Europe one and the same solid conception of human life.
>
> The Conversaciones . . . reject any attempt to impose systematic unification through an *ideology* of whatever kind, whether through artificial levelling-down or a "*planification*" of mind or by means of material or moral pressure.
>
> The cultural unity of Europe must not destroy national diversities. Neither must it be the consequence of a Super-State claiming to exercise a supreme cultural authority.
>
> This cultural diversity is of inestimable worth, not only in the European framework, but also within the various countries, and indeed any nation which endeavours through force to unify its culture violates its position as regards association with the culture of other lands. In this respect that freedom of expression and teaching, which is recognised in every country as due to different cultural and spiritual groups, should be considered as one of the essential conditions for intellectual co-operation among the nations of Europe.
>
> European culture, if it preserves the balance of unity and diversity under Christian inspiration, will maintain its due stability and that genius for revival of which it has throughout the centuries given such admirable proofs.
>
> The fact of being a Christian is a reality of the greatest moment, and it can exercise a significant influence upon the entire personality of a man. Therefore, Christian thought, more than any other, must remain faithful to the very nature of reality and faithful also to itself. The more firm is this double loyalty, the more successful will be our efforts here.
>
> Nor ought we be diffident about the influence that our Christian position can exercise upon secular and profane culture, provided that our position is kept authentic and sincere. But, instead of looking for *a priori* and prefabricated solutions, we ought to examine the problems of our day for what they are and as they present themselves to us, and see them always in the Christian perspective.

The document then enters into details of cultural contacts, the development of libraries and reviews, the interchange of students, the co-ordination of activity on various levels.

Enough, I trust, has now been said to show how there exists abroad this keen and living interest in the problem of Europe, how the ancient concept of Europe as *one* and yet *many*, as common to all and still richly diverse is being again understood and appreciated, and how Catholics on the Continent are conscious how much this concept needs to be inspired and illuminated, as in the past it so definitely was, by Catholic Faith and life.

JOHN MURRAY

THE MEANING AND VALUE OF EXISTENTIALISM

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TO the question " What is existentialism ? " the most common answer to-day from the non-professional philosopher would be, I think, that it is the realistic presentation of human situations, in which particular stress is laid upon the sordid and seamy side of life and in which reality is identified with some central, root experience—such as anguish, revulsion, despair—from which spring all the surface manifestations of a character and in terms of which a man's current behaviour and predicaments are to be ultimately explained. And not a bad description, either—at least, so far as existentialist literature is concerned. In the ordinary view, existentialism is practically synonymous with the plays and novels of Sartre, Camus, Malraux : the better informed (?), or less discerning, might add Anouilh and Graham Greene to the list. Any armchair discussion of existentialism will almost inevitably revolve around the charaters and situations of, say, *No Exit* or *The Plague* or *Brighton Rock*. Someone may throw in a vague reference to *L'Etre et le Néant* or to Heidegger or, possibly, to Marcel ; but, for the most part, it will be the plays and novels that will claim fullest attention, and it will be felt that in these existentialism may most easily be caught in the act, so to speak.

Incomplete and imprecise as this judgement may be, it has the advantage of bringing out the central theme of all existentialist enquiry : man, in his concrete human situations, as revealing the ultimate nature of reality. In the final analysis the " self " is the exclusive subject-matter of existentialism. Moreover, the popular estimate of the morbid character of existentialism is not only justified by the general trend of the greater part of existentialist writing ; it is recognised as just by the existentialists themselves. Sartre has said : " We have been charged with dwelling on human degradation . . . (with putting) the emphasis on the dark side of life. Someone recently told me of a lady who, when she let slip a vulgar word in a moment of irritation, excused herself by saying, ' I guess I'm becoming an existentialist'." Sartre does not deny the accusation. His defence is to show that man's dignity and value lie at the very heart of this degradation and are to be found in the free choice of man's despairing condition.

Existentialism, however, is more than a peculiarly highly-coloured form of realism in literature. Its advocates put it forward as a philosophy properly so called—as, indeed, the only valid philosophy. It is the purpose of these pages to examine this claim briefly. This examination will consist in an attempt to answer two questions : As a philosophy, what does existentialism mean ? As a philosophy, what is it worth ?

I

Existentialism might be conveniently paraphrased as *the philosophy of existence*. Like most nominal definitions, this does not get us very far along the road of explanation.—" There's glory for you ! " " I don't know what you mean by ' glory ' ", Alice said. Humpty Dumpty smiled contemptuously. " Of course, you don't—till I tell you ".—It does, however, start off the breaking-down process of analysis. To speak of philosophy is to speak of a certain type of enquiry : an enquiry that goes beyond mere experiment and observation, beyond, even, the limits of scientific or mathematical investigation. Philosophy involves a wider domain of research than any or all of the sciences ; involves, too, a specific method and terms of reference proper to itself. If I am to understand existentialism, I shall have to have a clear view of the existentialist's method of approach to his problem, of his instruments of research. Moreover, I must know *what* the existentialist is investigating. Has he the same objective as have had philosophers all through the ages? Our first question, therefore—As a philosophy, what does existentialism mean?—may be split in two : What does the existentialist mean by philosophy? What does he mean by existence?

Traditionally, philosophy has always been taken as the systematic search for a coherent intelligible explanation of reality. It claims universal jurisdiction, in virtue both of its subject-matter and of the mental stance it adopts in face of that subject-matter. Its matter is all-embracing. " Measels, rheumatics, hooping-cough, fevers, agers, and lumbagers," said Mr. Squeers, " is all philosophy together ; that's what it is. The heavenly bodies is philosophy, and the earthly bodies is philosophy. If there's a screw loose in a heavenly body, that's philosophy ; and if there's a screw loose in an earthly body, that's philosophy too ; or it may be that sometimes there's a little metaphysics in it, but that's not often. Philosophy's the chap for me." The philosopher studies all reality, but, unlike Mr. Squeers, he is not satisfied with a mere cataloguing of instances nor with a piecemeal consideration of appearances. He is concerned, precisely, to probe beneath the surface of experience ; to find, if possible, the underlying laws and ground of being—of all being, wherever it may be found, in whatever conditions, under whatever guise : of being, that is, simply as being. The philosopher, then, is one who is not content with what meets the eye—whether the eye of common experience or the more exacting eye of scientific observation, hypothesis and theory. He is looking, beyond the order of matter and of measurement, for the basic meaning of reality.

And how does the philosopher hope to come to grips with reality at a level so much deeper than that of experience or of scientific enquiry? By reflective, abstractive thought upon the fundamental, spontaneous

contact of the mind with being. For, after all, the philosopher is, or ought to be, a revised edition of the man in the street. He is the man in the street endeavouring to convert, if possible, his natural certitudes into reasoned certitudes resting on first principles or, if he cannot entirely convert them, pruning them of what is slipshod and vague, of whatever inaccuracy in them is due to a limited horizon of knowledge and observation. It is this work of making explicit and distinct, in the light of the first principles of mind and reality, the implicit and confused primary certitudes of the natural reason that constitutes any specifically philosophic enquiry. Such a view supposes that the radical explanation of the nature of reality, if it is at all attainable, will be the fruit of the abstractive power of the mind to gather universally and objectively valid meaningfulness from the individual and fragmentary contributions of experience. It supposes, too, that the mind so enriched with understanding can, under the governance of its own innate laws, legitimately affirm of concrete singular reality the intelligible content of abstract thought. Although the mind, in the process of speculative reflection and analysis, cuts away from the material conditionings of experience, it preserves, nevertheless, the inner meaning of experienced reality and consciously possesses this meaning in the vital synthesis of objective affirmation. For instance, when I say that, philosophically speaking, man's freedom involves moral responsibility, I am affirming as objectively true and universally valid a certain law of human conduct. In saying this, I am equivalently asserting the objective validity of such abstract concepts as man, freedom, right and wrong, moral law. I am asserting, moreover, that there are grades of reality ; that man, for example, is essentially different from the brute ; that there is a human nature common to all individual men, stable in its fundamental characteristics and consistent in its necessary exigencies—no matter with what variety of condition and circumstance it may be realised in the singular instances of Jones or Brown or Robinson. I am saying that reality is, of itself, intelligible ; that ultimately, reality and intelligibility go hand in hand and, therefore, that reality cannot finally be absurd and contradictory. Reality is meaningful, and its meaning can be grasped by the mind. Abstract thought does not distort reality but, rather, distils from concrete, singular being the concentrated spirit of truth. This truth finds its authentic expression in objective affirmation concerning reality.

II

The existentialist's approach to the problem of the meaning of reality is in direct opposition. He starts with a profound distrust of abstract speculation. He is convinced that in abstract thought the mind loses all vital contact with reality. And this initial lack of confidence is not a

mere matter of temperament or of pose. It is at once a protest against the up-in-the-air theorisings of exaggerated rationalism, an assimilation and development of the introspective and subjective doctrine of certain nineteenth century thinkers, and a personal, lived reaction to the tragic impacts within the history of our own times. The chronic temptation of the classical philosopher has always been to get above himself; to legislate, from within the splendid isolation of abstract speculation, for the ever-changing and unpredictable world of everyday existence. Reason has always tended to abound in its own sense; to reduce the cat to a grin and then to take the grin for the cat. From out its own substance it has produced, and adored, the Absolute, with a capital A. "One day," says Jean Wahl, "a man, Kierkegaard, was deeply dissatisfied with the ideas of Hegel. Hegel had shown that the truth is the whole, be it in art, in science, in history, and that beyond the particular wholes there is the absolute whole which contains everything. But Kierkegaard said: 'I am no part of a whole, I am not integrated, not included. To put me in the whole you imagine is to negate me'". (One is reminded of Sam Goldwyn's historic disclaimer: "Include me out"). The existentialist has echoed and amplified the protesting voice of Kierkegaard. He has accepted, too, and prolonged the "Know thyself" school of thought running, in France, from Maine de Biran through Ravaisson up to Bergson, and, in Germany, from Kierkegaard through Dilthey and Simmel up to Husserl. He has made particularly his own Bergson's suspicion of the intelligence which, being abstractive, mummifies the real by taking static snapshots of what is essentially kinetic. This attitude of insistence on the singular and personal has been strengthened for the existentialist by contemporary events and tendencies. Within a couple of generations man has been subjected to a crushing pressure of barbarity and bureaucracy—a pressure that has tended to shatter all the supports of human values and personal dignity, to make of man an item in a political or social inventory. Man has been reduced to a bundle of functions. "The rather horrible expression 'time table,'" writes Marcel, "perfectly describes his life. So many hours for each function. Sleep too is a function which must be discharged so that other functions may be exercised in their turn. The same with pleasure, with relaxation . . . I need hardly insist on the stifling impression of sadness produced by this functionalised world. It is sufficient to recall the dreary image of the retired official, or those urban Sundays when the passers-by look like people who have retired from life." Existentialism is a revolt against this process of depersonalisation. Georghiu's *Twenty-fifth Hour* is one of the more recent and powerful expressions of this revolt. Such, in brief outline, is the context within which existentialism should be viewed and appreciated.

The story is told of how one day Berdiaeff was stopped by one of his students and asked: "What is your position, Professor, with regard to

existentialism?" "Existentialism?" he replied, "Why, that's me!" Authentic or not, this anecdote marks the proper theme of existentialist enquiry—the 'self'. Existence is *my* existence. Reality is what exists. But for me—and, after all, I am the only one who counts—what exists is myself who *am* only within the determined limits of my finitude. Reality, the only reality which has any sense for me, is my own personal, lived condition of existence: not merely the momentary, fleeting, surface situations of banal experience, but that fundamental root-situation which embodies for me my unescapable sense of limitation.[1] This ultimate situation is that I am *launched* into the world *on my own*, free, autonomous and, finally, inexplicable. This free, inexplicable 'I' exists, and it is only this existence that is of interest or meaning to me. Existence, then, is not a general state or atmosphere, opposed to abstract possibility, into which beings are placed. Neither is it the unsubstantial, Hegelian idea of absolutely undetermined being; nor, lastly, is it a certain ultimate perfection or act shared by all existents in essentially diverse degrees. No; it is that singular, definite, basic situation which defines my own personal reality. Of this reality, of the only reality, I can have no concept. I can only have lived contact with it. In it and by it I live, move and have my being. And it will be in terms of this root-situation of mine that my nature will be both defined and developed. This is the elementary meaning of the now famous existentialist dictum that 'existence precedes essence'. "Atheistic existentialism, which I represent," writes Sartre, ". . . states that if God does not exist, there is at least one being in whom existence precedes essence, a being who exists before he can be defined by any concept, and that this being is man or, as Heidegger says, human reality. What is meant here by saying that existence precedes essence? It means that, first of all, man exists, turns up, appears on the scene and, only afterwards, defines himself. If man, as the existentialist conceives him is indefinable, it is because at first he is nothing. Only afterwards will he be something, and he himself will have made what he will be. Thus, there is no human nature, since there is no God to conceive it. Not only is man what he conceives himself to be, but he is also only what he wills himself to be after this thrust toward existence."

The ultimate existential situation, namely, that I am launched into the world on my own, free and inexplicable, takes on a different colouring according to the mind and type of the individual existentialist. Thus, for example, for Heidegger it will be *anguish*; for Sartre, *absurdity*; for Marcel, *incarnation* and *communion*. Amid this variety, however, there

[1] What is said in this sketch of existentialist doctrine applies primarily to Sartre and his atheistic confrères: Simone de Beauvoir, Camus and, in Germany, Heidegger. It is this atheistic form of existentialism that is most familiar to the popular mind. The underlying themes of subjectivity and freedom, however, are common to all forms of existentialism. On this account the writings of Marcel, an ardent Catholic, may be used to illustrate one or other point in general existentialist thought.

are certain constants : first, that the essential characteristic of man is his freedom ; and secondly, that the basic existential situation, which is man, cannot be the object of speculation. Man carries within him a terrible weight of freedom. Sartre puts it with his usual vigour : " If existence really does precede essence, there is no explaining things away by reference to a fixed and given human nature. In other words, there is no determinism, man is free, man is freedom. On the other hand, if God does not exist, we find no values or commands to turn to which legitimize our conduct . . . We are alone, with no excuses. This is the idea I try to convey when I say that man is condemned to be free." I am committed willy-nilly to my own inexorable freedom, to a freedom which has no other object than itself. " This is the very starting-point of existentialism. Indeed, everything is permissible, if God does not exist, and as a result man is forlorn, because neither within him nor without does he find anything to cling to." (For Marcel, on the contrary, man is not mesmerised by his own freedom ; he is constituted by his freedom, but by a freedom which is an open surrender to others—and, finally, to God). Man is dreadfully alone within the rigid bonds of his own freedom. What am I ? I just *am* ; a frightening awareness of barren, undetermined choice in the process of being made ; and my freedom consists simply in the fact that the choice is always unconditional, always absurd—since it is beyond all reasons, and since it is impossible not to choose. The hard core of my being, then, is this inevitable condition of utter unattachedness, of awful independence, without inheritance and without roots, whose only future is its insistent self-assertion. My role as man is to live this absurd and anguished freedom to the full. Here lies, for what it is worth, my dignity and my pride.

But this existence of mine, reality, is not an object to be contemplated ; it is a situation to be lived. ' *Ob*-ject ' means ' opposed to ', ' over against ', and, therefore, ' exterior to '. Now, I cannot exteriorize that reality which, precisely, constitutes the deepest intimacy of my being. If I am to know reality, I must remember that I, the subject, am essentially a part of the very problem I am studying. If this problem becomes for me an *object*, by that very fact I have closed the only door through which I might have reached a solution. Philosophy, the search for the meaning of reality, cannot be a system based on conceptual analysis, because conceptual thinking withdraws me from the existential scene, from myself, and turns me into a mere spectator of reality—whereas I *am* reality. As an existentialist, my approach to the problem of reality must be by a method of expliciting a direct intuitive contact with myself within experience. I, the enquiring subject, am involved in the enquiry itself and must remain all the while, therefore, in a lived intimacy with myself. I must remain present to myself in a felt realisation of the fundamental, concrete situation which defines me. My method of enquiry, then, must

necessarily be *descriptive*, and must consist in the uncovering, in the allowing to *appear*, of the subject in the throes of its isolated and inexplicable liberty. It is a method, therefore, of discovering appearances, a *phenomenological* method.

In the light of the foregoing remarks, our initial questions might be given these summary answers: What does the existentialist mean by philosophy? He means the progressive, descriptive elucidation of a primary, direct, felt contact with reality. What does he mean by existence? He means each individual man's own personal, lived, basic condition of freedom. What, then, is existentialism or the philosophy of existence? It is the descriptive unfolding, from within experience, of the intuitive awareness each man has of his own fundamental, lived situation of freedom.

III

Like most other 'isms', existentialism has had its theoreticians: Sartre in *L'Etre et le Néant*, Heidegger in *Sein und Zeit* and *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit*, Jaspers in the three volumes of his *Philosophie* and in *Vernunft und Existenz*. Ordinarily, however, existentialism does not reach its public through such scholarly channels. A philosophy of the singular and concrete, existentialism quite naturally finds its commonest and, indeed, most suitable expression in the novel, the play and the diary. These forms of literary presentation most aptly bring out the salient characteristics of a thinker's intimate and profound experience. Through them the mind of the reader or spectator will most easily be aroused to enter into sympathetic resonance with the original, lived experience of the writer and, thus, to grasp affectively and savour, as it were, his own inner reality—to become, in short, an existentialist in his turn. Since, for the existentialist, reality is to be *monstrated* rather than demonstrated, the strongest evidence of authentic existence will be example. Marcel has put this excellently in his recent *Gifford Lectures*. "In this connection," he writes, "I would like to make the point that for a philosophical approach like ours, which is essentially a concrete rather than an abstract approach, the use of examples is not merely an auxiliary process but, on the contrary, an essential part of our method of progressing. An example, for us, is not merely an illustration of an idea which was fully in being even before it was illustrated. I would rather compare the pre-existing idea to a seed; I have to plant it in the genial soil that is constituted by the example before I can really see what sort of a seed it is; I keep a watch on the soil to see what the seed grows up into." Before going on to evaluate existentialism as a philosophy, it might be instructive to see the existentialist at work—practising, on paper at least, what he preaches.

We are what we are; we are condemned to be ourselves. This central existentialist theme, tragic though it may be in its final atheistic

implications, is conveyed lightly and humourously by Sartre in that far from humourous book, *L'Etre et le Néant*. " Look at this waiter who is serving us. His gestures are lively, insistent and a little too precise. He comes to get his orders a little too quickly, he bends down a little too readily ; his voice, his glance are a little too solicitous. Now he is coming back with the drinks, imitating in his walk the inflexible rigour of an automaton, carrying his tray with the agility of a conjurer, keeping it in a state of precarious equilibrium which he restores with a flick of his wrist and arm. His whole manner is a performance. His movements are linked together like the parts of a mechanism, even to his expression and his voice ; he affects the incredible neatness and swiftness of inanimate objects. He is play-acting, he is enjoying himself ; what, then, is his role ? Whom is he impersonating ? The answer is simple : he is impersonating a waiter in a café." This is just an example, you will say. Certainly ; but it is a fruitful example. If I allow myself to coincide, as it were, with the situation described by Sartre, I shall come to realise more fully that human existence is what a man makes himself—whether on the unauthentic plane of surface experience or at the deeper level of concentrated self-awareness. Take, for instance, *Le Sursis* where Mathieu is contemplating suicide. " Rest ? Why not ? This obscure suicide, this too would be an absolute. It would be a law, an ethic, a choice. It would be enough to bend down a little, and the choice would be made for all eternity. . . . This act was in front of him, projected on the dark water, it was the pattern of his future. All the links with the past were cut, there was nothing in the world to hold him back, therein lay—appallingly—his freedom. . . . The water was his future. Now—it is true—I shall kill myself. All at once he decided against it. He decided that it had been only a test. He found himself standing upright, walking, slipping on the crust of a dead planet. It would be for another time." Here is man reduced to final, ineluctable choice ; his reality is to be identified with the here-and-now decision that must be taken. His existence *is* his freedom ; he cannot sidestep it, for he is condemned to be free. Again, in the theme of *No Exit*, we are given the picture of an earthly Hell, fashioned out of the stark isolation from one another of three people. It is a play in which man's existential freedom is portrayed in a sort of symbolic paroxysm of irrevocable choice. Garcin is a deserter ; Ines, a Lesbian ; Estelle, an infanticide. They are thrown together, just that, for no reason, haphazardly. Each one has become, eternally, a kind of solidified final, personal choice. They *are* what they have made themselves : Garcin *exists as* his own act of desertion ; Ines *is identically* her own unnatural vice ; Estelle's *whole reality* is to be child-murderess. Frozen in an unending solitariness, there is no possibility of communion between them. Yet, they are forever together, forever mutually spied upon. Such is the despairing issue of man's freedom.

Marcel's existential analyses are gentler but no less shrewd in the way they pierce below the surface and uncover the hidden roots of man's ontological condition. How easily and unobtrusively he gets the reader to enter into himself, to reach down (as he puts it in his *Diary*) to " the depths of a given fundamental metaphysical situation of which it is inadequate to say ' it is mine ', since it consists essentially in *being me* ". That basic self-identity, which gives me my essential grip on being and constitutes me what I am, is presented lightly, in an almost careless example. " The child, let us say, runs up to his mother and offers her a flower. ' Look ', he says, ' that was me, I picked it '. His tone and his gestures are very significant ; he is pointing himself out as somebody who deserves the admiration and gratitude of grown-ups. Look, it is I, I in person, I, all present and correct here, who have picked this flower '. Above all, don't believe for a moment that it was Jim or Lucy who picked it. The child's, ' I did it ', in fact, excludes in the most definite fashion the deplorable misunderstanding by which *my* exploit could be attributed to others. . . . Let us take the example of the amateur composer who has just been singing, in a throaty voice, a song for which he has written the tune. Some artless listener asks, was that by Debussy ? ' Oh, no ', says the composer, bridling and smirking, ' that was a little thing of my own '. Here again the ego is trying to attract to itself the praise, the surprised and admiring comments of a something *other* than itself, that it uses as a sounding-board ". Or, again, to bring out the meaning of *presence*, Marcel will quietly analyse that quality we call ' charm '. " The tensed-up person cannot be charming, ever. Charm is a kind of margin to personality, it is the presence of a person spreading out beyond what he actually says and what he actually does. . . . It is an overplus, a beyond . . . Someone has charm if he sprawls out easily beyond his virtues, if these seem to spring from some distant, unknown source. And only the individual, in direct contact with another individual, can feel his charm ". It is always the same : human reality cannot be demonstrated ; it must be allowed to appear, to become manifest. Only by remaining in the concrete can we hope to touch the singular, concrete existence which is man.

IV

Are we in a position now to pass any judgment of value on existentialism ? I think so. But it would be well to remind ourselves again that it is mainly atheistic existentialism of the Sartrian type that is under discussion. It will be obvious by this time that, strictly speaking, there are as many forms of existentialism as there are individual existentialists and that, therefore, there can be no one account nor any one assessment which would cover all variations of existentialist thought. The theistic existentialists—Marcel particularly and, at least in many respects, Jaspers

—cannot justly be made to fall under the strictures which may be passed on, say, Sartre's account of human freedom. They recognise in man's freedom a radical insufficiency, a cry for completion; and, thus, they leave man essentially open to salvation, essentially stretched towards something beyond which calls for free surrender. (Has it not sometimes been the realization of an exacting invitation offered to the free, personal gift of self that has proved the starting-point and occasion of a religious vocation?). With this appreciation, then, of the necessary discrimination to be made between one thinker and another, we may try to answer our last question: As a philosophy, what is existentialism worth?

On the Continent especially, where it is current and well known, existentialism exercises an immense attraction. And small wonder. Its observational analyses of man are, for the most part, masterly. Not only does it describe with sure insight the surface manifestations of life; it cuts down through the layers of accustomed, almost mechanical behaviour to the bedrock of fundamental human experience. It brings a man face to face with himself in the ultimate mystery of his existence. Here, I must often say to myself on reading a passage in Sartre or Camus, here is myself, my essential self, stripped of my daily subterfuges and insincerities. Here I am confronted with the authentic 'I', introduced to the last secret places of my being, where I really *am*. I am given a privileged revelation of myself, in which all irrelevancies are suppressed and I see myself in my utter contingence and, at the same time, in my complete responsibility for my own personal existence. The existentialist view of man, it seems, is the courageous view, which does not blink the consequences of its findings, no matter how repellent they be.

It would seem to be, therefore, the only uncompromising realism. The existentialist seeks no spurious refuge from the exigencies of life in an unreal and deceptive world of abstractions and first principles. There is only one first principle: I *am*, and everything else *is* in the exact measure of its insertion in the lived conditions of my existential situation. To coin an expressive terminology: I *ex*-sist—that is, stand out on my own as the central reality and ultimate term of reference; everything else *in*-sists—that is, *is* only in so far as it is part of my basic metaphysical condition. Philosophy, in the past, has withdrawn from *ex*-sistence and *in*-sistence and has confined itself to the useless contemplation of the myth of empty being.

Moreover, the existentialist writings have this great advantage over traditional philosophy's method of presentation: they show us the philosopher in the very process of his search instead of handing us ready-made solutions—solutions which are subjected to a treatment of detached conceptual analysis and to which we can give, at best, only a notional assent. Beside the passionate *involvement* of the existentialist, the traditional philosopher appears unwarrantably disinterested. I am *engaged*

in existence, and that engagement is of supreme importance to me. I want to understand what I *am* and, surely, I have more chance of understanding by being handled down towards the springs of human experience than by being, first, taken for granted and, then, coolly dissected like a zoological specimen.

Existentialism has, undoubtedly, genuine merits and is not without even its felicities. There is no denying the strength and penetration of its analyses of human experience, and many a traditional philosopher might do worse than adopt the existentialist technique in the preliminary approach to his subject. Philosophy should be a living and lived search for the meaning of reality; only too often it degenerates into a lifeless juggling with abstractions. Existentialism, too, has the immense value of forcing me to take up a position in face of myself, of others, of the world around me—of God (for it should be noted, even atheistic existentialism, by its very denial of God, involves the problem of religion). My basic freedom is a perpetual challenge to come out into the open and make decisive choice between the insistent alternatives of existence. For this very reason, existentialism must make me conscious both of the necessity of philosophy and of its difficulty.

But that is as much as we can grant it. It is not a genuine philosophy nor can it ever be one, while remaining faithful to its own nature and presuppositions. It is not a philosophy, because it stops at the precise point at which should be put the central and proper philosophic question: What is reality? For, let us suppose that by a process of existential analysis I reach the source of my own being. Now, at that moment, I am consciously identified with reality; reality, at last, is significant. Of this I am convinced. But what is my conviction worth? Is it an intellectual conviction? If so, its validity must be intellectually guaranteed. This guarantee cannot be, for the existentialist, the transparency of intellectual intuition, because he does not admit such an intuition. The only other purely intellectual guarantee is metaphysical affirmation under the norm of the first principles of reason. But this necessarily involves conceptual thinking and is, therefore, also excluded. The other alternative is that my conviction is not purely intellectual; it is, rather, a global affective sense of my own reality, a kind of self-saturation. But I cannot translate this into terms of meaningfulness. I know only *that* I have come upon myself; I do not know *what* I have come upon. If this is the only grasp I ever get upon myself, I can never say: '*This* is what I mean by reality'. All I can say is, 'Ah!' Wonder of mind may be the best preparatory attitude for a philosopher, but wonder is not philosophy.

The existentialist has been reduced to this impasse by his method, a sort of inverted heritage from Kant. Kant had politely but firmly bowed out metaphysics when he denied to abstractive thought the power of penetrating to the real order. Conceptual thinking, he held, was valid

only in the phenomenal order, in the order of appearances—(what the existentialist would now call the order of unauthentic existence). He did not say there was no real order ; he merely said that the speculative reason could never know it. This was his agnostic reaction to the excessive rationalism of Wolff. The existentialist accepts the Kantian rejection of conceptual thought as a means of reaching reality but preserves, as he thinks, the possibility of metaphysics through his special existential intuition. But there is no philosophic guarantee for such an intuition. It is curious, too, how the existentialist is still a prey to the old idealist paralogism about objectivity. I alone exist, we are told ; other things are only in so far as they enter the field of my existential situation. They are essentially relative to me. To take this for granted is to confuse two quite different statements : nothing *is for me* unless it is related to me ; nothing *is* unless it is related to me. Unconsciously, consciousness has been made constitutive of reality.

Another point, too, might be made. For the atheistic existentialist, the fact that I am condemned to be free shows the utter absurdity of my basic human situation. I am absolute insufficiency. Absolute means unattached, independent and, therefore, sufficient to itself. I am, then, completely sufficient insufficiency. Sufficient in what? In my insufficiency. Insufficient in what? Presumably, in props to my reality. The more real I am, therefore, the less grounds there are for my reality. My proper definition is meaninglessness. Sartre might thus triumphantly show that man is fundamentally absurd ; he would equally triumphantly show that existentialism cannot be a philosophy, that is, a search for the meaning of reality.

As a philosophy, then, what is existentialism worth? As a preliminary method for the realistic presentation of philosophic problems, it is invaluable. In keeping me close to the concrete, it helps to save me from the lure of abstract mental play-acting, divorced from the very reality I am supposed to be investigating. By insisting on my personal engagement in existence, it gives a bite and urgency to philosophic problems, since I see myself to be personally involved in them. By laying stress on my fundamental contingency and freedom, it warns me not to hold myself aloof, in my philosophizing, from the vital decision of personal surrender to something beyond myself. All this it does, and does well. We should not be afraid to say, however, that existentialism is not a philosophy. It has failed to recognise that the mind is made for truth ; that conceptual knowledge is not mere barren generalization, emptied of all existential content, but, through affirmation, a conscious possession of the real.—And if to our knowledge we should join our wills and hearts in the personal surrender of that freedom which is not sufficient to itself, we shall come not only to possess the Real but to be possessed by Him.

JOSEPH O'MARA

PSYCHOPATHOLOGY AND MYSTICAL PHENOMENA

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BOTH experimental psychology and psychopathology have made valuable contributions to our knowledge of the phenomena of visual and auditory hallucinations, while the " depth "-psychologists, by analytic studies and medical and psychiatric researches in psycho-' somatic ' problems have thrown a good deal of light on the complex physiological consequences of emotional states. Some at least of this knowledge is relevant in a proper assessment of the nature and value of certain sensory and intellectual processes met with in the lives of some saintly people, and allied or similar processes met with in the lives of some who are not so saintly.

I

The greatest difficulty in practice in considering psychical, psychological and mystical phenomena is not, as one might suppose, the inherent difficulty of the subject-matter, but rather the purely semantic one of knowing what one is talking about. Words are used in psychological and mystical literature which seem to be the same as those of ordinary intelligent speech, but on examination it emerges that the objects they denote are very different. The word mystical illustrates the point fairly well. Too often it is used as the logical contrary of real, or clear, or literal, or a combination of these, while a mystic is confused with a visionary, and a visionary in turn is taken to be one who is too aetherial to be occupied with mundane affairs, or too idealistic to seek for an attainable ideal. Most people, it would seem, confuse mystical with mythical or mysterious, while many seem to think that it has something to do with " misty," as in the phrase a " misty day," when visibility is low, and the outlook obscure. The whole problem is still further obscured by the use of mystical to describe certain poets, or certain kinds of poetry. A poet is not a mystic because his poetry is about abstract or theological concepts, nor even because it seems to derive from a supernatural interpretation of sensory experience, as in Joseph Mary Plunkett's " I see His blood upon the rose," but only if the content of the poems he writes is the result of an inspired experience wrought by the Holy Ghost in his intellect and will, as in St. John of the Cross. Need I add that being a visionary has nothing whatever to do with abstract painting, or El Greco landscapes, or fortune-telling, or adolescent dreams of youths with arms outstretched, silhouetted against the rising sun. Being a visionary means seeing visions, and seeing visions has a lot in common with the phenomena of illusion, hallucination

and imagery. Being a mystic, on the other hand, need not include seeing visions, or being suspended in mid-air in ecstasy. Being a mystic means being a soul so purified that intellect and will are subjected to the power of the Holy Spirit, who infuses a mode of prayer, and sometimes a degree of knowledge, which the unaided human being does not achieve. This can and does take place without the extraneous and unnecessary aid of visions and " interior voices," though most mystics have perhaps had the aid of these secondary and accidental phenomena (this is the teaching of St. Teresa and St. John of the Cross) in order to lead them to mystical contemplation.

With regard to the phenomena of mysticism in its proper sense (inspired contemplation), psychology and psychopathology have nothing positive to contribute, and for the very good reason that infused contemplation is brought about by grace, which does not destroy, but perfects and elevates the natural capacities. But in the other field, that of visions and revelations, they have an important role, and it is heartening to find this recognized in a very sane and balanced little book* by Father Gabriel, O.D.C. The content of the book is a series of lectures delivered by Father Gabriel to his students at the International College of St. Teresa, Rome. His purpose is to delineate the function of visions and revelations in the spiritual life, rather than to expound their nature and psychology, but he is very much alive to the possibility of mistaking hysterical or hallucinatory phenomena for visions and revelations whose source is divine. And not only that, but he is prepared to accept the possibility that God may use the natural phenomena of the senses and imagination to achieve his ends, so that in a given case a vision, for example, might be the same kind of phenomenon as an hallucination—in other words, a very natural and almost normal event in psychopathology, but used by God, as he might use any other phenomena of the natural order, for a purpose of his own.

Father Gabriel's book will serve a very useful purpose in aiding spiritual directors, and through them the faithful, to get visions and revelations in proper perspective. In the very first page of his preface, Father Gabriel tells us that " even in our own day, there is too much credulity in this department, and it is a credulity that leads to deplorable consequences, which are inimical to the real progress of the spiritual life "—and just before that he says : " Although the attitude of these mental scientists with respect to such extraordinary graces has become increasingly severe, nevertheless we cannot say that among spiritual persons an attitude of prudence in regard to these matters is as yet general." The whole purpose of the book, indeed, might be defined as a serious attempt to produce this proper attitude of prudence.

* *Visions and Revelations in the Spiritual Life.* Cork : Mercier Press. 1950. 8/6

Father Gabriel does not discuss in detail the psychology and psychopathology of visions, revelations and their analogous phenomena on the natural plane. But he tells us that " we must not forget that man carries about with him all the idiosyncracies of his own nature, even into his spiritual life, and the religious colouring wherewith he paints certain morbid phenomena does not alter their worthlessness." This is salutory advice. Anyone who thinks that the Church too readily accepts phenomena such as apparitions, private revelations, or stigmata, would do well to remember that Father Gabriel reminds us of nothing new in this field, but only underlines, on the authority of the Mystical Doctor of the Church, St. John of the Cross, and the great St. Teresa, what has always been the strict ecclesiastical position. The stigmata of St. Francis of Assisi, St. Catherine of Siena, and St. Gemma Galgani are recognised authoritatively, but besides these there are few, if any, others. Father Thurston, S.J., I think, has pointed out somewhere that in Belgium alone in the nineteenth century there were two hundred alleged stigmatists, not one of whom was declared authentic by the Church. And the number of apparitions of Our Lady which have been officially sanctioned, compared with the number of claims made, gives startling statistical evidence of the caution of ecclesiastical authority in this field.

II

It may help readers of Father Gabriel's book, or anyone interested in such problems, to state some of the facts that must be borne in mind in connection with visions and revelations. From philosophy and psychology we learn something of the normal processes of cognition of the human mind. In the interaction of organism and environment, certain nerve-endings (called the peripheral receptors) respond to their adequate and proper stimuli, physical, electro-magnetic, or chemical, as the case may be. The result of this stimulation is the process called sensation. As a cognitive process, however, this must be distinguished from the mere mechanism of stimulus and response as studied in physiology. This latter mediates sensation as a cognitive process, and must not itself be identified with sensation, as too often happens in physiological text-books. The cognitive process presupposes the intact organ, and the intact organism, while the physiological process can be studied as an isolated mechanism, or even parallelled by non-organic physical, chemical and electro-magnetic processes. In the intact conscious organism, the process of perception supervenes at once on the process of sensation. This means that instead of becoming aware of mere sensory data—colours, sounds, smells—or of the stimulation of the end receptors, we become aware instead of things—meanings, or meaningful experiences. We " see " tables, chairs, people, oranges and lemons, and not just patches of colour of various dimensions.

The psychology of perception is vastly complicated, both by subjective factors and processes, and by external conditions. Always, however, a synthesis of sensory data is effected, and memory and imagination play their part. Memory enables us to recall similar phenomena, and recognize the present material, while imagination supplements the present fragmentary sensory material with data from the same or other sensory modalities. Intellect, by abstraction from the sensory material, forms concepts which lead to understanding and generalization. One cannot stress too often the fact that there is no knowledge in the mind other than what has been received through the external senses, moulded in perception, or abstracted by intellect. There is no other channel through which knowledge of any kind can be naturally attained. The alleged phenomena of telepathy and para-psychology generally would require an extensive treatment on their own. It is enough to say for the moment that there is no such thing as extra-sensory perception (with all due respect for the scientific integrity of J. B. Rhine and his followers). The temptation to think that somehow the mind is equipped naturally with some form of innate knowledge has constantly misled philosophers and perhaps other generally more reasonable people, from Plato through Descartes to the Archetypal images of the Universal Unconscious of Jung.

But the fact that there is no innate cognitive content in the human mind, and that all its natural knowledge is acquired through sensory experience and the subsequent normal cognitive processes, does not mean that praeternaturally or supernaturally no other kind of knowledge can be acquired. If, however, God or some other intellectual agent wishes to give a further kind of knowledge to a human being, how can it take place? Man's nature being what it is, and God's omnipotence being what it is, the only possibilities (apart from a radical change in human nature itself) are either (*a*) the production of the effects of a normal stimulation of the peripheral receptors without an adequate stimulus, or (*b*) the production of the sensory synthesis which would normally be the result of perception without adequate sensory material to work on, or (*c*) the direct production in the intellect of a conceptual content without the process of abstraction from sensory material. In fact all three types of knowledge are found in the lives of visionaries and mystics, and the first two are also found in morbid states of pathological personalities. Moreover, the first two, but not the third, can be produced by disembodied finite intelligences. The third since it involves intellect is immediately subject only to God. (Intellect and will being rational, and therefore the capacities which specifically render man a person, are safeguarded by the inviolability of personality. They may, however, be indirectly affected though the production of effects in sensory and perpetual processes, on which they depend extrinsically for their material. Hence the dangers for both in the phenomena of obsession and possession).

When a cognitive content is produced in either of the first two ways, it is called in the case of (*a*) an external vision, and in the case of (*b*) an imaginary vision. The term " imaginary vision " is psychologically acceptable, but colloquially misleading. " Imaginary " is one of the words referred to at the outset as different in ordinary speech and in technical language. Here it does not mean unreal, or fictitious, or fabricated, but is simply the adjectival form of the noun imagination (the capacity of the mind to re-instate in consciousness the product of sensory stimulation in the absence of an adequate stimulus), and it means simply " the product of imagination". An image of this kind can be infused by God, or by the devil, but its character will be such as *might have been* produced by a human imagination given the requisite material. An external vision, on the other hand, and regarded strictly as a phenomenon different in mode from the imaginary vision, can be of three kinds. There is nothing to prevent the omnipotence of God, or the unknown power of the devil, from stimulating a peripheral receptor, so that the effect will be such as might have been produced by an adequate stimulus. Clearly this will give an " external vision "—*i.e.*, the cognitive experience of seeing something, with no natural cause to account for it. The second possible kind is the production of a sensory object or percept (*e.g.*, picture, statue, or apparition) which then stimulates the receptors in the normal way. The third kind of external vision, however, is the very commonplace phenomenon of hallucination. As Father Gabriel has pointed out, both visions of this kind and hallucinations " may be the work of the same psychological mechanism." But he adds, " the cause which sets the mechanism in motion is completely different."

In order to understand the nature of hallucination, some understanding of the normal functioning of imagery is necessary first. In ordinary language we use the word image either for an object which is designed to resemble in some way some other object; or if we are thinking of mental images, we use it almost exclusively for visual images. It is important to note at once that psychologically an image can belong to any one of the sensory modalities—visual, auditory, tactile, etc. An image in the psychological sense is any sensory representation of any kind which emerges in consciousness otherwise than by the stimulation of a peripheral receptor. Normally (in the sense of " for the most part ") this kind of sensory representation will be less vivid, less intense, less complete than the immediate result of perception ("the percept "). But this need not be so. There are several kinds of image which can be just as vivid as the percept—sometimes more so. These are still " normal," in the sense that, while they may not be found " for the most part," they are certainly not abnormal phenomena. The " primary memory " image is of this kind—the image we unconsciously carry of the first few words of a sentence, while listening to the end. The image of an object in an

artist's mind when, in the popular phrase, he " paints from memory," or which he bears of his model while studying his canvas even when he paints from life is of this order. But especially the " eidetic " image which is found in about 50 per cent. of all children and young adolescents illustrates the point. The child so gifted can look at a complicated pattern (*e.g.*, a picture, or a series of small objects) for a space of time too brief to allow the accurate study of even a fraction of the whole, and can then " project " the image on to a neutral ground and read off the details. For the most part this must be done quickly after the stimulation of the receptors. But the image may reappear later, at unknown intervals of time. This image is plastic, modifiable, and can assume a vividness of colouring or accurate delineation of line greater than that of the original stimulus-pattern. It can be either voluntary or involuntary. If the " ground " is moved, *e.g.*, through an angle of 90 degrees, the child will turn his head and " follow " the revolving image. This, however, is not hallucination. The child retains complete insight, and knows he is not " seeing " an objective picture. In the case of hallucination insight is the first thing to go, and the individual really believes he is experiencing a trans-subjective percept. But the point at the moment is simply this : the degree of vividness of an image is not the measure of its normality.

In the ordinary operation of mind an image does not occur as an isolated phenomenon, but as one event in a complicated structure, in which emotion, impulse, instinct and desire can play a part. The emotional tone and motor set of an image are perfectly normal factors, in both senses of normal mentioned above. The important fact, however, is that while normally an image arouses an emotion, the causal sequence can readily operate the other way, so that the experience of an emotion can produce a flood of imagery. The lover, experiencing a flood of tender emotion, sees the loved one in every face in a crowd. This is the case also with children, who, on experiencing loneliness or a loss of the sense of security in the dark, proceed to experience the emotion of fear, which at once peoples their " imagination " (and the room) with spectres and ogres. Exactly the same phenomenon takes place in anxiety-states at adult levels (especially the so-called free-floating anxiety), and in some phases of paranoia and schizophrenia. The process is the same in the normal and abnormal states ; only the content, and the degree of insight into the reality or transsubjectivity of the projected image is different.

There is no reason to expect among holy people a higher percentage of normally balanced minds than throughout the rest of the population. If anything, one might expect, at any rate in some social conditions, a higher percentage of maladjusted people leaning for support on religion. There are then two factors to be reckoned with : a person of unbalanced emotional pattern may, under the stimulus of an emotion, produce an image (in the literal sense) whose content will be that of the kind of imagery

most prevalent in his mind—and in the case of a religious person given to the practice of " composition of place " in meditation, or who mistakes imagery for thinking, this will most likely be imagery of a religious character. The process of projection (as described above) can then bring about hallucination. The other possibility is that children and young adolescents whose eidetic imagery is particularly vivid, may project on to a neutral background (*e.g.*, a dark recess, or a cloud) an eidetic image corresponding to a statue or picture they have seen. It is worth noting that the so-called phenomenon of " photographic memory " is nothing but a carry over of the gift of eidetic imagery into adulthood. It is not to be wondered at, therefore, that some adults will produce hallucinations of this type. For the sake of clarity, it must be stated that the word hallucination is used here because an eidetic image in which insight into its subjective character is lacking conforms fully to the psychology of hallucination. Moreover, hallucination does not necessarily mean a morbid state of mental health, any more than illusion does.

III

With regard to private revelations, much the same considerations must be borne in mind. By private revelations is here meant the phenomena experienced by mystics, visionaries and others, of hearing voices. The voice may be heard as a third party speaking in the ordinary transsubjective way, or it may be heard " within ". St. Teresa mentions a third kind of voice, in which the words are planted in the very centre of the soul, in their full meaning and authoritatively. This last seems to be part of the phenomenon of direct divine illumination of the intellect and is not under consideration here. The first two, however, must be considered. The first may be the production, by Divine or diabolic power, of the normal physical stimulus for hearing—vibrations of an elastic medium. Or it may be the direct excitation of the basilar membrane by the same sources. The third phenomenon, however, may be either divine, diabolical, or simply human in source. It may be simply human in the same way as visual hallucination can be simply human, but more easily. The reason for this is that the " interior " voice may be nothing more than a very vivid auditory image—produced by and for the imagination, but not recognised as such because we rarely in fact attend to our auditory imagery. But that we can do so is evidenced, *e.g.*, by the fact that a trained musician can enjoy the melody while merely reading the score visually, or that any of us can hear with the mind's ear (and without humming a note) at least a portion of a familiar melody. As with visual imagery, so also with auditory, people's capacity varies enormously, and one should not estimate the possible intensity and vividness in either modality simply by thinking of one's own. Rather one should

remember Socrates' *daimonion*, whose voice was so real to him that he followed its advice. Moreover, hearing voices is one of the regular symptoms of schizophrenia. To the schizophrenic, these voices are as real as a normal voice to a healthy person, or a " supernatural " voice to a visionary. That Socrates' *daimonion* may have been a schizophrenic phenomenon is borne out also by the evidence of his cataleptic trances. One does not wish to suggest that St. Joan of Arc's voices were also symptomatic of a schizoid personality (though it is possible that other phenomena in the saint's life might also be fitted into this picture). But it is important to remember that there is nothing intrinsically impossible or repugnant in thinking that Almighty God could and would make use of such a means to guide a chosen one—for the schizophrenic is a sick person, and the Lord certainly exalts the weak to confound the strong.

The content of hallucination, whether auditory or visual, will, like the dream content, always be found to be analysable into elements of the subject's past experience, since all the content naturally in the mind will have come through the senses. It may, however, be found in bizarre combinations and structures, which may make it seem new or novel. The technique of dream analysis, apart from the interpretation of symbolic content, consists simply in tracing the dream-content to its original sensory source. If on occasion a vision (external or " imaginary ") or an auditory hallucination can be shown to have a content demonstrably not derivable from the possible sensory experience of the subject (*e.g.*, a vision of future events or an auditory hallucination in a language utterly unknown to the subject), then one has a negative criterion by which to rule out the human subjective source of the phenomenon, but not as yet a criterion by which to judge between a possible divine or diabolic source. But the fact that the total content of the image is derivable from the subject's own experience is not a positive criterion by which to establish a purely subjective human source, since it is conceivable that both divine and diabolic power could use the subject's own experience as the raw material for imagery. The decision as to whether a given phenomenon of this order is merely human or not is fairly easy and is best left to the combined judgment of theologians and psychiatrists. It is the theologian's task to pronounce on the moral content and effects of such phenomenon, but the psychiatrist's to decide whether or not the personality of the subject is such that these phenomena conform to what in his experience belong to the realm of pathological emotional states. If the moral content is unworthy of a divine source, the phenomenon is human in origin. But even if the moral content is beyond reproach, but the personality is such that phenomena of this kind might be expected, it is again reasonable to postulate a human source. But the decision as to whether it is divine or diabolic in origin is a more difficult question. The criteria usually accepted are (*a*) the type of personality

who claims to have had such experience, (*b*) the content of the imagery, and (*c*) the effects on the spiritual and mental life of the subject. The first is important, but by no means final. A saint or a sinner can both be chosen for such favours. St. Paul was not a saint on the road to Damascus; the Curé of Ars was already saintly when he experienced diabolic manifestations. The second criterion we have already seen in one context, where it can be used negatively to rule out a merely human source. But it has another use: this time the moral or spiritual character of the content is involved. But here again it is of only limited value. If the moral or spiritual content of the imagery conflict with faith or morals, then its source cannot be divine. But the fact that the content from this point of view is irreproachable is not of itself a proof of divine origin. It may be merely human, and it is not impossible that the devil could produce such phenomena in order eventually to deceive. The third criterion involves a long time-process, and is not easily applied in any case. It will be seen from this paragraph that there is no easy way of deciding as to the origin of these phenomena. For that reason, the teaching of St. John of the Cross is very salutary. It can be summed up simply by saying that one should take no notice of visions and revelations, but live one's spiritual life on a basis of faith, hope and charity. If the alleged visions are divine, Almighty God will see to it if He wishes that this becomes abundantly clear. If they are not, then no harm will be done.

Some of the most difficult problems in psychopathology as well as in the realm of visions and revelations are presented by the hysterical personality. It should be noted that hysteria here does not mean simply the outbursts of emotions, floods of tears, and screams of terror associated with the popular notion of being "in hysterics." It is a form of illness of the personality (or, more accurately, of the emotions), whose manifestations are legion. We shall consider only two forms—hysterical anaesthesia and conversion hysteria. In the former sensation, or sensibility, is lost in a strictly limited field, without any discernible organic lesion. In the latter, the repressed emotion is converted into a physical symptom. (This is a picturesque and analogical way of describing a very difficult psychophysical process. It is the generally accepted formulation in psychiatry, and is adequate for our purposes). The symptom produced can be almost anything—a pain in the back, laryngitis, coughing, headache, high temperature, insomnia, anaemia, loss of weight, etc., etc. But more to our purpose, it can be a visible lesion of the periphery. Dermatology and psycho-somatic medicine generally is establishing ever more clearly and definitely the role of emotions in the aetiology of all sorts of disorders.

In the first type—hysterical anaesthesia—one is very close to the phenomena of rapture and ecstasy. No case of levitation though hysteria is recorded in the literature, so perhaps this phenomenon can be excluded. But trance, catalepsy, loss of sensibility, amnesia, loss of orientation

and adaptation to environment, de-personalisation, blindness, deafness, insensibility to pain, paralysis, rigidity, all these phenomena, and many others of visionaries, have their counterpart at least in the phenomena of hysteria.

With regard to conversion symptoms, the connection between hypnosis and hysteria must be borne in mind. Dissociation is characteristic of both phenomena. By this is meant (again in analogical and merely descriptive terms) the fact that a process or content ordinarily under the control or general supervision of consciousness is split off, as it were, and maintains a quasi-independent existence or functioning of its own. There is a case recorded in the literature where a patient was hypnotised (in deep trance), touched lightly on the forearm with a pencil and told she was being burnt ; the spot touched was bandaged and sealed, and the patient kept under strict supervision through the night. Next morning a discernible mark was visible, closely resembling a slight burn. Add to this the fact that hysterics can produce physiological symptoms of the variety listed above, and one will not be surprised if occasionally alleged stigmatists are found to be hysterical personalities.

The intelligent Catholic layman, in the light of all this, will adopt caution as his watchword in all that belongs to the realm of visions and private revelations. In this he will be merely following the salutory advice of St. John of the Cross and the great St. Teresa, and also the universal practice of the shepherds of the flock at all times. Moreover, even when the Church does authenticate such phenomena they still do not belong to the realm of truths to be held on Divine faith.

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DEMOCRATIC CAPITALISM

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I

The Present Discontent

CATHOLIC social teaching contains principles, but not a detailed programme. The latter it cannot have, not only because material conditions vary according to time and place, but because it is not the task of the Catholic Church to map out the technical and economic minutiae necessary to make a programme effective. She contents herself with placing a code of principles at the disposal of all those who possess sufficient wisdom to take them into account as the essential foundation of any particular plan with a chance of success. In general one might say that the social ideal emerging from her teaching is that of a community of free men and women co-operating together to achieve together the goal of economic life, which is the availability to all, through work freely done, of that reasonable standard of living to which every human being has a right in social justice.

This need for responsible co-operation in social and, particularly, in industrial life merits particular emphasis to-day in the still free countries of the West. Pius XI showed himself deeply aware of it when he wrote twenty years ago in *Quadragesimo Anno* :—

> Nevertheless, in the present state of human society, we deem it advisable that the wage-contract should, when possible, be modified somewhat by a contract of partnership, as is already being tried in various ways to the no small gain both of the wage-earners and of the employers. In this way wage-earners and other employees participate in the ownership or the management, or in some way share in the profits.[1]

His plea is that the wage-contract should be supplemented by a type of industrial organization that associates the worker more responsibly and more closely with the productive process. That, he felt, was the industrial need of the day.

The lack of its fulfilment is increasingly apparent in Great Britain : each day makes it more clear that central planning has proved itself incapable of occupying the role assigned to it by those who regard the planned economy as the only alternative to *laissez-faire*. Under the latter many workers were denied a decent sufficiency, and their relationship with management was usually an unhappy one, to say the very least. For it was based, as a rule, on nothing more than the wage contract, which had the additional disadvantage of proving frequently unjust in its effects, forcing on the worker a level of wages out of keeping with his dignity as a

[1] All notes will be found at the end of this article.

human being. Nevertheless, the intrinsic justice of the wage contract is not denied in this context[2]. Our complaint concerns, *firstly*, the impersonality that accompanied it as the only link between employer and employee; *secondly*, its abuse by an employing class who used their economic strength to force unjust terms on those they employed. This they did because labour, in their eyes, was without dignity; a commodity whose price depended solely on the state of the market.

Generally speaking, the struggle for social justice, particularly in Great Britain, has neglected the problems connected with the impersonality of the wage contract and concentrated on those associated with poverty, which the injustice of its terms frequently forced on the worker[3]. This has occurred because the materialism of the age has bred a prevailing tendency to view social reform, not as the establishment of a Christian way of life but in terms of the indiscriminate conferring of material benefits on those who need them. It has not been realized that the achievement of social justice requires something more than the provision of all with a reasonable sufficiency; that its terms are not met until men can earn their bread and provide for their future in a manner compatible with their dignity as free and responsible persons. Consequently the State has been called in to secure sufficiency for all without regard to individual responsibility, and the management of the nation's economic life has been entrusted to an entrenched bureaucracy[4]. As a result, though poverty has been relieved for the time being[5], the status of the English is depreciating to the proletarian level because they are increasingly dependent for their livelihood, not on their own resources or resourcefulness but on the arbitrary decisions of an all-powerful State machine. Particularly is this so in the case of the worker, especially if he works in a nationalized industry staffed by bureaucrats who seem no more sympathetic to his desire to be somebody than were many of his old capitalist employers. From his new masters the worker feels at least as cut off as he did from those who ruled him in the days of private enterprise, and no talk of ownership by the people or distributing profits to the people can rob him of the feeling that, whoever the people may be, they would not seem to include the likes of him. Thus it was with good reason that *The Times* wrote on 26 August 1948: "The miners do not feel themselves any more a responsible part of the industry now under the control of a bureaucratic machine than they did when the industry was privately owned." If, in this context, output figures are relevant that feeling or lack of it would seem to have been maintained[6].

It is not to be wondered at, therefore, that the worker is resentful and that his resentfulness should show itself in unofficial strikes[7]. For what other course is open to a man who is denied the responsibility he hopes for, at least subconsciously, whilst he sees his former leaders turned into State officials whose task it now is to urge their one-time followers to work

harder, keep down their wage demands and refrain from striking against the " people's state "—one name for the new bureaucratic Leviathan of to-day. The above affords some explanation, at least, of the seeming paradox associated with the fact that Britain's Labour Government has been plagued with a swarm of strikes ; that it has twice had to call out troops to do the essential work abandoned by the strikers and that on one occasion, the first since 1926, it had to use emergency powers to deal with a crippling dock strike[8].

In the light of this brief analysis we are driven to look far deeper than the relief of poverty for a solution of those problems associated with the presence of industrial discontent, not only in Great Britain, but wherever, in the still free world, men work at machines. The solution, I believe, is found in some words written over twenty years ago by the late Mgr. John A. Ryan—just at the time of the publication of *Quadragesimo Anno* :—

> It is not enough that they [the workers] should enjoy good wages, short hours, and security against the evils of sickness, accidents, unemployment and old age. Their position in the industrial system must include other functions in addition to those comprised in the traditional concept of employees. A change in the status of the worker implies a change in the status of the capitalist. If the labourer becomes something more than a wage earner, the capitalist must give up some of his present power. He must transfer to the labourer some degree of control, of profits, or of ownership.[9]

The similarity between Mgr. Ryan's closing sentences and the passage already cited from *Quadragesimo Anno* is striking. The thought underlying both represents the future line of approach. Status must be restored to the worker by tempering somewhat the labour contract with elements borrowed from the contract of partnership, in such a way as to associate the workingman more closely with the industry in which he works. In this way he will come to feel the responsibility that should be his as a person. " Why should it not be allowable," Pius XII asked delegates of UNIAPAC[10] on 7th May, 1949, " to assign to the workers a just share of responsibility in the establishment and development of the national economy ? " Why not indeed ? These words of His Holiness are confirmatory of the thought behind the passage in *Quadragesimo Anno* to which reference has already been made.

II

A Papal Warning

Just a year after he had spoken these words Pius XII addressed the Rome conventions of the Fribourg Institute of Social and Political Science and the International Christian Social Union (3 June 1950). The Holy Father used the occasion to warn Catholic social students of the dangers attendant on the continuation of a reforming policy that sought to check

capitalist abuse almost solely by strengthening the power of labour in its relationship to business and government. Father John Cronin, the Assistant Director of the NCWC has described this attitude, which has been by no means uncommon amongst Catholic social reformers of the past twenty years :—

> The answer, they said, was to strengthen the power of labour in relation to business and government. Stronger labour unions, enough labour influence in government to bring about social reform, and a curbing of the power of business—these were the answers. Where business was too powerful to be curbed easily, it should be nationalized. As for private business, labour was to be given the right of participation in management as a natural step toward the structural reform of full partnership.[11]

This outlook appears to contain little regard for the papal teaching on property and the essentially subsidiary function of government : thus it has tended to play into the hands of secular reformers, who see social reform as effective only through the agency of the State. Against it the Holy Father appears to have directed an important section of the speech to which reference has just been made :—

> In a few dozen years there has already arisen in most of these countries—and often under the decisive influence of the Catholic Social Movement—a social policy marked by a progressive development of labour law and consequently by subjection of the private owner in control of the means of production to juridical obligations in favour of the worker.
>
> He who wishes to advance the social policy in the same direction, finds himself at a boundary line—that is to say, the point at which the danger arises of the working class, in its turn, following the mistakes of capital. These mistakes consisted in withdrawing, chiefly in very large undertakings, the management of means of production from the personal responsibility of the private owner (individual or company) and transferring this management to the responsibility of anonymous, corporate groups.
>
> A Socialist mentality would accept such a situation easily enough. But this state of things could not fail to bring apprehension to those who are aware of the fundamental importance of the right of private ownership, as an incentive to initiative and a rule to determine responsibilities in economic matters.[12]

The Holy Father's warning seems perfectly clear. He favours what has been done to extend the legal rights of the worker over and against the employer :

> But, in the words of Father John Cronin, if future social reform is merely to be more of the same, adding to the rights of labour and curbing the power of property, then the evils stigmatised in *Quadragesimo Anno* will again arise, with labour or the State as the aggressor. A programme of social reform which makes any large group—whether it be a corporation, a labour union or the government—the primary source of rights involves a concentration of power which could be a prelude to Socialism. It impedes private property in its important function of stimulating initiative and determining economic responsibility.[13]

If the Pope had said nothing more on this occasion the matter of his address would not have been introduced into this article, except as providing

a most valuable confirmation of the rejection given in its previous section of a surfeit of centralized social reform. But the Holy Father went on to add a statement, which is immediately relevant to what we have to say in a third section on the subject of partnership in industry :—

> The same danger also arises whenever the right of economic joint management is claimed for the paid workers of an enterprise, notably when the use of this right is in fact directly or indirectly in the hands of organizations exterior to the enterprise. Neither the nature of the labour contract nor the nature of the enterprise do necessarily imply by themselves a right of this kind.

At once, as is so often the case, these words were subjected to misinterpretation from what might be called the extreme wings of the Catholic reforming movement. Some read into them a warning that their endeavour to secure for the worker a responsible place in industry had reached the limits of sound social theory. Others assumed at once that the Pope was favouring " a swing to the right". The Holy Father was doing neither of these things. As far as one can discern his words appear to contain four important observations. They should be considered as a whole and in their appropriate context.

In the first place, His Holiness states that the policy of those who claimed the right of economic joint management for the paid workers of an enterprise, carried the same danger as that which is implicit in capitalist concentration or in that type of reforming policy, which a Socialist mentality would not find it difficult to accept.

> The Holy Father, according to Canon Brys, therefore declares that economic joint management would again, in its own particular way, repeat the errors committed by capitalism and Socialism, because it would in fact withdraw the management of the means of production from the private owner's personal responsibility, and transfer it to anonymous, corporate groups.[14]

This claim, to repeat a quotation from Father John Cronin, " involves a concentration of power which could be a prelude to Socialism." The reference of the Holy Father in his first observation would appear to be to the state of affairs that would arise if economic joint management were claimed for the worker as a right and forced on business. The policy encouraging such a state of affairs is to be sharply distinguished from that which works for labour's participation in management, not as a right but as a commendable social expedient.

Secondly, the Pope points out that the situation to which his first observation has reference would arise *a fortiori* (" notably ") " when the use of this right is in fact directly or indirectly in the hands of organizations exterior to the enterprise". Here, according to Canon Brys[15], the reference is to the trade union leaders, who, as such, do not belong to what he calls " the working community of the enterprise". The point of this second observation appears to be that the danger already referred to is all the greater when trade union officials as such claim and exercise the right of

economc joint management over a business in which members of their union are working. This, clearly, would mean a veritable dictatorship of the proletariat.

But the Pope has no intention of slighting the trade unions. Addressing Belgian Christian workers on pilgrimage to Rome he said, on 11 September, 1949 :—

> They (the Trade Unions) have the full approval of the Church, on condition that they do their best to promote the Christian social order in the world of labour.[16]

And in the same speech the Holy Father declared that " The trade unions should not use their power wrongly". Canon Brys' comment on this second observation of the Holy Father seems eminently sound :—

> In the present speech, he (the Pope) declares that the right of participation in the management of an enterprise should not be exercised by the trade union. But nothing prevents the trade union or any other educational organization of labour from training their members to exercise this right. Indeed, it is a duty. But that trade unions should openly or secretly arbitrarily dictate the workers' attitude in those matters where they have the right to speak in the enterprise, is not to be tolerated. Once the workers have been properly educated and trained for their task, they must bear their own responsibility. Any interference from outside would be bound to distort the meaning and aim of the participation of the worker in the management of the enterprise.[17]

Thirdly, His Holiness denies that the right of economic joint management is a natural right : " Neither the nature of the labour contract nor the nature of the enterprise do necessarily imply by themselves a right of this kind." In the opinion of most commentators this section of the Holy Father's speech was pointed particularly at the resolution adopted at the 73rd *Katholikentag* held at Bochum (Germany) in September 1949. The resolution ran as follows :—

> Catholic workers and employers agree to declare that the right of joint management of all workers in social, personal, and economic matters is a natural right according to the rule installed by God, in so far as it gives effect to every man's sense of responsibility.

Apart from this, however, it is quite clear that if we hold with Pius XI in *Quadragesimo Anno* that the wage contract is not intrinsically unjust, then we cannot in the same breath claim economic joint management for the worker as a right of natural law. For, to quote Canon Brys once again :—

> . . . if the right to joint management for the paid worker were a natural right, the labour contract—which by definition excludes joint management—could not be called just.[18]

And at this point it should be remembered that the denial of economic joint management *as a right of natural law* implies no disapproval of a policy that strives to temper somewhat, as far as possibilities allow it, the labour contract with elements borrowed from the contract of partnership.

Pius XI favoured this policy in the passage from *Quadragesimo Anno* which we have quoted and to which we have often made reference. Pius XII most obviously had this ideal of his predecessor in mind when, after a few further sentences, he said in the speech to which this section refers :—

> The wisdom of our predecessor, Pius XI, showed this clearly in the Encyclical *Quadragesimo Anno*, and consequently, he there denies the intrinsic need of substituting for the wage contract a contract of partnership. This is not to deny the usefulness of what has hitherto been achieved in this matter, in various ways, to the common advantage of employers and employees.

Moreover, Pius XI, whilst deeming it advisable that " the wage-contract should, when possible, be modified somewhat by a contract of partnership", never gave natural right as the basis of this participation. But this does not mean that he disapproved of it. On the contrary, he approved of it and encouraged it. So, too, did his successor in the passage of his speech which we have just quoted. The conclusion seems justified that :—

> From the very text of the Holy Father's address to the social study groups, it is clear that he intended to do no more than reiterate this teaching of Pius XI. He not only quoted his predecessor by name but gave *Quadragesimo Anno* as the only reference for this passage in his talk.[19]

Fourthly, and lastly in this context, it should be noticed that the Holy Father is denying that the worker has a right in natural law to engage in management that is *economic* and *joint*. In other words, as a worker, he has no right to take part (with the same authority and the same powers of decision as management) in those purely economic decisions that have to be taken in connection with the day-to-day running of a business. If this were enforced as a matter of right the result would be " to withdraw the management of the means of production from the private owner's personal responsibility, and transfer it to anonymous, corporate groups." Thus a power group would be set up, which might well prove a prelude to Socialism, whilst private property would be impeded in its function of stimulating initiative and determining economic responsibility.

The point is not that workers are precluded. from economic joint management, where in a particular industry this policy is freely agreed to by workers and management. It is, rather, that they are precluded from its enforcement as a natural right. They are encouraged to prepare themselves for participation in management, not to claim as an alleged right the power to take economic decisions on a basis of equality with those who own a factory or a firm. There is nothing in this allocution of the Holy Father to discourage those who are prepared to work patiently towards the goal of industrial partnership ; who see the solution of the industrial problem in terms of what might best be called a shared responsibility between capital and labour. The papal elucidation of the issues involved should encourage them to press on quietly and with confidence towards their goal from which they need be no longer diverted by fruitless discussions concerning alleged but non-existent rights.

III

The Outline of a Scheme

It remains to sketch a scheme that would allow the " wage-earners and other employees (to) participate in the ownership or the management, or in some way share in the profits".

Participation by the employees in the profits of an industry necessitates the placing of a limitation on the risk and on the return of those who formerly took the surplus profits of industry in exchange for bearing a particular kind of risk. It means, in other words, that, as a reward for the risk they take, the holders of ordinary shares would no longer be left with the prospect of an unlimited return since their ordinary shares would be converted into cumulative preference shares.[20] Their risk of securing a return having thus been diminished, it is only equitable that the return itself should suffer limitation.[21] Surplus profits, as and when they occur, would then be distributed to those who work in industry. In them all workers would share whether they wore a white collar or no collar at all.[22] The resultant picture has been well painted by the late Mgr. John A. Ryan :—

> The labourer should be put in a position to share in the *surplus profits of industry*. After standard wages, a reasonable rate of interest[23], adequate remuneration of management, and all the other proper expenses of production have been paid, the wage earners should share the surplus, not with the owners of capital, but with the managers of the business. " Standard wages " means compensation adequate to a decent living for all employees, and something more than that for those workers who have special claims on account of greater skill, hazard, productivity, or any other special factor. " A reasonable rate of interest " is the rate which suffices to attract investment to a given industry. When the investor no longer hopes to share in the surplus profits, he requires an increase in the rate of interest. Or, he demands dividends on a cumulative basis. For example, if the prevailing rate were six per cent. and if the stockholders in a concern had obtained only three per cent. in each of the two preceding years, they should receive three, plus three, plus six or twelve per cent. in the current year. In other words, the capitalist should be guaranteed an annual return of six percent. Until this and all the other charges have been fully met up to date, there are no surplus profits. When a surplus arises, it should be distributed among all the members of the labour force and management. In a joint stock company a fair basis of distribution would seem to be the various salary rates and wage rates of the participants, from the president down to the office boy. The share of each would be proportioned to his regular wage or salary. Without very great difficulty, the same method could be applied to individual businesses and partnerships.

And the Monsignor then notes an important point, namely, that this system of profit-sharing should have the economic effect of providing the worker with an incentive for increased production :—

> This kind of profit sharing would vastly increase the interest of the labourer in his work. It would hold out to the rank and file of the workers that inducement which has been mainly responsible for the initiative, the energy, the enter-

> prise and the achievements of our captains of industry. That is, the hope of indefinite gain, unrestricted by law, and determined only by the finite capacities of the pursuer. If this hope, this opportunity, has justified itself in the achievements of the business man, why should it not prove efficacious in stimulating the productivity of the masses? They have the same psychology as the directors of industry and respond to the same economic incentives.

Anyone who has watched a peasant, a small shopkeeper or the owner of a small business hard at work will know that no small inducement for him to do so is provided by the fact that the profits of the business go into his pocket. In his person the functions of owner and worker are united and he legitimately takes all the profits he makes because he has created them. By a strange piece of logic we have invested the owner of a particular type of share in a large concern with the functions once held by ownership when combined with work. The logic and the equity of this proceeding would seem to be questionable. To check it in the manner described by setting a just limitation to the profits accruing to a particular type of ownership, would do much to restore a useful incentive to industry. It may be added that such action accords with man's dignity when seen in its proper relationship to the purpose of economic life.

At this point one might deal with the objection that investors will not put their savings in a business if all they can hope for is a limited return. This, of course, refers to the scheme we propose, which necessitates the elimination of ordinary shareholding. Mr. Paul Derrick, I think, has answered this difficulty in a satisfactory manner:—

> The answer is . . . that plenty of people to-day invest in preference shares without feeling that they are being unjustly treated. A large part of the investment by individuals that goes on in this country to-day is in Building Societies, in which the return is always limited. It is also limited in the case of securities issued by the Government and by many semi-public corporations, in preference share capital in industry generally, and of course throughout the co-operative movement. Most individual investors prefer a safe investment and a limited return.[24]

He adds that, where ordinary shares are eliminated, those who establish a new enterprise might be allowed a return of 15 or 20 per cent. on the first hundred pounds or so of capital, whilst they would, of course, receive an unlimited return in the form of dividends on wages and salaries. In industries that are established, the return on original capital, additional to the first hundred pounds or so, would be lower and it would vary from enterprise to enterprise according to the risk involved. "The main point is that dividends should be limited according to risks involved: not that the return on capital should be low, but that it should be limited." And later,[25] "All capital would be raised by issuing redeemable preference shares rather than debentures, since interest on the latter is paid whether a profit is made or not . . . It is the redeemable preference share carrying

a limited dividend, but only in the event of a profit being made, which represents the right relationship between labour and capital."

Mr. Derrick next points out several ways in which industrial risk can be reduced, thereby enabling the return on capital to be reduced, perhaps even to the level earned by preference shares to-day. (In this event there would, clearly, be a greater surplus of profit available for distribution). Two of the methods he suggests have the additional advantage of introducing the worker gradually to some degree of participation in the management and ownership of industry. Consequently his suggestions for reducing investors' risk seem worthy of careful consideration.

In the first place, a departure point is provided by the fact that the elimination of ordinary shares leaves in abeyance the voting power of their former holders. Mr. Derrick suggests the vesting of the voting power in the managerial personnel of a business through the issue of what he calls Proficiency Shares. A certain number of these shares would have to be held by those launching an enterprise : those who wished to qualify for directorships and top managerial positions would be obliged to hold them. Some would go to those occupying positions of lesser authority in the firm ; a limited number would be offered to salary and wage earners. Voting power would be proportionate to the number of shares held. On them no capital would be paid up (they could be issued at a nominal value of 1s. each), except in the event of a winding up. In such a case holders of Proficiency Shares would have to contribute a limited amount of capital proportionate to the number of shares held and to their own personal resources.[26]

This suggestion does something more than reduce the risk of the preference shareholder. It offers the responsible workingman and employee the opportunity of associating himself with the management of a concern in a manner proportionate to the position he holds in the business and the extent of his personal resources. This is not economic joint management, and it is not claimed for him as a right ; but as a useful educational expedient fully in keeping with the needs of his human dignity. It could be combined most usefully with the successful attempts at social and "multiple"[27] management that are being made in this country and, more particularly, in the United States.

It might seem, at first sight, that this suggested arrangement runs counter to the injunction given by the Holy Father to the delegates of UNIAPAC on 7th May, 1949 :—

> The owner of the means of production, whoever he be—individual owner, workers' association or coporation—must always—within the limits of public economic law—retain control of his economic decisions.[28]

It is difficult to see how it does, for, *in the first place*, the "enterprisers", top managerial personnel and directors, who retain the major control will doubtless be those whose holdings of shares in the business are large.

Secondly, lesser managerial personnel, together with salaried and wage earners, will be induced (by a process soon to be described) to take up shares and to become part-owners in the business. *Thirdly*, ordinary shares, though they carry voting power, carry nowadays much less actual control than was formerly the case yet this arrangement was not condemned by the Holy Father in the excerpt cited from his UNIAPAC speech. On the contrary, the corporation (or limited liability company), which embodies it in practice, is listed as an " owner of the means of production", who is " to retain control of his economic decisions". *Lastly*, holders of preference shares retain a conditional control of the direction of affairs in the sense that, when dividends are not maintained, the control reverts to them.[29]

Mr. Derrick's *second* suggestion for the reduction of investors' risk is found in his proposal that shareholders should be insured against loss of capital, in much the same way as workers can be and are insured against the loss of their job :—

> The Trade Association or Insurance Company could, for instance, take up preference shares on which no capital was paid up except in the event of a winding-up, but which nevertheless carried dividends : such dividends would be equivalent to an insurance premium. In the event of a winding-up, capital would be paid up on such preference shares direct to the insured investors, who would, of course, have been receiving lower dividends than they would have received otherwise.

Mr. Derrick's *third* suggestion for the elimination of risk is as follows :—

> Companies could issue to their workers special " Risk Shares", carrying not only a limited dividend in the event of a profit, but also liability to contribute a limited amount of capital to the resources of the company in the event of a loss. No capital would be paid up on such " Risk Shares " except in the event of a winding up, and they would be withdrawable at any time subject to two years' notice, or sooner by arrangement. In the event of the General Reserve of a company at the time of its ordinary general meeting being below what had been previously fixed as the necessary minimum working capital, workers and managers holding " Risk Shares " would be liable to contribute further capital up to, say, 10 per cent. of the nominal value of " Risk Shares " held by them. Such contributions would normally be made by predeductions from wages and salaries, so that the net result of bad times would be that some of those actively associated in the production would find themselves earning somewhat less.
>
> Directors and managerial personnel would be required to hold a certain number of " Risk Shares " as a qualification for their office, but their holding would be limited. Workers would not be required to take up any, but would be allowed to take up as many as they liked according as they wished to participate in the risks of production. In most reasonably successful enterprises it is probable that the workers would choose to participate to some extent in risks rather than watch the managers take an excessively large part of the profits because of their assumption of additional liability ; for, in the event of a profit, holders of " Risk Shares " would receive a positive dividend at least equal to that distributed directly as a dividend on wages and salaries.[30]

In this way, clearly, the responsible worker could participate in a species of ownership, which would entitle him to share further in the rewards of industry in return for bearing part of its risk.

But ownership for the worker of every grade in industry, from the manager to the office boy, could be extended further than this if part of the surplus profits, instead of being distributed, were accumulated within the business on their behalf. This could be brought about by private agreement within the firm, and it would be effected without such agreement if income tax were levied, not on the corporate incomes of companies, but on incomes distributed in the form of wages and salaries and dividends. The profits accumulated by all who worked in the firm could be ploughed back into capital development and shares to the amount could be issued to the personnel of the firm. Where no such capital development was required the whole or part of the accumulated surplus profit could be used with the permission of its owners,

> . . . to purchase newly issued Government securities of the same market value as their own redeemable preference shares and exchange them for the latter. The result of this process would be that most industrial preference shares would tend to pass into the hands of the workers in the industries concerned, while outside investors not actively associated in production would, to a greater and greater extent, find themselves holding Government securities. As a reward for national saving the workers would tend to find themselves owners of, or at least chief stockholders in, the productive resources of the country.[31]

IV

Conclusion

That, very briefly, is the outline of a scheme which seems to the writer to represent a practical and sensible attempt to realise the directive of Pius XI that " the wage contract should, when possible, be modified somewhat by a contract of partnership." Participation for the worker " in the ownership or the management, or (his sharing) in some way . . . in the profits " is not claimed for the worker by right. It is not to be imposed by force. Rather is it held up as a solution that must be accepted by those who want to steer a course midway between the abuses of unrestrained capitalism on the one hand and the ice-cold night of State omnipotence on the other. Here, we would suggest, is the line of a solution founded on the Christian doctrine of personal responsibility and worthy, therefore, of consideration by men of good will. It might not be a misnomer to term it Democratic Capitalism.

Paul Crane

NOTES

[1] Cf. *Quadragesimo Anno*; para. 65; C.T.S. and C.S.G. edition.

[2] Cf. *Quadragesimo Anno*; para. 64: "And, first of all, those who hold that the wage contract is essentially unjust, and therefore in its place must be introduced the contract of partnership, are certainly in error."

[3] This is not to say, for a moment, that *all* poverty in Great Britain or anywhere else is due *solely* to injustice. Some of it has been and is. That is the point.

[4] The economic effects of bureaucratic planning do not concern us in this article. In the writer's opinion they are unfortunate.

[5] In Great Britain, for the time being, a point has been reached at which, according to a recent investigator, "An able-bodied man willing to work need not suffer shortages of necessities of any kind, or even of comforts. He may count on work and fair wages." Cf. *Labour, Life and Poverty*, by F. Zweig, p. 17; Gollancz, 1948; 7s. 6d.

[6] Cf. *The Economist*, 16/11/50: "The fact remains that the (Coal) Board has in four years failed to make such small impression on the coal industry's problems as could reasonably be expected. Output per man year remains even in 1950 nearly 10 per cent. smaller than it was in 1937. Absenteeism has barely been reduced since the five-day week began. Even output per manshift worked is only a little above the pre-war level, and after the improvement of 1948 and 1949 has shown hardly more than seasonal changes this year. All the scarce machinery and equipment poured into the mines during the past ten years has perhaps arrested what would otherwise have been a continuous decline in productivity; more than this could be said even for the limited and unsatisfactory mechanization of British mines between the wars."

[7] Some, of course, have been Communist engendered; but, even in their case, the prevailing resentment has given the Communist much to work on. This is particularly so, perhaps, in the case of those which have originated in the docking industry. Cf. *Review of the British Dock Strikes*, 1949 (Cmd. 7851); H.M.S.O., 9d.

[8] That which took place in the summer of 1948.

[9] Cf. *A Suggested Limitation of Capitalist Property*, by Mgr. John A. Ryan, D.D.; Catholic Truth Society of Ireland, 1946, 2d. This essay was written twenty years ago; more or less at the time of the publication of *Quadragesimo Anno*.

[10] Cf. the translation of the speech that appeared in *The Catholic Mind* for July, 1949.

[11] Cf. Father Cronin's article in *America*, 5/8/50.

[12] Translations of this speech appeared in *The Clergy Review* for August, 1950, pp. 120–124 and, with the omission of an opening sentence or two, in *The Christian Democrat* for August, 1950. The excerpts given in this article are taken from *New Life* for January, 1951.

[13] *Op. cit.*

[14] Cf. an article entitled "Papal Thought on Joint Management," by Canon Brys, in *New Life* for January, 1951. Canon Brys is the General Chaplain of the Christian Workers Movement of Belgium, and the writer is deeply indebted to his article whose comments form the basis of what has to be said in the second section of this essay.

[15] *Op. cit.*

[16] Cited by Canon Brys; *op. cit.*

[17] *Op. cit.*

[18] *Op. cit.*

[19] Cf. an article by Rev. Benjamin L. Masse, S.J., entitled "Labour's Right in Management," in *America*, 15/7/50.

[20] Cumulative preference shares carry a right to the payment, as soon as the company is in a position to pay, of dividends previously held back because of the unsatisfactory state of a company's profit and loss account.

[21] I am not inclined to believe that it is justifiable to give to the holders of ordinary shares whose liability is limited, the whole of those residual profits, which economists assign to them as a reward for the risks they bear when investing their money. I find it difficult to see that this is an equitable arrangement. After all, factors of production should be rewarded according to their contribution,and it does seem that the claim to unlimited profits made by the holders of ordinary shares is a reward out of proportion to the contribution they make to industrial success. Moreover, the workers in a concern (managerial and otherwise) have made their own contribution to a product whose sale we will suppose is now booming and brings a tide of "windfall" profits to the firm that makes it. It is difficult to see on what grounds they can be denied a proportionate share of the windfall.

I am not concerned to argue this point here or in the text because once ordinary shares have been converted into cumulative preference shares, the risk of the shareholder is limited and what basis there was for his reception of an unlimited return disappears. It might be noted here that the conversion of ordinary shares into cumulative preference shares could be achieved by a simple change in company law or as the result of mutual agreement in any existing business or firm.

[22] There is no question of expropriation here for the interests of (former) holders of ordinary shareholders have been catered for by the conversion of ordinary shares into cumulative preference shares of " the same nominal value as the ordinary shares carrying maximum dividends equivalent to those previously paid on the ordinary shares, if those dividends averaged more than 5 or 6 per cent. ; or perhaps of a higher nominal value, more or less equivalent to the market value of the ordinary shares, and carrying dividends of about 5 or 6 per cent. The dividend of the investor would not be *reduced*, but simply *limited* to the average, or perhaps even the maximum, dividend paid on the ordinary share." Cf. an article in *The Month* for February 1948 and entitled " Partnership in Industry." It is by Mr. Paul Derrick, and to it the writer is much indebted as forming a foundation for this section of his essay. Cf. also Mr. Derrick's book, *Lost Property* (Dennis Dobson ; 1947, 8s. 6d.).

[23] " Interest," in this context, stands for a rate of return on invested capital, as distinct from the sums paid annually to holders of debentures.

[24] Cf. *The Month*, February, 1948.

[25] *Op. cit.*.

[26] Here, but only in accidentals, a few of my suggestions differ very slightly from those of Mr. Derrick.

[27] For an English example of the success attendant on this type of management or a variant of same, cf. " Social Life in Industry," by C. A. Lidbury in *The Observer* for October 1st, 1950.

[28] As translated in *The Catholic Mind*, for July, 1949.

[29] As an example of such a situation Mgr. Ryan quotes the Dennison Manufacturing Company of Framingham, Massachussetts, U.S.,A. where ". . . the preferred shareholders receive a fixed annual return but no profits and so long as the business is reasonably prosperous, they have no control over the management. The immediate control is in the hands of those managerial employees who have been with the company for at least five years. They share the surplus profits with the subordinate employees. If dividends average less than eight per cent. over a period of three years, the voting power and the control revert to the owners of the preferred stock. Hence there is always a strong inducement for the managerial employees to make the business successful. In this arrangement not only are rewards determined by functions, but the operating function is normally and immediately performed by the most capable persons in the company, while the inactive shareholders exercise only that conditional control which is necessary to protect their interests as owners." Cf. *A Suggested Limitation of Capitalist Property*; from it we have taken all the citations of which Mgr. Ryan is author.

[30] Cf. Derrick, *op. cit.*

[31] Cf. Derrick, *op. cit.*

THE UNITY OF MAN

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MAN is more successful in probing the secrets of the physical world, it would seem, than in solving the problem of his own nature. The reason is that man is a contradiction to himself: be belongs to two worlds, the world of matter and the world of spirit. And it is commonly in this manner that the problem of man's nature is presented: how is spirit joined to matter? how are we to understand the union of body and soul? Outside the ranks of Catholic or Scholastic philosophers the chief difficulty is to explain how, on the phenomenological level, there is a stream of conscious thought and simultaneously a chain of physiological processes in the brain. There seems to be a complete difference in nature between a conscious idea and an externally observable nerve impulse. The one phenomenon always accompanies the other, but their mutual relationship remains a mystery. These philosophers hold that no adequate explanation has yet been given, the Scholastic theory being little more than mere verbiage, and the general option is for some form of psychophysical parallelism, not so much as a pretended solution but as a working hypothesis or a simple statement of the data of the problem.

I

The Scholastic doctrine is an application and elaboration of the aristotelian doctrine of matter and form. The soul in man is the form, the principle of perfection and of action, while the body is the material principle, and the two form a unity of composition, a unity which is one substance. All other material substances are likewise composed of two complementary principles, matter and form. But the human substantial form or soul is to a certain degree independent, having operations in which the body takes no intrinsic part, subsisting to a certain degree in its own right, and therefore even capable, after death, of existing in separation from the body. According to this explanation, there are some mental phenomena, namely thinking and willing, which may be accompanied by but are really distinct and separate from all bodily phenomena, while on the lower psychological level the phenomena of sensing and feeling are at once both physical and psychical, or rather neither one nor the other but psychophysical, proceeding from the composite unity of body-soul. The operations of intellect and will are said to proceed from the soul alone, and to depend only extrinsically on the body or brain in so far as the latter supplies, as it were, the raw material out of which intellectual thought is

manufactured. The vegetative and sensitive soul in man acts therefore like the soul or substantial form of an animal, while the intellectual or spiritual soul acts like a purely spiritual substance, like an angelic spirit. Vegetative, sensitive and spiritual soul in man, however, is all simply one substantial form, so that it is the nature of man to be a philosophical and theological anomaly, spirit and matter, angel and beast.

The general rejection of this doctrine as inadequate, by other schools of philosophy, must come as a surprise to the Scholastics. Their surprise is liable to be tinged with impatience at the other fellow's slowness of wit, and then with a certain pitying complacency. After all, it is not everyone whose mind has been sharpened by the subtleties of Scholastic metaphysics. But the other fellow often turns out to be far from dull-witted, to be capable of giving as good as he receives in any philosophical fisticuffs, and even to be disconcertingly well versed in Scholastic doctrine. Without entering much deeper into the philosophical foundation and proof of this doctrine, it will be useful to examine the reason for its general rejection by non-Catholic philosophers. The reason, it seems, is two-fold. In the first place, the proof of the Scholastic doctrine is commonly formulated in a manner which, if not inaccurate, is at least open to misunderstanding. Secondly, the over-emphasis usually placed by Catholic philosophers on the spirituality of the human soul has led, even among Catholics themselves, to unfortunate erroneous opinions.

The spirituality of the human soul is regularly proved by the following type of argument: Man's mind is able to know spiritual things, such as justice, mercy, relations, and other universals, and even God, the most spiritual of all objects. Now only a mind that is itself spiritual is capable of conceiving ideas of spiritual objects. Therefore man's mind is spiritual. Therefore man's soul is spiritual, since his mind is a power or faculty of his soul. Now this proof, simple and obvious at first glance, has the danger of leading too far, of proving more than it warrants, if important qualifications are not added. We seem to reach the conclusion that the soul of man is as perfectly spiritual as an angel. We shall see presently how this conclusion derives from still another source, and we shall point out its dangerous consequences. In the second place, the proof advanced overlooks the fact that man has not, and according to his natural powers cannot have, more than an analogical knowledge of spiritual things. Yet there should be no scandal taken, for example, at the anthropomorphical descriptions of God in the Sacred Scripture. We know God truly, but we have no proper idea of Him. Our knowledge of Him is impregnated with materiality. As for universal ideas such as justice and the rest, in what sense are these spiritual? My ideas about a particular individual material thing are all universal ideas, but the real object of my knowledge, what I know, is this particular individual. The universal idea exists only in my mind, a mode of my thought, the only real foundation of which is the

material object. The proper line of proof of the soul's spirituality, therefore, should be according to the abstract and to that extent immaterial or spiritual *manner* in which the human mind knows particular material objects. Arguing to the spirituality of the mind from the spirituality of its objects is therefore rather unsafe. The only proper objects of our knowledge are material things, which indeed argues rather to an inherent materiality in the human mind and human soul—a humbling but salutary conclusion. This is usually expressed by saying that the soul in its intellectual operations is extrinsically dependent on matter, a statement put in as an apologetic and almost unimportant qualification to the central thesis of the soul's spirituality. But this material dependence is of the very nature of the soul. And without the support of revelation, how satisfying would the traditional philosophical proof of immortality appear, seeing the dissolution of the body in death?

II

When all the emphasis is laid on the fact that man's soul is spiritual, without qualification (through an over-reaction to the crude materialism current in some philosophical circles, and because of the theological vocation of Catholic philosophy), we are led to take a distorted view of man's place in the natural and supernatural world. The very word spiritual, with its variety of meanings, adds to the confusion, so that when we think of the soul as spiritual, in the sense of non-material, we comfortably and unconsciously ascribe to it also the quality of holiness, in the sense in which we speak of spiritual books, or the spiritual life. There creeps in the opinion that the soul is intrinsically good and holy, and that the body, on the other hand, is intrinsically evil. It has come to be almost a traditional mode of thought to consider one's soul as burdened with the flesh, imprisoned in the body. The soul alone has value, being immortal; the body is worthless, to be cast off at death, and good riddance. So pervasive is this idea that it requires an effort to readjust one's mind to the truth that it is not the body that dies, but the man, and that the body is destined to be resurrected and glorified. The recent definition of the dogma of the Assumption of Our Lady carries this primary lesson. But too often our Catholic preachers and writers on spirituality unwittingly lead their audience and their readers astray on this point. "What shall it profit a man to gain the whole world and suffer the loss of his soul?"—the text is given a new sense, and doubtless a legitimate one, but which generally leaves us with the uncomfortable impression that all pursuit of worldly riches and any degree of care for the good things of this world are intrinsically bad. The poor man will be honourably admitted into heaven, the rich man will be sent to the other place, and presumably the middle classes will have to spend in Purgatory a period of painful readjustment

proportional to their ill-gotten incomes. Underlying this idea is the Puritan impulse to condemn as bad in itself what has only suffered a misuse, to have recourse to amputation in every case of a sore leg. Surely it is clear that the good things of this world (and everything made by God is good) are there to be used by man, to be used by him properly and intelligently, of course, as the means towards his final end? As St. Ignatius says in his *Spiritual Exercises*, "The other things on the face of the earth were created for man's use and benefit and to help him to attain the end for which he was created." But we find the world, the flesh and the devil relegated all to the one category of evil, and by the flesh is meant the body. The body is evil in itself, being no more than a complex of sinful passions and inclinations, especially the great taboo, sex, and it should be starved and beaten, though not quite out of existence, since suicide is unaccountably forbidden as a short-cut to Heaven. And one should groan: "Who will deliver me from the body of this death!"

We believe that the good scheme of things was ruined by original sin. We too often forget that the ruin has been more than redressed by the Redemption. We shall not be held personally responsible for the fact that we never now have complete and perfect control over our unruly passions. Our business in life is to use them and control them to the best of our ability, to reintegrate our total self. Are we in a sorrier case than might have been without the Fall? It is to be doubted, seeing the superabundance of help that is now at our disposal. We are not born in personal sin, and there is no falling into any sin by accident nor by inadvertence. Our sins are estimated solely by the measure of deliberateness and free perversity of our conscious will. Sin comes only from our highest faculty. The first sin in history was committed by an incorporeal being, all the more heinous on that account. True, we have now to contend with a body whose demands and impulses, though natural and good in themselves, are not under the easy control of the will. It is a constant fight to use them always for their true purpose, but as St. Paul says it is a good fight.

When we scrutinize the authentic traditions of the Catholic Church, we see that it is the whole man, body and soul, that is to be saved, more, that man is to work out his eternal salvation by employing the body that has been given him as an integral part of his nature, with all its natural powers and processes. It was God's plan to redeem us by taking a human body and soul. Infinitely beyond our grasp, dwelling in inaccessible light, He walked among men in visible, tangible, human shape, within the grasp of our understanding and also of our senses. We can know God now because the Incomprehensible has been translated into our human language; and we can love Him now in earnest, not merely with the power of our intellectual will, but with the truly human love that partakes of both will and sensible affection, knowing that Christ has first loved us, His

divine love for us overflowing into the love which moves His human heart. The devotion to the Sacred Heart means just that. A more astonishing lesson of the same thing is provided by St. Paul, who tells the husband and wife that their human love for one another, consecrated by the sacrament of Matrimony, is similar to the love that Christ has for His Bride the Church. To our modern minds, wearily accustomed to the degradation made of sex-love, there seems something almost scandalous in such a comparison. Again we have to set our perspective aright and remember that sex was made by God, that its misuse by man is specially evil only because it is specially beautiful in itself and in its purpose, that the love of the sexes has been singled out by Christ to be blessed and consecrated as one of the seven sacraments. All the sacraments, indeed, tell the same story. They are material means of grace, visible signs which are more than signs because they actually effect the grace which they signify. The water which flows on the body in Baptism is the cause of the spiritual cleansing. In the Eucharist He tells us to eat His Body and drink His Blood, and we are fed both as to body and soul. Truly our spiritual life is an affair of the whole man. Grace perfects nature, and our way of perfection is to become holy not only in our soul but also in our body, the temple of the Holy Ghost.

III

The findings of modern empirical psychology all converge to show the structural and dynamic unity of man. This happy result would hardly have been attained if the psychologists had started with a preconceived assumption of a radical conflict of finality between body and soul. The very conflict and maladjustment of the mental patient are in themselves a proof of the fundamental law of unity of the psychological personality. The basic unity of human nature reveals itself in negative fashion by the obvious fact that an unresolved mental conflict is an abnormality, a disease of the personality, and in a positive way by the compelling force experienced by the mental patient to establish unity and harmony. His failure to do so in the conflict of neurosis, and his recourse to the false unity of psychosis, are proof of the psychological unity or integration of the normal personality. The all-pervading pathological anxiety or depression engendered by mental disintegration, by the breakdown of normal functioning, is the protest of nature. The psychological perfection of the normal personality is directly proportional to the well-integrated harmony he is able to establish in the totality of his individual self and of his social self in his relations with his fellow-man, having all his capacities, his needs and his goals, sensitive and intellectual, directed by a unifying philosophy and theology of life—we should say, directed to his true final end.

Here again we can learn a lesson from the child. Are we not told to become as little children? True, the child's pattern of life is relatively

simple, he is not faced with the psychological *sturm und drang* which he will have to cope with in his adult years, and the easy integration that he achieves reflects the simplicity of his immature personality. The solution comes readily because the child's problem is an easy one. But the adult's problem, if more complicated, is the same *kind* of problem. In the personality of the child, therefore, we can see more clearly the intention of nature. In its shallow depths we see the unity of human nature, the functioning unity of body and soul, of sense and intellect, of affection and will, without the distortion caused by deeper and more troubled waters The young child has not yet learned to be complex. For him, to think is to act. And what he thinks can be read on the open book of his countenance, though scarcely before his thought has spontaneously overflowed in words, and the movement of his whole body completes the outward expression of his words. If he wants a thing, he says so, and tries to get it. If he is pleased, he laughs, and his laugh extends to clapping hands and dancing feet. His displeasure is no less apparent and total, for again his whole body and soul are at one in outward expression : his tears are not enough but he must declaim his distress, and make a face, and stamp his feet, and clench his fists, and be " mad all over." Fact and fiction are to him equally good and exhilarating, because fancy, thought and action are continuous with one another, and because he lives and is at home with himself in each. Thought, will, sensation, desire, emotion, all flow together spontaneously and harmoniously into action, for they are the colours which in the living reality are unified in the white light of action. Action is life, and it is good to be alive.

With the doubtful advantage of growing maturity, the child of our culture learns complication. He acquires the habit of inhibition. He must obey the rule of polite discourse and no longer say outright what he thinks, especially what he thinks of other people, because the outspoken truth is often embarrassing to grown-ups. He learns to hide his feelings, whether pleasant or unpleasant, to present to the world a countenance whose impassive calm is allowed to be moved only by the fashionable expressions of conventional emotion, the technique of simulation and dissimulation. But what is more to our present argument, he will begin to live in division from himself, to distinguish thought from action, theory from practice, to adopt different and sometimes contradictory roles, and to evolve in his own conception of himself an artificial ideal which is to a varying degree removed from the reality. His religious life will be kept in a decent privacy : it will not do to talk about it, and it will not be allowed to protrude too obviously in his business and family life, being an affair of his " soul." In general, indeed, he will follow the fashion of keeping his private thoughts to himself, and sometimes from himself, for immediate expediency has become the rule of action. What he thinks, what he feels, what he says, and what he does, tend, as a result of practice, to issue from

different and mutually independent compartments. Now this division (we might almost say disintegration) of the personality shows itself to be artificial by the fact that it gives rise to internal conflict, a conflict with the natural and fundamental need of psychological unity. It is not a fight between higher and lower self, between angel and beast in us, between body and soul, but a struggle against disintegrating forces operating at all levels ; it is a struggle, not to suppress one part of our nature, but to bring our total self, body and soul, into the healthy unity of action directed towards the highest purpose of our human destiny.

IV

The analytic method in philosophy involves an inherent danger. We are prone to confuse metaphysics and physics, in particular to carry forward a metaphysical distinction as a physical separation. The damage caused by our analytic scalpel is not always repaired by the subsequent synthesis. Our too enthusiastic surgery is liable to develop into an autopsy. So as children we delighted in taking our toy to pieces to satisfy our curiosity as to how it worked ; but often when we reassembled the dismembered parts, we found that somehow it was not as good as before. The whole is more than the sum of its parts. So it is with the nature of man. When we consider separately his body and his soul, or more subtly his intellectual and his sensitive life, we no longer see how these are combined in one in the living reality. Instead of the man, we find ourselves considering a corpse possessed by an uneasy ghost.

When we look upon man as he really is, we ought to take note that first and foremost he is an intelligent being. His mind is the core of his being. By it he transcends the material universe, space and time ; he can read the meaning of the book of nature and probe the secret of existence. But let us not go too far. As St. Thomas says, man is in the lowest rank of intelligent beings. The angels have the gift of infused knowledge from their Creator ; they have never had to go to school. Man's knowledge is learning ; he must acquire it the hard way, by his own effort, and he has to start his life knowing nothing, a *tabula rasa in qua nihil est scriptum*. Nature endows him only with the power to know, to learn, and the way he must use this power is through experimental contact with the objects of his knowledge. Now this experimental contact necessarily means a physical material action of the object on the mind. Without the bridge of physical action, object and mind would remain for ever cut off from one another, confined within their own individual natures. The action of the object is a necessary preliminary to the activation of the mind. Since it is a physical material action, we can understand that both object and mind must be themselves material. And here immediately we find ourselves face to face with the paradox of man's nature : man's mind, an intelligence whose natural mode of operation is to make free of all

material limitations, to reach beyond the confines of matter, thereby showing itself to be spiritual, is at the same time and by its very nature a material thing. The conclusion is easily drawn : man's mind is not a simple power, but a functional coordination of intellect and sense, and it is for this very reason that man must have a material body, that he must be a unity composed of matter and spirit, of body and soul.

The foregoing argument might seem at first sight to be unnecessary. Our conclusion might appear to be more evident than the premises of our argument. Would it not be more reasonable to start with this very obvious fact, that man has a body, and reason to the less patent fact that he also has a spiritual side to his nature which raises him above the brute animal? But on the latter line of reasoning one is liable to miss the point that we wish to make, namely, that according to the intention of nature man's material body, his powers of sense and feeling, are a natural and necessary consequence of his centrally spiritual nature. His sensitive powers, his very emotions and passions, have no autonomy or purpose of their own, but are by nature involved in the higher purpose of man's intellectual and spiritual being. The purpose for which a thing is made determines its structure and its functioning. The senses of an animal serve a purely biological end. In man they have a higher purpose, a spiritual vocation, and so their very inner functioning will be different, more perfect, and their value enhanced.

Since the structure of the whole man is determined throughout by the intellectual or spiritual core of his nature, human action is intended to show the same direction towards a higher purpose. Man's composite nature is reflected in his action, he expresses his whole self in his acts, in so far as he uses material things intelligently, and fulfills his destiny by directing their use to his spiritual end. Looked at from one point of view, man's action is all on the material level, serving the needs of his own body, seeking his livelihood by work, communicating with his fellows by external words. One can analyse that material action of man and fail to see the thought which is infused into it. His soul informs his body, and his spirit informs the work of his hands. His is a higher Behaviourism. If his action is human action, it will be purposeful and intelligent, there will be a meaning in it, just as the black letters on the page of a book are, in a way, only material impressions of printer's ink, but the book conveys a meaning to him who can read. So man's destiny is in his own hands, bound up in his use of all his own powers, bodily and intellectual, and of the material creation in which he has been placed. The sweat of his brow and the toil of his hands have a transcending value. One in his own nature, he is meant to give a meaningful unity to his life, consistently to direct all his acts towards his ultimate end, which is God. It is left ultimately to himself to write out his future Judgment in the actions of his life.

DERMOT M. CASEY

THACKERAY IN IRELAND

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BACON says: "When a traveller returneth home, let him not leave the countries where he hath travelled altogether behind him." It is equally true that, when a traveller sets out, he should leave behind him all that might blind or trammel him in his interpretation of another land. Prejudice, both political and religious, culpabable and indurated ignorance, muddle-headed sentimentality—these were a part of the impediments which Thackeray should have jettisoned before he made that tour commemorated in *The Irish Sketch Book*. There was, however, another burden which he could not lay aside and which affected his point of view—his personal connection with Ireland through his hapless marriage.

The *Sketch Book*, of slight intrinsic value, has yet some historical and psychological interest. It serves to explain the attitude which made it possible for English tourists to preserve an untroubled conscience in the face of Irish sufferings. It gives us occasionally a picture of some contemporary aspect of Irish life, seen with mere ocular vision and offered without the power, or perhaps the wish, to interpret. *The Irish Sketch Book*, like so many other works of the same kind, proves that the average Englishman shared with his government the view that the Irish were at best irresponsible children, at worst dangerous incendiaries—certainly never to be envisaged as an ancient race which had, in fact, brought Christianity and culture to Britain in the less fortunate days of the sister isle.

It would be incorrect to ascribe to Thackeray a clearly realized animosity to Ireland. No matter what country might be concerned, Thackeray's ideas in the political, religious or sociological sphere were uniform only in their confusion and consistent only in their inconsistency. Chesterton has wisely said: "He was primarily a man of impressions rather than a man of convictions. And such convictions as he had were of the slightly hum-drum Victorian sort; a vague disapproval of armed revolution; a vague approval of philanthropy." He was essentially good-natured, but indolent in all that required penetration to fundamental principles. Enormously interested in human beings, he worked by creative instinct, and not by reasoned analysis. His approach to life is mainly emotional; and his chaotic and contradictory views are supported by a scaffolding of conditioned reactions—conditioned in every case by his upbringing and his particular milieu. For independent thought he substitutes a set of clichés. They are the clichés of his political, religious and social background. Nowhere in his life or writings can one discern the power to judge critically any of the outstanding issues of his time.

He was born into an England still rife with injustice—an England in which Protestant Dissenters and Catholics were penalised; in which the criminal law was unduly severe and unequally administered; in which the factory system was a festering sore, and child labour an abomination; in which parliamentary reform had long been awaited in vain. Thackeray becomes a garrulous Radical. He joins the Reform Club, and confides to his mother: "I am not a Chartist, only a Republican. I would like to see all men equal, and this bloated aristocracy blasted to the wings of all the winds." But his ideas of reform are curiously restricted in their application. Thackeray is content to float comfortably on the calms of a stagnant humanitarianism. Despite his sharp-shooting at snobs, he is not indifferent to social privilege. The latitudinarian in religious thought is intolerant when his engrained prejudices are released by emotion. The man who denounces England's betrayal of Poland would be the last to admit England's betrayal of Ireland. His fluctuations—which spring from the clash of liberal theory and illiberal background—never enable him to evolve a lucid or a stable point of view. When, as sometimes happens, he feels stirring dimly within him the necessity of judging where justice lies, he takes refuge in a rosy *non sequitur*, and declares: "Look, the sun shines on both alike, ' and the blue sky bends over all ' ".

Such was Thackeray's state of mind, and it could not be expected that he could develop, during his Irish tour, an acumen which he was unable to apply to the problems of his own country. Indeed, in the case of Ireland, still less could be expected, since he came knowing so little and prepared to dislike so much. His attitude towards Ireland is compounded of many moods: amused superiority, unease, repugnance, pity, and an angry sense of frustration. Underlying and reinforcing such feelings, there was the keenest personal grief, a sense of revulsion at returning to a land where already he had suffered so much. In 1840, two years before the Irish tour, Thackeray had brought his young wife to Ireland under circumstances so dreadful as to remain ever-present in his memory.

I.

Thackeray was a young man of twenty-four, studying art in Paris, when he fell in love with an Irish girl of eighteen, Isabella Shawe. She was the daughter of Colonel Matthew Shawe, C.B. (said to have been Military Secretary to the Marquess of Wellesley in India) and of his wife, the former Isabella Creagh of Doneraile, Co. Cork. There were four other children of these parents: Jane, Arthur, Henry and one other son. When her husband died, Mrs. Shawe brought her family to Paris where, by careful economies, they managed to live on a small income. After a year of courtship, much disturbed by the jealous and tyrannical interference of Mrs. Shawe, Thackeray married Isabella on 20th August 1836.

There can be no doubt that Mrs. Shawe was a highly objectionable mother-in-law, and that Thackeray suffered long and patiently at her hands. Of this there is ample proof in the letters of Isabella and Thackeray, and in Thackeray's novels (which are largely autobiographical). Over and over again we meet Mrs. Shawe impaled on Thackeray's pen-point under various guises, yet always essentially the same. She is the original of all Thackeray's portraits of the Irish " Mejor's " wife or widow —under-bred, over-bearing, hard, vulgar, stingy, boastful, combining gross solecisms with excruciating pretensions. Most notably she appears as Mrs. Major Gam in *Denis Haggarty's Wife*, as the Campaigner in *The Newcomes*, as Mrs. Baines in *Philip* (the novel which records, under fictional guise, Thackeray's wooing in Paris). Two brief passages from *Philip* give us a vivid picture which is thoroughly supported by all that is known of Mrs. Shawe's character and behaviour :

> She was a frugal woman ; fond of her young, or let us say anxious to provide for their maintenance ; and here with my best compliments, I think the catalogue of her best qualities is ended. She had a bad and violent temper ; a disagreeable person, attired in very bad taste ; a shrieking voice ; and two manners, the respectful and the patronising, which were both alike odious[1].

And again :—

> She covered the dagger with which she would have stabbed us ; but we knew it was there clenched in her skinny hand in her meagre pocket. She would pay us the most fulsome compliments with anger raging in her eyes ; a little hate-bearing woman, envious, malicious, but loving her cubs, and nursing them and clutching them in her lean arms with jealous strain[2].

Later Thackeray was to say : " One must not judge too hardly a woman who is really and truly demented." And this, in fact, seems to have been very near the truth. " With such a mother," says Ray, " it is not surprising that only two of the Shawe children were entirely normal. Henry was a dipsomaniac, Jane pitifully neurotic, and Isabella, as we know, lost her mind not long after the birth of her third daughter in the summer of 1840."[3]

The marriage which was to end so pitifully gave to Thackeray four perfect years. The young couple settled in London, living from hand to mouth, too happy to care that Mrs. Shawe penuriously withheld all but the first instalment of Isabella's allowance, or that Arthur Shawe, deplorable brother of Isabella, foisted himself upon them until they managed to ship him off to India. In 1837 a daughter was born (Anne Isabella, later Lady Ritchie), and in the following year a second child, who died after eight months. This misfortune deeply affected Mrs. Thackeray. In May 1840, there was another baby (Harriet, who became Mrs. Leslie

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[1] *Philip* (Smith, Elder ed. 1878, ii, 3).
[2] *Ibid.*, i, 328.
[3] *The Letters and Private Papers of W. M. Thackeray.* (Ed. Gordon N. Ray, 1945) i, clxiv.

Stephen). For some weeks all went well, and then Mrs. Thackeray's nervous instability began to cause some uneasiness. The family went for a brief holiday to Margate, but it was apparent that Isabella's condition had become worse. Thackeray was now so awkwardly circumstanced that he was at his wits' end. The success of *Samuel Titmarsh* had given him the idea of transferring his hero to Ireland for a fresh series of adventures. Chapman and Hall rejected this notion, and were equally unwilling that the book should be called *A Cockney in Ireland*, but they agreed to publish an Irish sketch book. The contract was signed on 8 September 1840. It was arranged that Thackeray should go to Ireland in search of copy. What then was he to do with a wife who seemed to be suffering from nervous prostration, and with two children, the elder of whom was three years and the younger three months? Thackeray's mother, resident in Paris, was not in a position to take charge of his family. Mrs. Shawe and her daughter Jane were just then living in Cork at Grattan's Hill. Thackeray decided to take his wife and family to Cork, and to leave them under the care of Mrs. Shawe while he was travelling through Ireland. At once Mrs. Shawe made it clear that she would not have room for them in her little cottage; and so it was arranged that Isabella should stay with her mother and Jane, while Thackeray and the children, with the faithful nurse Brodie, should have lodgings in the house next door to Mrs. Shawe. Thackeray wrote to his mother: "She [Isabella] will be well with her mother while she is unwell—a bull: but I mean that there will be no scenes and quarrels. A couple of months, please God, will set her up somewhat, and will suffice, or nearly so, for my Irish tour."[1]

The little party left London on 12 September, and arrived in Cork three days later. By then the worst had happened, and Thackeray was forced to recognise that his wife was, at least temporarily, insane. On Sunday (13) she had thrown herself overboard, and was twenty minutes floating in the sea before she was rescued ("she was found floating on her back, paddling with her hands, and had never sunk at all"). On the following night she had made another attempt at suicide. The thought that the Shawes would welcome and succour them sustained Thackeray until they reached Cork. Delusive hope! Mrs. Shawe met them like a Medusa, and refused to have Isabella under her roof. Thackeray writes to his mother:—

> [Mrs. Shawe] has a spare room in her house and refused to receive her [Isabella] on account of her nerves (she's been very ill, that's certain) & those of her darling Jane. She abused me for bringing her away from London, said her daughter had been denied to her in time of health to be thrown on her in illness, & so on. She tried to pump out from Brodie whether I had been ill-treating her or not, & I scarcely get a meal at her home but I am obliged to swallow an insult with it.—But why talk of it? The woman is mad.[2]

[1] 10 September 1840 (Ray, i, 473).
[2] 21-24 September 1840 (Ray, i, 479).

And he adds that he must endure Mrs. Shawe's attitude, else she will withdraw herself completely, and prevent Jane from seeing and comforting Isabella.

For a little over three weeks the Thackeray family remained in Cork. Grattan's Hill and their lodgings at Mrs. O'Mahony's are described both in Thackeray's letters and in the *Sketch Book* :—

> I have just been strolling up a pretty little height called Grattan's Hill, that overlooks the town and the river, and where the artist that comes Corkwards may find many subjects for his pencil. There is a kind of pleasure-ground at the top of this eminence—a broad walk that draggles up to a ruined wall, with a ruined niche in it, and a battered stone bench. On the side that shelves down to the water are some beeches, and opposite them a row of houses from which you see one of the prettiest prospects possible—the shining river with the craft along the quays, and the busy city in the distance, the active little steamers puffing away towards Cove, the farther bank crowned with rich woods, and pleasant-looking country-houses—perhaps they are tumbling, rickety, and ruinous as those houses close by us, but you can't see the ruin from here.
>
> What a strange air of forlorn gaiety there is about the place ! The sky itself seems as if it did not know whether to laugh or cry, so full is it of clouds and sunshine. Little fat, ragged, smiling children are clambering about the rocks, and sitting on mossy door-steps, tending other children, yet smaller, fatter and more dirty[1].

The house is dirty too ; ramshackle, friendly, hospitable. It is true that the windows lack pulleys and the door locks ; that the drawingroom door cannot stay shut unless a chair is pushed against it ; that there is no poker and that the coals are brought on the lid of an old saucepan. But the people of this house are full of generous warmth. When Brodie is ill, they vie with each other in nursing and dandling the baby. Mrs. O'Mahony's three children play with small Nanny Thackeray, who soon begins to pick up a Cork accent. And then there is the old gentleman who inhabits the parlour (sleeping, Thackeray insists, in the piano). He wears an overcoat with deep pockets from which he dispenses apples to all the children.

> The English girl's father met her in the street one day, talking confidentially with a tall old gentleman in a greatcoat. " Who's your friend ? " says the Englishman afterwards to the little girl. " Don't you know him papa ? " said the child in the purest brogue. " Don't you know him ?—THAT'S UNCLE JAMES ! " And so it was : in this kind, poor, generous, bare-backed house, the English child found a set of new relations : little rosy brothers and sisters to play with, kind women to take the place of an almost dying mother, a good Uncle James to bring her home apples and care for her—one and all ready to share their little pittance with her, and to give her a place in their simple friendly hearts. God Almighty bless the widow and her mite, and all the kind souls under her roof ![2]

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[1] *The Irish Sketch Book* (ed. Collins), 99 f.

[2] *Ibid.*, 104.

Thackeray's letters to his mother during this period make pitiful reading. It is clear that he is " on duty " at his wife's side most of the time, although Mrs. Shawe and Jane sit with her frequently during the day. Isabella's condition varies. At times she seems to brighten, only to relapse into melancholy. She is " devoured by gloom " and full of a sense of imagined guilt. She has forgotten her children. (A retrospective analysis, necessarily tentative, has suggested that she was suffering from schizophrenia.) There is no longer any question of Thackeray's tour. The problem is : how can he take his family away to his mother in France ? Everything depends on Isabella's condition, so he watches, waits and hopes for a sign of improvement. She has now a horror of boats and of the sea. He toys with the notion of a little experiment, by which he may test what Isabella can bear :—

> There is a little boat to Cove, seven miles off. When she is better I may practice her on that : and then I must get her to Dublin, from Dublin to Liverpool by night with a dose of opium, from L[iverpool] to London, from London to Dover & so on[1].

The nights are the worst. He sits beside her watching her troubled sleep, writing a play for Charles Matthews, driven somehow by his creative passion. The candle gutters. He lies down, and a ribbon around her waist is fastened to his wrist lest she awake. And then suddenly he can endure no more, and he decides to risk the dreaded journey :—

> That woman at Cork became so odious . . . that on Friday morning, lying in bed awake, with my poor Isabella really worse than she had been for some time, worried by the howling of Anny, by the paw-pawing of her mother, & the discomforts of the place—that I say lying awake for 4 hours, I said to myself why am I to stay longer here—and this bright thought having occurred to me, I instantly felt myself happier, got up, walked to the Doctor, who advised me to go by all means, and so came off at 2 o'clock by the Queen Steamer, giving Mrs. Shawe no hint of my departure until 1, when she was advising me to put Isabella into a mad-house.[2]

But Isabella never recovered. She lived until 1894, surviving Thackeray by thirty years. He never forgot her. When he first met her in Paris he had said : " Your little red-polled ghost pursues me everywhere, the phantoms of . . . your songs are ever in my ears." When his life was nearly ended, he said : " I would do it again."

II

Two years after his calamitous visit to Cork, Thackeray returned to Ireland, so that he might fulfil his contract with Chapman and Hall. As a writer, his characteristic method was a juxtaposition of sentimentality and satire developed in a diffuse and talkative manner, and heavily weighted

[1] 4–5 September 1840 (Ray i, 483).
[2] 11 October 1840 (Ray, i, 486).

with digressions. Speaking in general of Thackeray's style, Chesterton says: "It is a method admirably suited to his particular purpose; that of half-ironically worming himself into the centre of a subject; politely insinuating himself into the secrets of everybody, before he begins to treat them satirically." But, in Ireland, Thackeray did not worm himself into the secrets of anybody. For want of knowledge his satire misses fire; and his humour is often as misplaced as jesting at a death-bed. By the end of his tour, he himself had come to realise that he was not fitted to write of Ireland. "I am beginning to find out now that a man ought to be forty years in the country instead of 3 months, and *then* he wouldn't be able to write about it. I wonder who *does* understand the place?"[1]

It might have lessened his incapacity, had he troubled to acquaint himself with Irish history; but his attitude as a traveller was rather that of Tom Sheridan's sire: "'I want to go into a coal mine,' says Tom Sheridan, 'in order to say that I have been there.' 'Well, then, say so,' replied the admirable father."[2] But there is, in fact, an irony which Thackeray does not divine in the contacts which he made during this period in Ireland. Those who entertain him, and those whom he meets socially belong to that very class which (as a Republican) he professes to despise. The suffering natives (theoretically his equals in the human brotherhood) he regards from afar with an eye which is Olympian, satirical or jaundiced. They, indeed, are no more willing than he to make any contact. How could it have been otherwise? He belongs to a nation and to a class which has treated them as pariahs in their own country. They will beg from him, pose for his pencil, play the buffoon; they will discuss him in muttered Gaelic, or stare at him silently. But the barrier is not lowered for one moment on either side. They are his jarveys, his chambermaids, his boatmen; they are the vagrants at the inn door; the children who run at the side of his coach; the idle men leaning over the bridge; the starving people pulling nettles from the ditches, or lying without work or hope outside their huts. In a word, they are Ireland, though he does not suspect it. He comes to a land which he regards as an extension of his own country, and he imagines that the misfortunes of the masses are, on the whole, merely due to the class system which in England also needed reform. He did not advert to the fact that in England the stratification was one of class; and that in Ireland it was due to political and religious persecution, by which his countrymen, as colonists, had trodden into the mire the native population. If, in addition to the need for social reform, he were asked to name one other element which he considered responsible for conditions in Ireland, he would at once have mentioned religious intolerance, which he considered equally detestable on either side. Since Catholic Emancipation had been achieved thirteen years before, Thackeray

[1] To his mother, 25–30 September 1842, (Ray, ii, 78).
[2] *Sketch Book* (ed. Collins), 364.

saw no reason why Catholics and Protestants could not now live together like brothers. He ignored the long years of penal persecution which had reduced the Catholic Irish to serfdom. He ignored the fact that Catholic Emancipation could not restore to them the prosperity, culture and prestige of which, because of their religion, they had been deprived. They remained now as prostrate materially as they had been during the Penal Laws, and many a year was to elapse before they obtained in fact the right to education which was now theoretically theirs.

Near Waterford Thackeray saw a hedge-school for the first time: "A crowd of half-savage looking lads and girls looked up from their studies in the ditch, their college or lecture-room being in a mud cabin hard by." Without comment, he passes on to a description of a merry rascal who is selling poached salmon. He does not ask why and when it was that hedge-schools came into existence. And yet he is well aware of the quality of Irish intellect which had been doomed to waste for hundreds of years. In Cork, for example, he particularly remarks a love of books, a thirst for learning :—

> I think, in walking the streets and looking at the ragged urchins crowding there, every Englishman must remark that the superiority of intelligence is here, and not with us. I never saw such a collection of bright-eyed, wild, clever, eager faces . . . I listened to two boys almost in rags; they were lolling over the quay balustrade, and talking about *one of the Ptolemys* ! and talking very well too. One of them had been reading in *Rollin*, and was detailing his information with a great deal of eloquence and fire. Another day, walking in the Mardyke, I followed three boys, not half so well-dressed as London errand-boys : one was telling the other about Captain Ross's voyages, and spoke with as much brightness and intelligence as the best read gentleman's son in England could do. He was as much of a gentleman, too, the ragged young student; his manner as good, though perhaps more eager and emphatic; his language was extremely rich, too, and eloquent . . . Both of these ragged Irish lads had the making of gentlemen, scholars, orators, in them.[1]

When Thackeray came to Ireland the National Schools scheme had been in existence for over a decade, and already the non-Catholic section had endeavoured to make the schools essentially Protestant. Thackeray equally expresses his detestation for the Synod of Ulster and for Archbishop MacHale (whom he calls mountebank). He strongly advocates an undenominational education which, he believes, would bring both sections to live in fraternal amity. Yet frequently the old yeast works through his efforts at general toleration, as we may note in a letter to his mother— At Armagh the Moderator of the Synod of Alster (*sic*) has told him of monstrous intrigues of the Roman Catholic clergy. He thought that they would make a good chapter for his book, but he felt bound to seek verification. He found that the Moderator's statement was "a rank and monstrous falsehood . . . a little truth with 90/100 part lies . . . but they

[1] *Ibid.*, 96.

are all so in this country, all exaggerating in abuse of each other. Not but that the priests are a disgusting body, and though I say thank God now as I ought if the truth must out, when I found the story against them was untrue, my first feeling was one of some mortification."[1]

His feelings on the religious issue continue to be mixed. He advocates a Munster University, " for which the Corcagians are eager." He praises the work of the Christian Brothers. But he finds at Maynooth only lazy squalor," and desiderates half a score of drill sergeants " to see that the students appear clean at lecture and to teach them to keep their heads up and to look people in the face." The priests at Maynooth are no better : " Why should a stranger, after a week's stay in the country, be able to discover a priest by the scowl on his face, and his doubtful, downcast manner. Is it a point of discipline that his reverence should look as ill-humoured as possible ? "[2] Yet, speaking of a priest in a desolate part of Connemara, " a young, lively, well-educated man " (presumably from Maynooth), he exclaims : " Who would not honour such missionaries—the virtues they silently practice, the doctrine they preach ! " Melleray he passes without stopping : " I was very glad we had no time for the grovelling place : and as for seeing shoes made or fields tilled by reverend amateurs, we can find cobblers and plough-boys to do the work better."[3] The Ursuline Convent in Cork wrings from him the cry : " O honest Martin Luther ! thank God you came to pull that infernal, wicked, unnatural altar down—that cursed Paganism . . . Fly and beat your breasts in caverns and wildernesses, O women, if you will, but be Magdalenes first." " Here I am in a room with a live nun, pretty and pale—I wonder has she any of her sisterhood immured in *oubliettes* down below ; is her poor little, weak, delicate body scarred all over with scourgings, iron-collars, hair-shirts ? "[4] He has breakfast with Father Matthew, for whom he has a sincere admiration ; yet he quotes a delightful old gentleman who told him that " all the fun had gone out of Ireland since Father Matthew banished the whiskey from it."

III

And here a fundamental impression emerges, despite Thackeray's copious descriptions of rollicking races at Killarney, comic coachmen, wayside wits, and the thousand high-spirited peasants of all ages, male and female, who gyrate through his narrative like a Hibernian merry-go round. The jovial tourists dash through the countryside at crazy speed, with

[1] ?–16 October 1842 (Ray ii, 85).
[2] *Irish Sketch Book*, 411.
[3] *Ibid.*, 64.
[4] *Ibid.*, 85.

plenty of whiskey and cold chicken in the boot, " singing, shouting, laughing, roaring, for the whole journey, ' British sailors have a knack, pull away ho, boys ! Huroo, my fine fellow, does your mother know you're out ? ' " And the peasants climb on the ditches to watch ; the half-naked children run by the wheels—but somehow they are not really gay :—

> Indeed any stranger going amongst the people can perceive that they are now anything but gay. I have seen a great number of crowds and meetings of people in all parts of Ireland, and found them all gloomy. There is nothing like the merry-making one reads of in Irish novels, Lever and Maxwell must be taken as chroniclers of the old times—the pleasant but wrong old times—for which one cannot help having an antiquarian fondness.[1]

This sombre impression may have been due to the hovels which littered the countryside, to the general air of inertia, to the vast number of beggars and diseased paupers who thronged every area through which Thackeray passed, and who never failed to have a profoundly irritating effect on his nerves :—

> I confess, with regard to the beggars, that I have never yet had the slightest sentiment of compassion for the very oldest and dirtiest of them, or been inclined to give them a penny.[2]

He despises their " lying prayers and loathesome compliments." He remarks how the livid and ghastly faces of the people interpose between you and the delightful scenery. Then, with a revulsion of pity and horror, he cries out :—

> And so it is throughout the south and west of Ireland ; the traveller is haunted by the face of popular starvation. It is not the exception, it is the condition of the people. In this fairest and richest of countries, men are suffering and starving by millions. There are thousands of them at this minute, stretched in the sunshine at their cabin doors with no work, scarcely any food, no hope seemingly. Strong countrymen are lying in bed " *for the hunger* "—because a man lying on his back does not need so much food as a person a-foot. Many of them have torn up the unripe potatoes from their little gardens, to exist now, and must look to winter, when they shall have to suffer starvation and cold too. The epicurean, and traveller for pleasure, had better travel anywhere than here ; where there are miseries that one does not dare to think of ; where one is always feeling how helpless pity is, and how hopeless relief, and is perpetually made ashamed of being happy.[3]

He poses the question : " How do all these people live ? " He refers to the Irish Poor Law Report as if he had read it, but it is apparent that he knows and understands nothing whatever. When Thackeray came to Ireland the population was over eight millions. Of that number one-third consisted of destitute poor. This was due to a variety of causes all of which sprang directly from unjust government. Thackeray is

[1] *Ibid.*, 78.
[2] *Ibid.*, 50.
[3] *Ibid.*, 99.

aware of the evils of absenteeism, but does not seem at all sure that injustice can exist when the landlord is resident. He has been hospitably entertained by various landlords in Ireland, and appears to regard them with a favourable eye. He does not mention evictions ; yet between 1839 and 1843 (a period which includes the year of his Irish tour), 50,000 tenants had been evicted—that is to say merely in those four years. If Thackeray had kept in mind even the outstanding Parliamentary events of his own life-time, he should have recalled that, hot on the heels of the Catholic Relief Bill, in 1793, the landlords created the 40s. freeholders, purely for the sake of their votes. In 1829 these 40s. freeholders were disfranchised ; their utility to the landlords was therefore ended, and they were thrown on the roadside. Many other causes contributed to Irish poverty, particularly the state of agriculture and of trade. Thackeray remarks the neglected state of Irish agriculture, despite the " amazing fertility of the land." He observes the tracts of hundreds of acres left barren " where the commonest effort might make it productive." He thinks that the holding of Agricultural Shows and dinners might go far to solve the problem. Alas ! it is a problem that he might have understood had he, in fact, read the Poor Law Report, because there (as also in the Census of 1841) the condition of Irish agriculture was fully set out. These reports reveal some interesting points as to the relative condition of agriculture in Ireland and in England after the Union. They serve to explain that, of the two and two-third millions of destitute poor in Ireland the majority were able-bodied peasants who wanted to work, but could not secure employment. The total number of cultivated acres in England was twice that of Ireland. Per acre, the number of labourers employed in England was more than twice that employed in Ireland. Per acre, the produce of the land in England was twice that of Ireland. And in England the agricultural labourer received four times the payment of a labourer in Ireland. In Ireland the agricultural labourer received 2s. to 2s. 6d. a week. Happy was the Irish peasant who could command even these miserable wages. Thackeray was aware that the Irish thronged to England to get an opportunity of working on the land ; and that, when their usefulness there had ended, they were shipped home, lest they fall upon the rates.[1] Apart from emigration, there was no escape from semi-starvation at home. In trade also the results of the Union were visible. The decay of manufactures had thrown thousands out of work, and these helped to swell the two and two-third millions of paupers. " How *can* the State support such a burden ? " asks Thackeray ; but, like Mr. Scrooge, he finds the answer : " Are there no workhouses ? "

There were. They had been established four years previously, but, as Thackeray observed, the poor liked their freedom " and prefer to

[1] *Ibid.*, 108.

starve and to be as ragged as they list."[1] In any case, not all the destitute were so fortunate as to have the entrée to a workhouse. Each district was made chargeable with the support of its own poor; but, according to the Act, a pauper should have occupied the same tenement in a given electoral division for twelve out of eighteen calendar months previous to his application for relief. The landlords, anxious to clear their tenants off the rates in rural electoral divisions, evicted them when they became destitute; so that these unfortunates were not merely starving and homeless, but also ineligible for relief.

Thackeray is shocked at the mud cabins. Over and over again he mentions them ("an ordinary pigsty in England is really more comfortable"). According to the Census for 1841, seven-tenths of the Irish in general, and two-thirds of the Irish in Connaught lived in rooms unfit for human habitation. But the instinct for reform is strong in Thackeray. He bids the destitute reform their dwellings:—

> Are we to set all this down to absenteeism, and pity poor injured Ireland? Is the landlord's absence the reason why the house is filthy, and Biddy lolls in the porch all day? Upon my word, I have heard people talk as if, when Pat's thatch was blown off, the landlord ought to go and fetch the straw and the ladder, and mend it himself. People need not be dirty if they are ever so idle; if they are ever so poor, pigs and men need not live together.

There is in fact rich irony in the *volte face* which Thackeray executed during his Irish journey, and it is scarcely surprising that, in the end, he succeeded in antagonising all parties. When Thackeray arrived in Ireland Lever, who was acquainted only with his writings, gave a dinner for him. A chance remark revealed that Thackeray was a member of the Reform Club, and at once he was treated by Lever and the Tory gathering with polite distrust. Major Frank Dwyer, a guest on that occasion, records:—

> [Thackeray] adopted the liberal ideas of that period to their fullest extent, and the immediate object of his visit to Ireland was to write up something in the interests of his party—the coming question of the day was the repeal of the Corn Laws; and there was also something to be ascertained about Maynooth, and a faint shadowing forth of what has, since then, been known as "Upas-tree felling."[2]

But, as we have seen, the Tory element had no cause for uneasiness. At the end of his Irish journey, Thackeray records that he has been cured of his liberal tendencies:—

> A man coming here as I did with a strong predisposition in favour of the Catholics, priests & all, can't fail to get indignant at the slavish brutal superstition of the latter, and to become rather Toryfied so far. So I shall be abused by the Catholic Press for abusing the priests, and by the Tory papers for being a liberal and very unhappy be sure will this make me. And both parties will ask, what business has this booksellers' hack who is only fit to cut jokes and scribble buffooneries to write about our country?—and both parties will be right too.[3]

[1] *Ibid*, 156.
[2] Extract from Major Frank Dwyer's *Memoranda*, Ray, ii, 66, footnote.
[3] Letter to Thackeray's mother, 25–30 September 1842 (Ray, ii, 78).

Irish national reactions may be gauged by O'Connell's attitude when chance brought him into the same room as Thackeray, who had never met the Liberator, but who had never lost a chance to vilify him :—

> I saw Dan O'Connell yesterday at the Reform Club, all the world is mad about him here and I find myself in a minority of one regarding him and his conduct. The old rogue gave me a fierce look at wh. I felt as if my heart were coming into my mouth—for he has no love for Titmarsh as I am told—indeed that author has offended people of every party in Ireland, and would be massacred were he to return thither.[1]

His castigation by Lever, however, was caused simply by personal spleen. Lever had accepted Thackeray's dedication of the *Sketch Book* to him, and had given the volume a favourable review. Later, in revenge for a review which he considered too carping, and also for Thackeray's parody of him (entitled *Phil Fogarty*), Lever retaliated with Elias Howle, the Cockney traveller and wit in *Roland Cashel*. He attacks Thackeray's attitude towards Ireland with the conscious rectitude of an old lag turned King's Evidence :—

> Mr. Howle . . . was the creator of that new school of travel which, writing expressly for London readers, refers everything to the standard of " town " . . . Ireland was . . . a splendid field for his peculiar talents . . . " This inspired Cockney " determined . . . not to counsel nor console, not to lament over nor bewail our varied mass of errors and misfortunes, but to laugh at us. To hunt out as many incongruities—many real enough, some fictitious—as he could find ; to unveil all that he could discover of social anomaly ; and, without any reference to, or any knowledge of, the people, to bring them up for judgment before his less volatile and more happily circumstanced countrymen, certain of the verdict he sought for—a hearty laugh. His mission was to make " Punch " out of Ireland, and no one was more capable for the office.

Laugh, Punchinello ! And yet in his wandering through Ireland, Thackeray suffered keenly, not at the sight of that complicated misery which he could not understand, but because he was haunted by memories of his domestic tragedy. From Cork he writes :—

> I have had some weary work here, going about to the old haunts, where I was with the poor little woman—it is astonishing what memories the people have, a carman who drove me home recollected me perfectly, and made enquiries, etc. I went to Grattan's Hill but could not find my dear little Nanny's friends Minny & the rest, they were out with their mother—what a sickness the place gave me ! & this opposite door where the mother used to live ![2]

Killarney, he says, is " too handsome ; and the loneliness by no means bearable ". He has sent off a letter to " poor Puss " (Isabella—then in a private asylum at Chaillot) ; and met a cousin of hers who, due to Mrs. Shawe's tales, treated him as if he were a dreadful reprobate. " I am always thinking about Nanny, but not of the little one, God bless her ; but the mother makes half the children, that's the truth."

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[1] Letter to Thackeray's mother, 11 March 1844 (Ray, ii, 165).
[2] Letter to his mother, 29 July 1842 (Ray, ii, 68 f.).

In Dublin he writes :—

> To-day a little child in its nurse's arms in Sackville Street, saw me and began shouting out " Papa, Papa " wh. gave me such a turn of the stomach as never was—its a long time since I've been away from the little people, but pray God the long time will soon be over : 3 weeks more in the north and the job will be all but done . . . I have left this letter open thinking and thinking about the children and whether I should take them or leave them with you . . . I've been thinking of little else.[1]

And finally, about a fortnight before he left Ireland : " O I am glad that the end of my trip is (near). I have been heart weary for months, that's the fact."[2]

It should not surprise us to find such human feelings underlying the traveller's inhumane obtuseness, for it is true that we tend to narrow the field of our sensibilities to our own sufferings, and that our personal problems most actively engross our interest. How could we otherwise endure a world where enslavement, persecution and starvation are still the fate of so many millions ? It is even understandable that Thackeray's prejudice hardened as he surveyed those whom his race had so greatly afflicted, " for [says Dostoievsky] it is always more difficult to forgive those who have not offended one, and just because they have *not* injured one, and that therefore one's complaint against them is groundless." Were it possible to treat a part as the whole, one facet as an entire character, one could perhaps make a final judgment of Thackeray in his relation with Ireland. Even then, what aspect should one select as representative ?—the gratitude that drove him, despite terrible memories, to revisit Grattan's Hill ? Or the mingled ignorance and sense of guilt which drove him to sneer at Irish beggars ? Maybe the truth is suggested in Thackeray's own words : " I often think that, in one's intercourse with men, wh. creates sympathies with some & antipathies with others, the party who hates you, & he who loves you, are both right."[3]

B. G. MacCarthy

[1] Letter to his mother, 25–30 September 1842 (Ray, ii, 78).
[2] Letter to his mother, 16 October 1842 (Ray, ii, 85).
[3] Letter to his mother, 12–14 August 1842 (Ray, ii, 72).

THE NEGRO IN AMERICA

BY DANIEL LYONS, S.J.

AMERICA'S race question is the most enigmatic social problem in the world. For over two centuries the United States has been a melting pot of every race, creed, and nation. That it has engendered so much racial strife seems utterly incomprehensible. Since there are no native Americans (except for a few hundred thousand Indians), the problem should be viewed realistically: why have the Europeans who emigrated to America acquired such a prejudice towards the Negro?

I

America's Negroes cannot be considered foreigners by the rest of the population. Of the 12,865,518 Negroes in the United States, 99.4 per cent. are American born and 97 per cent. are of purely native parentage. This makes them far more American than the average person, for nearly ten per cent. of America's population were born abroad and less than seventy per cent. are of native parentage. In 1790, America's 800,000 Negroes constituted twenty per cent. of her population. To-day the thirteen million Negroes make up ten per cent. of the population.

The injustices committed against the Negro in America do not make pleasant reading. They are chiefly threefold: (1) political; (2) economic; (3) social.

Political injustice: of the three million potential Negro voters in the deep South, the vast majority are not allowed to vote. Theoretically, they are given this right by the Federal Constitution. But each state is able to restrict a voter's right, and the Southern states arbitrarily reject Negro voters by a nebulous "good conduct" qualification, by placing a tax on voting, and by various other schemes. The Federal government has declared many of these devices unconstitutional, and each election sees more Negroes going to the polls.

Economic injustice: the main way to get benefits for a certain district, under a democratic government, is by political pressure. Hence the Negro in the Southern states, without a vote, is unable to protest effectively against the rankest discrimination in the law courts, in the public schools, and in the municipal services.

Economic injustice dogs the heels of the Negro wherever he goes. Though Negroes constitute ten per cent. of the U.S. population, they receive only three per cent. of the national income. Everywhere the majority of the desirable jobs are closed to coloured applicants. Tradition and prejudice enforce this in the Northern states. In the South, it is also

insured by keeping the Negro ignorant. Southern states have separate schools for Negroes, and in a few states only one dollar is spent for schooling per Negro pupil for every eight dollars spent for each white child.

A large proportion of Southern Negroes suffer from malnutrition. Southern states pay less to Negro teachers, Negro labour, and Negro pensioners. A coloured person must live in the worst section of many American cities. The United States Supreme Court has declared racial zoning unconstitutional, but real-estate men enforce it privately. Negroes, the last hired and first fired, are limited to inferior, low-paying jobs. Most of them are porters, waiters, domestic servants, or sharecroppers (poor tenant farmers). Tens of thousands of Negroes do the dirty jobs around meat-packing plants. They are seldom allowed to work in business or the professions, or even to hold jobs as clerks. America's treatment of the Negro was tersely summed up by the late George Bernard Shaw when he spoke of the " haughty American nation which makes the negro clean its boots and then proves the moral and physical inferiority of the negro by the fact that he is a shoeblack." The condition of the Negro reflects, not so much upon himself, but upon the rest of America, which forced that condition upon him.

Social injustice : the myriad social restrictions forced upon Negroes are known as Jim Crow laws. The maze of Jim Crow legislation was passed by the congresses of Southern states at the turn of the century. First and foremost is the law against intermarriage. The other laws are, supposedly, all safeguards of this one. They include segregation in buses, trains, schools, restaurants, parks, libraries, cinemas, and places of work and residence. These laws constitute a labyrinthine social jungle. They are so involved and undefined that a Negro in travelling often finds it impossible to avoid offending against one taboo of etiquette or another. Even throughout the Northern states the better hotels and restaurants are usually closed to Negroes, though all of the state schools and most of the private schools accept them.

During World War II, Negro servicemen were segregated and frequently received inferior treatment, especially since they constituted a smaller group. They could not get specialized training to any appreciable extent. Their regiments were usually " service units," attached to transport, supply and housekeeping jobs. The Navy tried to keep Negroes confined to the galleys until a few years ago, and the Marine Corps still maintains total segregation. During the war a small number were received into certain parts of the Army Air Corps, but only after a well qualified Negro pilot filed a suit in the Federal courts, demanding that his application for admission to the Air Corps be considered on its merits. Two hours later the War Department announced that a Negro pursuit squadron would be formed.

The Red Cross insisted throughout the war on maintaining separate

blood banks for blood from Negro donors. The American Medical Association protested, as there is no way to tell the blood of different races apart, since there is no difference between them. Negroes took it as an added insult because all the blood banks set up by the Red Cross were modelled on the blood plasma bank set up in New York by the eminent Dr. Charles R. Drew, who is a Negro.

Americans have allowed the notion of whiteness, in a certain sense, to become an obsession. When America is spoken of as a melting pot, only the nations of Europe are thought of, not those nations from whence the slaves were stolen. So ingrained has this peculiar psychosis become that Americans tend to regard the prevention of race mixture as an essential characteristic of the American way of life.

II

It is natural for people to want to do what is right, and when they are doing something that is not right they are acting unnaturally, so they must make it seem right to themselves. Everyone, inasmuch as he employs such a dual personality, is given to justifying his wrongdoings, first to himself and then to others. This process is known as " rationalization." Because the Negro in America was not being treated fairly, excuses had to be thought up for the way he was being treated. This gave birth to a whole framework of theories against the Negro.

The Negro, it was argued, was a pagan savage who was a descendant of Noah's son, Cham, whom God had cursed. It was with reason that God had made Negroes different : He meant them to be slaves. As soon as such theories were disproven, new ones were concocted. Negroes, it was said, were all right for slave jobs, but lacked the ability for anything other than manual tasks. Consequently, they were barred from all but the heavier or dirtier work. Their terrible slums, it was charged, were their own fault : they were lazy, dirty, thriftless, and naturally criminal. Other theories were that " black is evil," and " niggers are just no good." Since Negroes were considered less capable, it was understood that they should get inferior schooling and less of it.

All of these theories have been disproven long ago by theologians and sociologists. Any notions of hereditary, physical, moral, or racial inferiority are now without foundation. There is a definite time lag, however, before the findings of science reach the ordinary people. At present there exists a strange anomaly in America : the general public still have racial prejudices caused by theories which were proven false long ago. Prejudice cannot continue that way. People always want to be rational.

No race is superior and none inferior. But in the United States the Negro has inferior opportunities. It is paying them too high a compliment to expect them all to be on a par with whites when the Negroes are forced

to spend their lives in the most congested areas, surrounded by some of the worst elements of society. It is true that the Negroes in America are physically inferior to the whites in some ways, *e.g.*, they die at a substantially earlier rate. This is due, however, not to an inferior nature, but to a lack of proper nurture. So it is in the mental and moral fields, where Negroes also suffer from consistently poor environment.

It is often argued that Negroes are naturally more criminal. They do commit more of some crimes, such as petty stealing, though less of others, such as embezzlement. But their paltry thievery reflects mainly on the white society that subjugates them to severe economic discrimination. Negroes do not steal, nor fight, any more than do a proportionate number of white people on the same economic level. Another charge hurled against the Negroes is that they have produced no great leader. Neither have the Catholics ever produced a president. At least until recently, prejudice made such feats impossible. This writer happened to be teaching in a large American college a few years ago where the small number of Negro students are given equal opportunity. One of them became president of the student body, and took the highest honours in the graduating class. He was voted the most scholarly and also the most popular boy in school; he won the Diocesan apologetics contest, the North-west oratorical championship, and took statewide honours in debating. (A convert, he is now studying for the priesthood in the Jesuit Order). Negroes are usually allowed to be leaders only of Negroes. In the fields where Negroes have been left unshackled, such as in athletics and in the entertainment world, they hold far more than their percentage of top positions.

Some people have tried to portray the Negroes as being very emotional by making much of their musical abilities. The Negroes, they say, are "king of jazz." It should not be forgotten that it was only under white influence that the Negroes invented jazz. Such songs as the *St. Louie Blues* are so foreign to the Negro's folk music that they seem to have been written to depict the nervous discontent and unhappiness of the white man's tinselled civilization. Of themselves the Negroes originated their profoundly religious "spirituals," America's only folk music.

Negroes, it is said, are superstitious and emotionally religious. Poorly educated, this is to some extent true. Deprived of material comforts, they have long been notably religious, although they tend to lose this quality as they mix with the whites. The hackneyed argument that "it was not without reason God created the Negroes as a distinct race," is becoming all the more decrepit as education advances. The racial inferiority and the enslavement of the Negro as a part of the divine economy, which it implies, do not tally with the teachings of Christ on racial equality. Nor does it harmonize with the beautiful doctrine of the Mystical Body. He Who spoke with a Samaritan at Jacob's well precisely because the Jews would not speak with Samaritans, and He Who gave us the lesson of the

good Samaritan, thoroughly cursed race prejudice. The New Testament is replete with racial justice and condemnations of anything smacking of racial intolerance.

III

In the eyes of the rest of the world, democratic America's treatment of the Negro is the most glaring inconsistency on earth. It has no parallel in Central or South America, England, France, Spain, Italy, or even in Russia. Such prejudice cannot be inborn, since it is largely limited to the United States. The false explanations for the Negro problem have been considered and dismissed. What are the real causes? America's race problem, which is the illegitimate offspring of ignorance and injustice, sprang from three main sources: (1) religious; (2) historical; (3) economic.

Religious causes: just as the race prejudice which existed in Germany under the Nazi regime could never have arisen if it had not been preceded by false philosophies, so the attitude of Americans towards the Negro could never have occurred if it had not been preceded by false religious ideas. North America's racial attitude never existed in South America, though they, too, had coloured slaves. If the United States had enjoyed South America's religious background and frame of mind it would not have its race dilemma to face to-day. What was it in North America's early religious background that made its grievous sin against democracy possible?

We are prone to think of America's early colonizers as deeply religious people. In some ways they were. But it was a warped religion, saturated with the spirit of Calvinism. Instead of "Blessed are the poor in spirit," the attitude transplanted from England was to despise anyone for being that way. To Calvinist minds an agricultural or business career was a sacred "calling," and to achieve success was a definite sign of God's favour. Logically, then, the poor had incurred God's disfavour. Since the prosperous and cultured were clearly God's elect, it was not hard to look with contempt on the savage Indians, and, later, on the Negro slaves, for God had "ordained" that they be in such a condition. This attitude was so stressed that it became, at least subconsciously, the main tenet of the Calvinist and Puritan religions.

In South America, where Catholic Spain colonized, the Indians were Christianised and officially guarded from exploitation. The descendants of early Negro slaves there, instead of being throttled as a lower caste, have continually been amalgamated. But under the Calvinistic policy, which North America pursued, the Indians became almost extinct, and the Negroes were trodden under foot.

Significantly, California, Arizona, and New Mexico are not even thought of when one speaks of the Southern states, as they were colonised

by the Spanish, and never practised slavery. The superb treatment of the Indians in these three states was in the sharpest contrast to the rest of North America. Nor did California, Arizona, and New Mexico ever acquire the prejudice towards the Negro which is such a blot on the states directly east of them. Hence the term *Southern states* has come to refer only to those states between Florida and Texas.

The only Catholic area in the Southern states was in French-Catholic Louisiana, and it is worthy of note that there were more free coloured people there than in any other part of the South. The Protestant Negro historian, Woodson, remarks that the English were " put to shame by this noble example of the Catholics." As the Church began to spread, Bishop England (a graduate of Carlow) established a school for free Negroes in Charleston, South Carolina. A generation before the Civil War, communities for coloured Sisters were established to labour in the South. The Catholic Church was just getting started in America at that time, however, and its influence was necessarily small.

Historical causes : muddle-headed thinking sometimes confuses the sense of strangeness encountered by the inexperienced in meeting with those of another race, with race prejudice. A sense of strangeness on both sides does not involve any initial aversion. Negroes are not prejudiced against whites. The physical differences of two races, however, can very easily be the foundation upon which a prejudice is built, as well as blamed. Historically, the fact that Negroes have been separated from whites has had much to do with the lack of fundamental understanding between the two races. At the outset, Negroes were not regarded as perpetual slaves. They possessed the same status as the white indentured servants, and many were permitted to work off the price they cost their master. But rationalizations about inferiority enabled the " superior race " gradually to push the Africans into chattel slavery for life, and their children were given the " right " of succession.

If the Negroes had arrived in America as poor immigrants their descendants would have been able to educate themselves, and America's race problem would hardly exist. Instead, the Negroes were shipped to America and sold like cattle. They had no chance to become literate or even learn to speak anything but broken English ; their families were split up at the nod of slave masters ; their morality was disregarded at the whim of immoral owners.

Historians no longer hold that slavery was the one big issue in America's Civil War. They point out all the other differences between the North and South, with their industrial versus agrarian economies, and their different types of culture. There was a natural cleavage which led to a common hostility and lack of understanding. When the war was over, the victorious North handled the liberated Negroes of 1865 very unwisely. The assassination of President Lincoln at this time was most unfortunate.

His treatment of the freed Negroes presumably would have been far more enlightened. After his death the North failed to realise what a colossal problem the South had on its hands. Instead of first trying to educate the Negroes (ninety-five per cent were illiterate), the North at once forced the South to elect Negroes to its legislatures. Cheap Northern carpet-bagger politicians swept through the South, exploiting and aggravating the festering sores of racial intolerance.

So detested did the Northerners make themselves that when the Federal troops were taken out of the South, in 1876, the reaction was fierce. Laws were passed immediately by the Southern legislatures which not only deprived the Negroes of their right to vote, but which insisted on segregation at home and at work, in travel and at school. It is this myopic policy that has been perpetuated. Segregation is no solution whatsoever. It is a physical means taken to solve a moral issue, and as such merely prolongs the problem and forestalls any hope of its solution.

Economic causes : the fear of inter-racial marriage is not the main factor underlying America's race prejudice. When the ordinary American regards this as the basic cause of the economic restrictions imposed upon his coloured fellow-citizens, he is merely trying to bolster up the *status quo*. Race purity and anti-intermarriage are deep-seated rationalizations stirred up to justify and perpetuate economic oppression. As Father John LaFarge, S.J., has remarked, the eagerness to retain cheap labour leads to an emotional attitude which is frequently mistaken for reasoning.

The economic phases of segregation have always been paramount with the Negro. Injustice in this field cuts him every hour of the day ; while intermarriage is far-off, for the most part, and under just conditions would appeal to him no more than it would to whites. Prejudice adapts itself most remarkably to economic exigencies. It first arose when hundreds of thousands of Negroes were imported as slave labour, during America's pioneer expansion. By 1800, slavery had become neither necessary nor profitable, and it could easily have been revoked, for rationalizations were at a low ebb. Then came the Industrial Revolution, with its cotton gin creating a world-wide market for cotton. Slaves were in demand like never before, and the man-hunt in Africa became furious. Entire tribes were wiped out, in consequence of this inhuman trafficking. Again, much needed rationalizations were in vogue, and doctrines of innate white superiority were brewed up that have since been surpassed only by the Nazis.

One of the factors in perpetuating discrimination has been the economic competition which exists between lower-class whites and Negroes, resulting in a selfish prejudice. It is similar to the case of the Mexicans on the Pacific coast. At first they were condemned as unfair economic competition ; but even though the census lists them as whites, rationalizers soon had them popularly damned as a " racially undesirable element."

As long as Americans continue to discriminate against Negroes purely on the basis of colour they will have to continue excogitating notions of racial inferiority, in a rather desperate effort to preserve a semblance of honesty in their own minds.

Much of prejudice is traditional. Americans are not aware of their false impressions about the Negro, which they absorb as continually and as imperceptibly as the blood pulses into their fingers. In literature and daily life, on the radio, stage, and screen, the stereotyped impressions are constantly there: the shiftless, comic Negro; the simple, smiling, doorman type of Negro; the "local colour" Negro; the minstrel; the lazy mulatto. In ordinary life Americans meet the Negroes only as bootblacks, porters, waiters, red caps, domestic servants, heavy manual labourers, or in the sports and entertainment world.

Prejudice thrives on ignorance much more commonly than it does on ill-will. The ordinary American still feels that the Negro is racially inferior. Why? Because of his experiences with Negroes. "They never get anywhere." Most people cannot detect the ignorance involved in that remark. The average person can hardly be expected to realise the subtle effects of "caste" in America which hinders the cultural development of Negroes. He cannot comprehend their cultural isolation, the disheartening treatment they receive, their being denied an outlet for anything more than "bread-and-butter" ambition. He is not aware of all the injustice, harsh treatment, and frustration they encounter, and which tend to produce a withered and thwarted personality.

What about interracial marriage? Whenever the race problem is discussed, the question is usually asked: "Would you want your sister to marry a Negro?" The answer, it seems, is supposed to be, "No; therefore let us continue on with the present position for the next fifty years," no matter how much injustice is involved. This is the excuse given for the discrimination against the Negro. The barring of "social equality," extended in some states to almost every sphere of life, is masqueraded as essential for this end. In the popular mind the intermarriage issue is mainly used to establish and buttress racial prejudices. Such thinking prescinds from the obvious principle that marriage is a question of free will. To imagine that if a Negro dines with a white man he can therefore marry his daughter is a post-prandial *non-sequitur* which ignores the fact that most probably the man's daughter does not choose to marry the coloured man, even if the latter should want to marry her.

When someone asks, "What if they did marry?" he is no longer told that it is against "race purity." But that is apparently the idea behind the objection. Taking the vast majority of Americans as they are, it is true to say that intermarriage is very much "against the grain." For those who do not think so, there is still the consideration of any future children. Will they have to suffer because of the prejudices of others?

Logically, the more interracial marriage is " against the grain," the less frequently will such marriages occur. By their own admission, prejudiced whites seem to think that the " grain " is remarkably thin, if prevention of every form of social intermingling is necessary to preclude whites and Negroes from falling in love. If society ever arrives at the stage where race amalgamation is not " against the grain " (for the brotherhood of man under the Fatherhood of God is much stronger than mere fellowship of race), if American society ever arrives at that stage of development, then, to be calm about it, there will be no problem at all.

IV

In solving her Negro problem (perhaps it should be termed a white problem, as it is in white people's minds where the prejudice lies) America need not be rash ; but she should be rational. The more Americans are able to pull the thorn of racial strife out of their country's side, the better Christians will they be and the better America will they have, for by turning away from Divine wisdom they have rejected human wisdom as well. There are three factors comprising the ideal solution : (1) religion ; (2) education ; (3) legislation.

Religion : the race question is historical and economic, cultural and educational, but its solution must be based fundamentally on religion. Education and legislation will not effect a lasting moral change unless they are reinforced by religous motives. Morality can hardly be legislated.

Because the race problem is primarily a moral issue, the Catholic Church is in an advantageous position towards bringing about its solution. A correct attitude towards the Negro by America's 26,000,000 Catholics would revolutionise America's race relations. To-day, as the Negro advances in education, he is looking more and more to the Catholic Church. He is becoming further aware of the inadequacies of his own sects. As the younger generation becomes better educated than its Negro preachers it is falling away from coloured churches. The percentage of Negro Catholics in most areas is as yet very small. This is mainly because none of their ancestors came from Catholic countries. In the last ten years, however, there have been more than 75,000 Negro converts to the Church. The powerful Catholic press is devoting 1,200 per cent. more space to the Negro question to-day than it did fifteen years ago. There are now more than 500 priests and 1,700 nuns who specialise in working for the Negro in America. They care for 345 missions and 250 schools, scattered in 59 dioceses. There are approximately 400,000 Negro Catholics, and 58,000 Negro pupils in Catholic schools. Negro students are welcome in the great majority of Catholic schools, convents, and seminaries throughout the country (except in those four Southern states where mixed schooling is still forbidden by state law). All this is in keeping with the heartfelt words of Pope Pius XII, addressed to the clergy of the United States :—

> We confess that we feel a special paternal affection, which is certainly inspired of Heaven for the Negro people dwelling among you; for in the field of religion and education we know that they need special care and comfort and are very deserving of it. We therefore invoke an abundance of heavenly blessings and we pray fruitful success for those whose generous zeal is devoted to their welfare.

Education: second only to religion for solving the race question is education, the handmaid of religion. Ignorance and prejudice commonly go hand in hand. Nothing will dissipate prejudice like a Christian education. An untrained mind is open to prejudice because, by jumping to conclusions, it is quick to generalise. Such a mind, seeing an ignorane and uncultured Negro from the lower South, associates the lack of culture with the fact that the person is coloured. A well-educated mind, on the contrary, perceiving the same Negro, recalls the poorer "white trash" from the South (and from the North, too, for that matter), and associates the backwardness with the particular individual's tardy environment, rather than with the colour of his hair or skin.

Prejudice is a rash judgment. An educated person will not make an unwarranted transition from the traits of some of the members of a race to their whole racial group. Unless he is trying to deceive himself, he will not blindly associate the physical characteristic of colour with moral qualities. The basis of prejudice is ignorance: the very notion of prejudice means condemning without sufficient reason, *e.g.*, to condemn a member of a racial group whom one has never met, simply because he belongs to that group. Yet most Americans still judge Negroes partially on the basis of emotional prejudices harboured since childhood. Such generalizations would fade away if people came to know a few coloured persons who are on their own cultural level. Americans come to know Negroes, for the most part, only as the latter perform the menial occupations imposed by a traditionally prejudiced society.

One of the worst social sins of to-day is generalizing against minority groups. An individual's peculiarities or failings are blamed on the fact that he is black or brown, if he is, whereas if he were white it would be impossible to generalize. As Father LaFarge has pointed out: "The first step toward combating wrong emotions and distorted habits is to clarify one's own ideas." (*The Race Question and the Negro*, p. 275). The second step towards the elimination of prejudice is to cease breeding children on it. Only too often white parents give their children the notion that they should not have any contact with Negro children. Children accept the prejudice unquestioningly.

Negroes need education, also. Poor housing and excessive poverty produce, not just in Negroes but in everyone, inferior bodies and weakened wills. Yet a person can never be judged because of his race. He must

be given the opportunity to prove his mettle. Colour of skin is no more significant than colour of hair, as far as individual worth is concerned.

Legislation : those who declare that the race question will never be solved until everyone is filled with the spirit of Christianity may sound pious enough, but they could hardly be less practical. Such an attitude in politicians simply means that they are shirking the difficulties of setting up a social order adapted to man as he is. To wait until everybody loses his prejudice before passing laws against discrimination is like waiting until every thief stops stealing before hiring policemen. Where selfishness enters in—and much of prejudice is financially profitable—we cannot rely solely on the moral integrity of everyone.

Should the legislation be by the separate states, or by the Federal Government ? Much of it will have to be Federal : firstly, for uniformity ; secondly, because the states in the deep South have proven themselves over-reluctant to take any steps at all. The problem involves Federal responsibility. Since the American Constitution guarantees to every citizen the exercise of his natural and civil rights, it should be uniformly enforced for everyone, no matter in what state he lives.

At long last the Federal government is realising that the race crisis in America is a national problem which depends for its solution on Federal action. After prolonged indifference, the United States Supreme Court is now aware that to uphold the Constitution, to guarantee to those reasonably qualified a chance to vote in national elections, and to safeguard even the Negro's constitutional rights, is the obligation of the Federal government. Every state should guarantee to all the impartial use of such public services as parks, schools, police protection, libraries, and the right of buying a home where they are able to and where they choose. But the Federal government must be prepared to step in where the states wantonly fail to do this.

It is the Supreme Court in America to-day, rather than Congress, that is gradually whittling away the legal foundations of discrimination. The Justices of the Supreme Court are unanimous in their position that everyone must be accorded equal treatment in everything that comes under public supervision. Negroes in the South are now entitled to the same opportunities for a university education as white students. The executive departments of the Federal government have abolished the colour line. Many Northern states have enacted anti-discrimination laws. The Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld Negroes' civil rights. Southern states have finally been forced to put Negroes on jury panels. More Negroes are being allowed to vote in the South than ever before. Real estate titles containing covenants barring sale to Negroes are legally unenforceable to-day. Negroes can no longer be prevented from travelling first class on trains, and cannot be segregated on interstate buses. Segregation is still almost universal in Southern schools, but it is quite certain

the Supreme Court will find Negro schools unequal, whenever a case is put before it.

In July, 1948, President Truman ordered " equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons " in the armed forces. A Presidential committee set to work in earnest to enforce this decree. The committee based its arguments on efficiency. To refuse a job to an intelligent or well-trained Negro, it argued, was a waste of manpower ; while the concentration of unskilled Negroes in segregated units merely served to multiply their inefficiency. The committee recently reported that the Navy, which banned all Negroes just thirty years ago, now employs them in every job classification, both ashore and afloat. Three-quarters of the 25,000 Negroes in the Air Force have been integrated into mixed units. All training schools and all jobs are open to them. Negro and white troops now sleep in the same barracks, patronise the same swimming pools, and use the same service clubs. The Negro servicemen are extremely proud of the success of this programme, while even the white Commanders testify that racial incidents have diminished rather than increased.

V.

The colour chemical which causes a brown or black pigmentation in one's appearance is called melanin. There is, of course, no connection of any kind between any cultural or moral quality and the amount of melanin in the body. Yellow pigmentation is caused by another chemical, carotene, while a pinkish tinge is due, not to one's political affiliations, but to the blood vessels showing through the skin. Everyone but an albino has some degree of these colour chemicals in his body, and albinos occur in every race. Since any inferiority that may exist cannot be racial, it must be environmental. Therefore any inferiority found in members of the Negro race as a group is due to a lack of equal environment and opportunity.

Although this article has been limited to the Negro problem, the principles indicated are equally applicable to other national or ethnological minorities. The sheer consistency of sincerity obliges this. No group, whether Jews, Japanese, or any other, can be condemned as a group. Each individual must be taken for what he is, and allowed an equal chance. The peculiar injustice involved in prejudice was well illustrated in an open letter written by a young American Negro, in 1944, to the students of Princeton University :—

> If you discriminate against me because I am uncouth, I can become mannerly. If you ostracize me because I am unclean, I can cleanse myself. If you segregate me because I lack knowledge, I can become educated. But if you discriminate against me because of my colour, I can do nothing. God gave me my colour.

DANIEL LYONS

IRISHMEN IN PALESTINE

1946-48

BY J. J. W. MURPHY, C.SS.R.

PALESTINE has been described as being the size of a county with the problems of a continent. Its size is rather more : " from Dan to Beersheba," the traditional limit of its inhabited area, is roughly equal to the combined area of Kerry, Cork and Tipperary. The description of its problems is nearer to the mark : it has problems of race, religion, language, politics, economics, defence, concentrated within its narrow borders and complicated beyond description. It may sound incredible, but the census of 1931, the last taken under the British Mandate, gave forty-one distinct religious bodies and sixty different language groups in Palestine. This concentration and complication does make understanding difficult, but it also tends to produce what may be called laboratory conditions for the observation of so many human impulses acting and reacting within such a small space.

Irishmen are generally interested in the problems of nationalist politics wherever they meet them. There were several hundred Irishmen in Palestine during the troubled years of 1946-1948. Some had been there for many years in the service of the Palestine Government ; most of them were in the police, where they were strongly represented at all levels. The newcomers were nearly all in the British Army, most of them in three Irish regiments, the Irish Guards, the Irish Fusiliers, the Ulster Rifles, who were stationed in Palestine after the 1939-45 war. There they came into close contact with a nationalist problem unique in history. Two peoples, differing from each other in everything except their intense patriotism, were contending bitterly for possession of the same country which each claimed as its native land.

I

It was not easy to judge between them. The pattern of nationalist politics familiar to the Irish was very little help here. The Jewish writer Arthur Koestler has said with some truth that one's view of the ethical basis of Jewish and Arab claims to Palestine depends on what date in history one decides to start from. The country was Jewish for some fifteen centuries until 135 A.D., when the bulk of its Jewish population was massacred or deported ; it then became a province of the Roman Empire. It was not always Jewish : the Jews invaded it and took it from the native Canaanites in the fourteenth century B.C. The Jews maintain that they did so at God's command. Christians and Muslims agree, but they point out that God gave Palestine to the Jews on certain conditions which have not been fulfilled. Religious Jews, who are a small minority in the Zionist

party, admit that they lost Palestine because the law of Moses was not kept in the second century A.D. Christians believe that the loss was a punishment on the Jews for their rejection of our Saviour. Muslims agree with Christians on this point; their religion honours our Lord Jesus Christ as a great prophet, somewhat as Christians honour St. John the Baptist, that is, as the forerunner of Mohamet, whom they believe to be the last and greatest prophet. About one in ten of the Palestinian Arabs are Christians; the rest are Muslims.[1]

The historical arguments were as inconclusive as the religious. The Jews' case was that they were trying to get back their own country from which they were driven by force in 135 A.D. The Arabs answered that it was not Arabs but Romans who drove out the Jews; the Arabs did not come to Palestine till the seventh century; racially they claim they are akin to the ancient Canaanites dispossessed by the Jews and that they had then at least as good a claim as the absentee Jews; they have been living in Palestine now for thirteen centuries, which is longer than most modern states can claim to have occupied their present territories.

There was also the economic argument that the Arabs had let the land go to waste; from being, as it is described in the Bible, a land flowing with milk and honey, it had been reduced to a collection of malarial swamps, barren sand-dunes, and denuded hills. Jewish enterprise and money and modern methods of land-reclamation were bringing back fertility and prosperity; the Arabs were a feudal community utterly out-of-date and doomed to perish; the Jews were the pioneers of western civilisation in the Middle-East. The Arabs answered that western civilisation seemed to have some serious drawbacks which might well out-weigh its advantages, and that in any case they did not admire the version of it presented by Jews from Polish ghettos and Russian small towns, whence came the great majority of Palestinian Jews since the beginning of this century.

As for the *ad misericordiam* plea that the Jews had no country of their own and that they must go somewhere from the danger of such persecution as they had recently suffered in Germany, the Arabs replied that it was the Jews' own fault if they had no country. In 1903 the British Government had offered them British territory in Africa, nearly four times the size of Palestine, as a refuge from persecution and a foundation for an independent Jewish state. There was a similar offer in 1938. In so far as there was an urgent need to find a home for Jewish refugees from Europe, the Arabs declared that they were ready to do their fair share and admit their quota, provided other countries with larger territories than Palestine would do likewise.

By the time the arguments on both sides had got so far, the average soldier and policeman, whether officer or other rank, was feeling rather

[1] "Muslim" and "Moslem" mean the same as Mohammedan, which is a less correct term. Christian Arabs agree with Muslims in opposition to political Zionism.

lost. Probably the Irish followed them farthest before losing themselves. But there was more to come. They had still to hear the Jews explain how vital it was for British strategy to build up a strong friendly Jewish state in the Middle East, and they had to listen to Arab warnings that it would be fatal for Britain to do anything of the kind. The Communists and fellow-travellers had also to say their piece, which consisted in the usual acts of faith that the Jewish-Arab conflict was entirely artificial, worked up by Britain for her own sinister ends, and that if the British were out of Palestine, the Jewish and Arab working-class would liquidate their differences, and also their capitalist and imperialist bosses, and settle down peacefully under a progressive régime.

All this by no means exhausted the subject in debate, but it was enough to point firmly to the practical conclusion that the case of Jew versus Arab in Palestine was a case for settlement, if ever there was one, and not a plain issue of right against wrong to be fought out to a finish without compromise on either side. The British Foreign Office had come to that conclusion long ago, but had failed to get the Jews and Arabs to see it their way. The Irish could have told them why: they knew what passionate nationalism can do to a people. But here were *two* peoples, both intensely conscious of their nationality, both absolutely convinced of the justice of their conflicting claims, both full of the folk-lore and martyrology of their respective national struggles in the past—the Palestinian equivalents of '98 and Easter Week, of Robert Emmet, Michael Dwyer and Kevin Barry. It was difficult for Irishmen to be impartial and equally difficult to know which side to take. So the soldier turned with relief to obey his orders, which were plain enough: to keep the peace in Palestine between Jew and Arab impartially.

II

In his book *Cordon and Search*, Major R. D. Wilson tells how the 6th Airborne Division carried out those orders from its arrival in Palestine, September, 1945, till April, 1948, the date of its departure.[1] This Division had no Irish unit on its establishment. It had under its command, for brief periods only, the 1st Battalion Irish Guards and the 2nd Battalion Ulster Rifles. But for some reason Irishmen seem to have been attracted to it, and the proportion of Irish in its ranks was higher than is usual in a unit with no special Irish connection. In peace-time Irish regiments in the British Army can usually fill their ranks with men of Irish birth or of Irish blood. In war-time their casualties are high, not through foolhardiness or lack of skill, but through determination to win at all costs (" For that is our doom and pride "), so they have to fill up the gaps with what is nearest to them, even though Irish recruits may be coming in substantial

[1] *Cordon and Search* by Major R. D. Wilson, M.B.E., M.C. Aldershot: Gale and Polden, 1950. 10s. 6d.

numbers, as happened in the recent war. Thus it was that many Irishmen who joined during the war, found themselves at the end of the war scattered among various units not of their choice. Other reasons may have influenced individual cases, and as far as the Airborne Division was concerned, the Irish must have had some preference for it, because only volunteers are taken for parachute units.

Major Wilson leaves to his last chapter the answer to a question which civilians would probably ask first: Did the troops really know the purpose for which they were in Palestine? His answer is worth quoting in full:—

> Whatever the political complications, and they were many, all knew what the *object* was. It was the reverse of war; it was simply 'to keep the peace'. As time went on and the situation became more tense and obscure, this object grew in importance. Moreover, the simplicity of its meaning (though not always of its attainment) contrasted strongly with so many of the issues that were mainly political, and often beyond the understanding of officers and soldiers alike. It became therefore the guide to which all who had to make decisions turned, and those decisions were as much those of the lance-corporal on patrol as the senior commander in his headquarters. The degree of impartiality which was achieved was reflected in the lamentations of both Jews and Arabs that they were the victims of biased treatment. Had one side shown itself satisfied, it whould probably have been a true indication that the Security Forces had not been acting impartially. (*Cordon and Search*, pp. 204-5).

Major Wilson quite rightly does not claim that complaints from both sides in such a case necessarily prove a just impartiality: he only says they reflect the degree to which impartiality was achieved. Edmund Burke said about governmental neutrality in religion, "Equal neglect is not impartial kindness." Neither would equal oppression of Jew and Arab have been impartial justice. Major Wilson says that when the Division was on its way to Palestine,

> it was noticeable how open-minded—ignorant might be more truthful—were the troops on the Palestine question . . . As far as their sympathies went at the time, these probably lay in favour of the Jews, as a result of what these troops had seen in North-West Europe earlier that year . . . . this attitude was put severely to the test during the following two and a half-years, and in the majority of cases failed to stand up to the strain. (*o.c.*, p. 15).

It was impossible to feel impartial when all the hostility came from the Jewish side only. The Arabs criticised the Palestine Government severely, and sometimes quite unfairly, but their relations with the troops remained friendly until the beginning of 1948, when United Nations had decided to partition Palestine. Even then, although they fought and killed British soldiers who stood between them and the Jews, they had no hard feelings and expected the Army to have none—which was at times expecting rather a lot. Many of their attacks were sheer irresponsibility: "trigger-happy" was the Army word for it, meaning that the Arabs could not resist the impulse to shoot once they got hold of a firearm, preferably an automatic weapon which poured out a deadly stream of bullets and made a great

deal of noise. It was not at all unusual for Arabs to call round the day after they had shot up some British troops, to say how sorry they were and that they must have mistaken them for Jews. But that did not bring dead men back to life, and so Major Wilson tells us that " in the last few months which the Division spent in Palestine, much of the sympathy which its members had felt inwardly towards the Arabs, declined." (*o.c.*, p. 177).

The Jews were not so trigger-happy, but they were equally ready with explanations and apologies when the harm was done. To understand this, one must know the Jewish political set-up, at least in outline. First, it it is necessary to distinguish between Jews and Zionists. Most Zionists are Jews, but not all Jews are Zionists, except in the religious sense. The Arabs insisted that they had no quarrel with religious Zionists: their enemies were the political Zionists who wanted to take over Palestine and make it a Jewish state. The Zionists of Palestine were legally under the Palestine Government, but actually their internal affairs were regulated by a body elected by themselves which dealt with the Palestine Government on behalf of all the Jewish Zionists in Palestine. In close cooperation with this body was the " Jewish Agency," a statutory body under the Mandate, which according to Mr. Albert Hyamson was from 1937 on " an undisguised alias for the Zionist Organisation " all over the world. (*Palestine under the Mandate*, p. 116). The duty of the Jewish Agency, as laid down by the Mandate, was to co-operate with the Government in establishing a " National Home " for Jews in Palestine. But the Palestine Government had also a duty to safeguard the rights of the native Arabs which clashed with the Jewish Agency's ideas of what a " National Home " meant. To Zionists it meant a Jewish State comprising the whole of Palestine, with the Arabs reduced to a minority by means of unrestricted Zionist immigration. When refused this, the Jewish Agency secretly encouraged certain Zionist groups to acts of sabotage and terrorism in the hope that the Government might be frightened into acquiescence. There were three of these groups, the Hagana, the Irgun Zvai Leumi, and the Stern Gang. All were secret organisations determined to attain political ends by violence. But the Hagana had an intermittently tolerated existence since the Arab rebellion of 1936, when it was recognised as a Jewish defence force for the protection of Jewish settlements against Arab marauders. Its leaders were in close contact with the Jewish Agency and took their policy from it. Generally they avoided such conflict with British troops as would lead to bloodshed, and confined their activities to aiding illegal immigration of Jews and to hampering measures designed to prevent it. The Irgun Zvai Leumi, generally known as the " I.Z.L.," took no orders from the Jewish Agency or from any other body. Their policy was underground warfare on the same lines as if British troops in Palestine were an army of occupation in an invaded country. The policy

of the Stern Gang was the same in principle, but they specialised in the periodic killing of individual British soldiers or civilians. The term " terrorist " was generally applied to both these bodies ; the Jews called them " dissident " because they did not take orders from the Jewish agency.

The blowing up of the King David Hotel in Jerusalem (22 July 1946) was the work of the Stern Gang and the I.Z.L. One wing of the hotel was used as offices for the civil government and military headquarters staff. Here is a Jewish account of what happened :—

Government headquarters in Jerusalem was blown up and almost a hundred officials and members of the public who happened to be in the building murdered, and about as many others seriously injured, the criminals showing themselves indifferent as to whether their victims were British, Jew or Arab. (Hyamson, *o.c.*, p. 160).

There was a chorus of condemnation from the Jewish newspapers, but no suggestion that the Jews ought to co-operate in bringing the perpetrators of the outrage to justice. Major Wilson tells how for the next three days,

" day and night the rescue operations went on, with the Sappers working like men possessed, for deep in the wreckage could occasionally be heard sounds which encouraged them to fresh exertions . . . Out of the wreckage the Squadron raised six survivors, the last being freed seventy-one hours after the explosion . . . Two days after the attack on the King David, the British Government published a White Paper on the connections between the Jewish Agency and the so-called ' terrorist organizations.' Coming as it did at such an inconvenient time, this was a great shock to the Yishuv.[1] Moreover, in the light of it, such expressions as ' dastardly crime ' and ' abominable outrage,' which had figured so prominently in the Jewish Palestine Press in connection with the act, looked far less convincing. Having said this, it would be unjust to omit mentioning the genuine praise in one or two of the Jewish papers for the men of the 9th Airborne Squadron, R.E., who evoked such admiration from all who saw them. (*o.c.*, pp. 64-66).

This was not the first affair of the sort, but it was by far the worst. Many more were to follow it, but none were to take the same toll of life until the last few months of the British Mandate in 1948 when the Arabs joined in the fighting. Major Wilson's " Diary of Events," (covering twenty-two pages of an appendix) shows that in the five months before the blowing up of the King David on 22 July 1946, there were twenty-one attacks by Jewish underground forces on British life and property in Palestine, an average of one a week. Yet during all that time troops not on duty went about unarmed, on somebody's theory " to avoid provoking the population," meaning the Jewish minority. It was only much later, and after several attempts to revert to this illusory practice in each lull of terrorist activity, that arms were carried at all times by all ranks. The Arabs denounced (" as ever in this connection," says Major Wilson) British " weakness, leniency and unpreparedness." The average soldier could not help feeling that here, at all events, the Arabs were perfectly right.

[1] A Hebrew collective noun meaning " settlement " applied to the Jewish population of Palestine by the Zionists.

III

It was natural for Irishmen, as their fight with the Jewish underground developed during the subsequent year and a half, to compare it with what they knew of their own country's troubled times some twenty-five years before. Few of them were old enough to have taken any active part on either side in the struggle of the I.R.A. with the Crown Forces in 1920-21 and with the Free State Army in 1922. The R.I.C. Auxiliaries who had been enrolled in the Palestine "British Gendarmerie" in 1922, had, as far as I know, all retired from its successor, the Palestine Police, by this time—one of them at least, Mr. Douglas Duff, to write some interesting memoirs. But all the Irish, soldiers or police, were old enough to have heard first-hand accounts of the fighting in Ireland; some had been in the Irish Army and had either taken part in the 1920-22 fighting or known those who had, so all had a fairly good idea of what it was like.

For the great majority it was rather disconcerting to find themselves at the "receiving end" of underground operations. They knew the Irish fighting from the underground angle: they had heard of flying columns, ambushes, attacks on barracks, rescues from jail, men on the run, all told as the thrilling story of how a small nation was said to have stood up to an Empire's might. Now they were on the same side as the Empire's might was supposed to be, and they made sarcastic jokes about it as they saw the Jews in new high-powered cars flying past them while they repaired once again some worn-out Army vehicle that had broken down on the road in hostile territory. "Might of Britain, me foot! Look at what they give us to fight the ———s with!"

But they never for a moment doubted that, given a free hand, they could beat the Jews at their own game. Fighting them in the open was a rare and welcome luxury. Major Wilson tells how ten men of the 8th Parachute Battalion fought twenty-four better-armed Jewish terrorists, with the rest of the Battalion deliberately looking on, sure that their comrades would win. "In spite of their superiority in numbers and lavish scale of automatic weapons, the Jews after losing two seriously and twelve slightly wounded, soon lost heart in the fight and surrendered." (*o.c.*, p. 45). This is not to suggest that the Jews did not usually show themselves brave. They often did, in other ways, and Major Wilson pays tribute to their courage. But that most ardent champion of the I.Z.L., Mr. Arthur Koestler, remarks that in the Jewish-Arab fighting, after the British had left Palestine, both sides seemed to have a strong preference for shooting from behind cover rather than for action in the open.

No good soldier can find fault with anyone who takes what cover he can find in order to carry on the fight with forces that could destroy him in the open. What the soldier condemns is taking cover behind non-combatant civilians. Every underground movement must do that to some extent, and it is fair enough, provided the civilians concerned can

take the consequences. But when the underground plays upon the forbearance and humane feelings of the enemy in order to get immunity for its civilian cover, the soldier thinks he has a legitimate grievance, and when he sees the dead bodies of his comrades, killed from behind that sort of cover, he is apt to give way to primitive impulses of wild justice.

Major Wilson gives on page 60 an example of how children were trained by the Jewish underground for a provocative purpose. He might have given other examples of their training, such as appeared when a search-party was refused entrance to a Jewish settlement, crashed the gates in Bren-carriers and found the children lying in ordered rows across the avenue, making further movement of vehicles impossible without killing them. The Jews in Germany and Poland did not try this trick on the Nazis: there it would not have worked so well. Yet "British Nazi" and "Gestapo" were the common terms of abuse flung at the troops, and seldom was this lying insolence chastised, although it was naturally resented by the men who had helped at the risk of their lives to rescue the Jewish remnant from the Gestapo and from the Nazi concentration camps.

Needless to say, Zionist propaganda made the very most of the few cases where such like provocation proved too much for military discipline, and these exaggerations were eagerly taken up and repeated all over the world by all those who for any reason disliked Great Britain. Major Wilson gives two instances, and says they were the only two, in which troops of his Division took the law into their own hands after two incidents of a particularly exasperating nature. In those unauthorised reprisals Jewish property and persons were damaged, but no Jewish life was taken; discipline was quickly restored and the ringleaders were punished. The best proof of the extraordinary forbearance shown by the troops in face of extreme provocation was the criticism, not all of it from hostile sources, that they were a spiritless lot. "Indeed," says Major Wilson "some argued that this restraint was strongly tainted with apathy and carried to such an extreme that it no longer represented a virtue in which to take such a pride." (*o.c.*, p. 48). He then gives the two cases of spontaneous reprisals just mentioned, to show that this criticism could not be sustained. But the fact that it could be made, is surely sufficient proof of forbearance.

Irishmen are generally not slow to anger, but many an Irishman then in Palestine thought of Black-and-Tan reprisals in his own country and wished that the same restraint had been exercised there as he now saw exercised towards the Jews in face of worse provocation. At the same time he now realised, as never before, what the strain of conflict with an underground enemy can do to human nature, and while not in the least condoning Black-and-Tan methods of reprisal, he knew how strong can be the temptation to resort to them in extremity.

In a foreword to *Cordon and Search* Major-General Sir Hugh Stockwell, who commanded the 6th Airborne during its last eight months in Palestine, pays a tribute to the " tremendous support " given to the troops by the Palestine Government, and says he feels sure that he is voicing the opinions of everyone in the Division. I do not feel so sure, nor, unless I am mistaken, does Major Wilson who speaks of feelings " of greatest frustration to all ranks " caused by political interference. In theory the Army had received from the Government ample legal powers to deal with terrorist activity as it thought fit, but " in practice the demands of political expedience often decreed otherwise." (*o.c.*, p. 18). In defence of the Palestine Government it may be said that it had to take its policy from the British Foreign Office ruled by Mr. Ernest Bevin, the successful Trade Union leader who had assured the British electorate that he could solve the Palestine problem.

What caused the greatest feeling of frustration was the way the Government kept wooing the Jewish Agency, in spite of having proof that the Agency was using the nuisance-value of the terrorists as a bargaining counter. Again and again military and police operations were held up, or stopped half-way, in order to win Jewish co-operation which never came. There were plenty of disclaimers and condemnations of terrorism from the Jewish representatives, but they always refused to co-operate in its suppression : they were not going to throw away a trump-card. The Irish, quick to take the measure of politicians, saw through the Jewish political game at once, but while their views carried weight in the Army they were not acceptable on high Government levels.

IV

Major Wilson mentions visits to the Holy Places as having aroused much interest among the troops. They certainly did, and of course among the Irish especially. Those visits were bright spots in the sombre life of the soldier. Because of the help that they were to morale, commanding officers encouraged and facilitated Army chaplains in organising these trips, which were always most popular with the troops. It was remarkable how even the most nominal Christians, who could hardly have answered correctly three questions out of the catechism of any church, became interested and impressed as they never were by visits to places of merely historical interest. For some thousands of these men the memories of Bethlehem on Christmas Night and of the Via Dolorosa on Good Friday will remain when the hardships and dangers and frustrations of those times in Palestine have been slowly pushed out of their minds by time and the return to normality.

There were other bright spots, not many, Major Wilson mentions an incident which, I think, deserves to count as one. (*o.c.*, p. 131). It

was the prevention by the Hagana of another " King David " affair planned by the Stern Gang for Citrus House, the headquarters in Tel Aviv of the 3rd Battalion Coldstream Guards. Major Wilson thinks that the Hagana did this merely to impress the United Nations Special Committee which had recently arrived in Palestine : he does not seem aware of some facts that gave it another aspect. Briefly, the Coldstream Guards, without help from the Hagana, discovered a tunnel in course of construction beneath the street and leading towards Citrus House. In the cellar where it began they found some notices from the Hagana warning the Stern gang to desist and a Jew killed by a booby-trap set by the Stern. Outside was a lorry-load of cement which had been abandoned when the booby-trap. went off. From this and other evidence it was apparent that the dead Jew was one of a party sent by Hagana to block up the tunnel. The Coldstream did not think it necessary to scrutinise the motives of a man who had died trying to save their lives. They sent a wreath to his funeral. Such gestures of appreciation were rare on both sides, as were the reasons for them, but they served to purify somewhat the squalid atmosphere of underground war.

Major Wilson seldom gives his opinion ; he wisely lets the facts speak for themselves. But I do not think a dozen Irishmen in Palestine agreed with Major-General Stockwell's decision (which Major Wilson thinks was right) to withdraw British troops from no-man's land in Haifa, where these had been for three months holding Jews and Arabs apart under fire from both sides. That was done on 21 April 1948. The Mandate had a little over three weeks to run. While it lasted British troops were bound to maintain law and order to the limit of their resources, and the British Government had given United Nations an assurance that they would. To withdraw at that time meant practically handing Haifa over to the Jews, and Haifa was the most important place in Palestine. Major Wilson believes that the available troops were no longer equal to the task of holding back the rising tide of civil war and that therefore the duty of maintaining order to the limit of resources had fairly been fulfilled.

A British Government's promise to United Nations sat lightly on the Irish conscience. As the situation got quickly worse after the U.N.O. decision in November 1947 to partition Palestine, a mocking couplet went the rounds :—

> " For how can man die better than facing fearful odds
> For the honour of old UNO and a lot of clueless bods ! "[1]

Most of the troops were past caring whether Jew or Arab won, and the order to abandon no-man's land was at first a welcome relief. But next day they paid the price when they saw Arab women and children falling under deliberate Jewish fire, and all through the following week

[1] " Clueless bods "—Service slang for bodies, *i.e.*, people without a clue to anything.

when they met the silent reproach of thousands of Arab refugees homeless and hungry trying to get away anywhere out of Haifa and away from the Jews. The Irish Guards came to Haifa from North Galilee the week after the withdrawal from no-man's land. They had been protecting Jewish settlements from Arab attack at some rather heavier cost in killed and wounded than the troops in Haifa had suffered during the same period. They did not like what they found had been done in Haifa, and when some of them said so, they found few to contradict them.

Of course if it were true that the available British troops in Haifa could no longer hold Jews and Arabs apart, the withdrawal was justified. But although Major Wilson from his position on headquarters staff was well placed to know all the facts of the situation, his judgment cannot, and does not, claim to be final. What could or could not have been done by troops in a given situation is, within certain obvious limits, a matter of opinion, not of fact. The Haifa situation was not within those obvious limits, and there was another opinion.

Some of what Major Wilson records in his book belongs to the history of the 1st Infantry Division, especially 1st Guards Brigade (Grenadier, Coldstream, Welsh and, later, Irish Guards), who with troops under command (Marine Commandos, 4/7 Dragoon Guards, 6th Field Regiment Royal Artillery) were the last to leave Palestine, 30 June 1948. It is to be hoped that we shall have an account from these and also from the Palestine Police who knew the country and the ordinary people as soldiers could not know them. They all went out of Palestine undefeated, yet not well pleased with themselves. They had some reason to be proud of their record: they had taken their turn and done their share, according to their lights, in giving Palestine nearly thirty years of just and humane rule, a thing rare enough in its long and troubled history. Above all, they had shed less innocent blood than any of its numerous conquerors.

One thing that Jewish and Arab politicians agreed on was that the British, because of commercial and military interests, could not afford to leave Palestine and that they never would unless driven out by force. Repeated British announcements that they would leave before the 1st of August at latest were received with incredulity and derision. Only when preparations for departure were so far advanced that there could no longer be any room for doubt, did it dawn upon Jews and Arabs that the British could afford to leave and were actually about to leave. There was a brief embarrassed silence, soon broken by a chatter of fantastic explanations from the discomfited prophets. It was the comic relief in a tragic situation and as such the troops enjoyed it.

Yet, in a sense that never entered the heads of Jew or Muslim, it was only too true that Britain could not afford to leave Palestine, not because of danger to military or commercial interests, but because it was the abandonment of a trust for which she was responsible to an older and

higher authority than United Nations, to all that was left of Christian civilisation in the modern world. To the politicians in charge of British affairs this may have meant nothing : they accepted, though under protest, the verdict of a United Nations majority resulting from a monstrous combination of Christian and Communist votes. But it meant something to the men who had lived, worked, fought and suffered in Palestine and who were leaving dead comrades there. So they left the Holy Land as some of their forefathers must have left it after the partial failure of the third Crusade, feeling that they had done their best and that their best was just not good enough, wondering vaguely if ever they, or any other British troops, would come back to do a better job, not sure whether they wanted to or not.[1]

J. J. W. Murphy

[1] The Irish soldier in Palestine had no national tradition about the Crusades such as the English and the Scots could look back to. But when Crusades were mentioned, he would not admit that the Irish had missed the opportunity of fighting in such a cause. He may have been right, for it is historically certain that the Crusades were preached extensively in Ireland and that much money for them was collected there by the Pope's agents. See *Italian Merchant Bankers*, by M. D. O'Sullivan, D.Litt., F.R.Hist.S., in the *Journal of the Galway Archaeological and Historical Society*, Vol. XXII (1947) pp. 158–161.

SOME IRISH BARDIC POEMS

EDITED BY LAMBERT MAC KENNA, S.J.

XCVII

A POET BOASTS OF HIS SKILL

FEAR FEASA Ó'N CHÁINTE .cc.

1. Mór an feidhm deilbh an dána
baoth don dreim nach diongmhála
car re céadfaidh mo cheirde,
téachtmhuir ghlan na Gaoidheilge.

2. An t-oigéan dorcha domhuin,
an sruth aidhbhseach éagsomail,
ní (fios) acht baos righe ris,
ní slighe d'aos an ainbhis.

3. Drong anbháil don aos dána
gabhaid d'iarraidh anára
ilchearda uara re a n-ais,
rithlearga uama an iomhais.

4. Le neart ainbhis dá n-aslach
labhruid—lór do dhíomussruth,
gé thig sár a n-iomráidh as—
glár nach ionráidh dá n-eolas.

5. (An t-aos dána) ceann a gceann
tearc gá bhfuil fios a gcoingeall,
slighe ána ónab uaisle mé,
grádha uaisle na héigse.

6. A haisde diamhra docra,
a hilchearda ionganta,
tiad gan deaghcuma ón droing bhuig,
roinn eaturra ní fhéaduid.

7. An tan thagraid rer oile
ní cás don aos eagnoidhe
dul ó dhiomdhaidh na ttuagh ttais
tre lionnmhuir uar an iomhais.

8. Do bhreith na suadh iar sodhain
na hoide na hollomhain,
fagháil anma ní dleacht dáibh
gan seacht ngarma do ghabháil.

9. Fochlag, Mac Fuirmidh feasach,
Dos, Clí na gceard neimhcheasach,
fiu an (daghbhoth), a chara, a ccradh,
Cana, Anshruth is Ollamh.

10. Gé táid foghráidh 'n-a bhfochair
bhíos anbhfann a n-ealothain,
a ngrádha foirfe as siad sin
doirche iad acht ar oidibh.

11. Ar ngabháil na ngrádh suthain
ní thabhraim troigh mhearuchaidh
'n-a rianaibh doilghe budh deacht,
ní diamhair oirne a n-imtheacht.

12. Dá n-abradh daoi (dod) dhaoidhibh
tre mheisge dtruim dtathaoirigh
ní riomsa nach do réir ghráidh
(dom) chéill dob ionnsa an admháil.

13. Teagmháil riom tar éis m'ionnlaigh
do badh ceann i gcaithiorghail,
nó cosg muire i dtrágh do theacht
nó snámh tuile dá treiseacht.

14. Nó déanamh brogha as a bharr
nó bas do (bhearnadh bearann)
nó cor eich tre fháinne slán
nó breith ar sgáile a sgáthán.

15. A gceardcha na cceasd ndorcha
do sgiamhas sgath m'ealathna ;
a hucht a ttroide as teann sinn
na hoide dob fhearr d'Éirinn.

16. Do iarras go foirfe ar gceird
na trí tighe a-tá a nGaoidheilg ;
mairg dan dualas déagsoin ruinn
ní ar éansgoil fhuaras m'fhoghluim.

17. Ní léir (leo) lés 'n-a fighe,
aos aitheanta ar cceirdeine ;
gach oige dar innigh mé
a hinnibh oide is éigse.

18. Deacroide teagmháil rem throid
ó do ghabhas grádh Focloig ;
i mbéilshlighe na mbalg bhfis
ní thard éinfhile m'éislis.

19. Córuide gan righe riom
don lucht anas 'n-a himioll ;
ní fhuil troigh nar thomhais mé
do mhoir fhorais na héigse.

20. Do (shnámhas) iad tar a n-ais
srotha ionnalta an iomhais,
do ghlé mé m'oige eisdibh,
oide mé 's as maighisdir.

21. Gomadh aithreach leo a labhra
lucht ainbhis na healadhna
mo sproigeacht riu dá ronnar
as fiu an oideacht fhuaromar.
Mar

Translation

1. The writing of poetry is a big task ; 'tis folly for unqualified folk to concern themselves with the inner nature of my craft, the shining ice-bound sea of Gaoidhealg.

2. That dark deep ocean, that wondrous strange stream—to face it were foolishness ; it is no safe way for ignorant folk.

3. Among professional poets there are some queer people who in their desire for a reputation produce all kinds of tedious verses and even rhetorics interwoven with poetic matter.

4. In their great ignorance they attack the poets, and use—'tis great presumption on their part though disgrace on their own name comes of it—unwarranted language about their own learning.

5. Few possess qualifications for the poetic profession, the high degrees of poetry, that course which has gained me my renown.

6. Poetry's mysterious baffling metres and its many peculiar patterns are produced in clumsy form by those stupid people who cannot even see the distinction between them.

7. When learned folk dispute, they find, on their journey over the cold calm sea of poetic lore, no difficulty in escaping the furious attack of (foes with) blood-dripping axes.

8. According, then, to the sages, it is not lawful for Teachers or Ollamhs to be so styled unless they have acquired the Seven Degrees.

9. A Fochlog, a learned Mac Fuirmidh, a Dos, a Cli with his deft productions, a Cana, an Anshruth, an Ollamh—the rich productions of these (alone) are worthy of their (origin in a) composition-hut.

10. Other inferior Degrees, poor in lore, exist, but the ones I have mentioned are the perfect ones; they are full of difficulties except for Masters.

11. As I have got the final Degrees, I make no false step in their difficult courses; to go over their courses is nothing difficult for me.

12. If in some fit of sottish abusive drunkenness one of your dolts were to write something offensive to my Degree my good sense would compel me to ignore it.

13. To face me and contend with me would be like putting one's head between two combatants, or stopping the sea from flooding the shore, or swimming against a current of great strength.

14. Or building a house from the roof down, or boxing one's way through a line of sharp spears, or drawing a whole horse through a finger-ring, or seizing an image in a mirror.

15. 'Twas in a smithy where folk hammer out strange problems that I have perfected my best poems; now I can face a fight with the best Masters in Éire.

16. I have gone carefully into all my profession, the Three Mansions of Gaoidhealg; 'twill go hard with anyone who has to face me for I have acquired my learning in many schools.

17. Experts in my work can find no blister on its texture; all the stuff I have woven comes from the inner store of Masters and Poets.

18. My Fochlog Degree makes me more formidable; as for my command of the language of the lore-bubbles, no poet has ever belittled me.

19. Folk who have never gone beneath the surface of poetry had better not strive with me; I have explored every foot of the surface of that sea.

20. I have swum on the clear streams of lore, and have purified my work in them; I am a Teacher and a Master.

21. My training authorises me to dogmatise about poetry to those folk who are ignorant of it and make them sorry for ever having mentioned the subject at all!

Notes

MSS: O'Conor Don's Book, 402 (O); 23 E 15, 181 (E), 3 C 13, 948 (=O), E vi I, 120 Text is O except as noted below.

1b. druing E *c.* cor O. *2a.* taigéin E *b* -amhaill OE *c* bhfuil OE *d.* ainbhf. OE *et sic infra* *3b.* gabhad E, *sic leg.* *c.* fuara OE *4b.* -srath OE *5a* Aos dána Éirionn O, An taois dána E *c.* rian ána ina hu. E. *6a.* haiste O, huird E *c.* táid OE *d.* -orra O *7c.* nuadh E *d.* fuair OE *8d.* ngrádha O *9b* na gceard O, ní ceard E *c.* dadhbhoth E, annsruth O *d.* anroth E *10c.* a ngrádha O, na grádh E; iad OE *11b.* tabhruim O *c.* dorchadh E *d.* orrtha E *12a.* daoi O, daoir E; os do dhaoithibh O, os daoitheamh E *b.* tre O, le E; miscce O *13c.* ttráigh OE *14b.* bhearna mbarran E, mairneadh mbarann O *15a.* -chain E; cceas E *d.* a néir. O *16b.* atá an O, ttá san E; -ealg O *c.* -lghas OE; druinn E *17a.* dóibh O; lés a f. E *b.* adhanta E *18d.* déinfhiligh O, aoinfhile E *19a.* righe E. cosnamh O *c.* bhfuil OE *d.* mhuir OE; foras E *20a* athsnámhas O, *c.* aisdibh O *21a* Dámadh E.

SIR JOHN HOWLEY

1789-1866

BY FRANCIS FINEGAN, S.J.

THE Howleys of Richill, Co. Limerick have always claimed a Connaught origin from the district of North Mayo and South Sligo. The family history cannot however be traced beyond the period of the Confederation of Kilkenny, when two brothers Richard and William Howley acquired a landed property at Ballintoher near Killenaule in South Tipperary. It is safe to conjecture that they were soldiers of fortune who sympathised, as was natural for a family of Gaelic origin, with the aims of the Confederation. There can be no doubt that these brothers were members of an ancient stock and were recognised as such, if we are to judge from the marriage alliances of the Howleys from the time of their settling at Ballintoher. Richard Howley married Julia, daughter of the great O'Kearney of Cashel. The younger of the brothers, William Howley, left Ballintoher about the time of his brother's marriage and settled in Manchester. Either William Howley himself or his immediate descendants abjured the faith. At all events the Archbishop of Canterbury who crowned Queen Victoria was descended from this William Howley.

I

Richard Howley (the first) of Ballintoher and Julia O'Kearney had two sons Richard and John. John Howley, on raising a company of men at his own expense, received the commission of lieutenant in the armies of King James II and fought at the battle of Aughrim 1691. We know nothing more of this Lieutenant John Howley. Dalton in his *King James' Irish Army List* (Vol. II. p. 414) states, on the authority of Sir John Howley, that Lieutenant Howley was the former's great grandfather. This error is not just another of Dalton's many abberations. The erroneous information was supplied to Dalton by Sir John Howley following a correspondence with a relative, a Mr. John Kenny of Ennis. Sir John, if he had taken the trouble to consult the family papers in his elder brother's possession, would have learned that he was the great grand-nephew and not the great grandson of the Lieutenant. It was the lieutenant's elder brother Richard (the second) who succeeded Richard Howley and Julia O'Kearney in the Ballintoher property. Richard Howley (the second) by his first marriage with Penelope Ryan of Ballyvistea, Co. Tipperary, was the father of John Howley of Lurgoe, Co. Tipperary, at whose death (intestate) in 1751, a grant of administration of his estate was made in Prerogative Court to his son Thomas. The heir to the Ballintoher property was, curiously enough, the son by the second marriage of Richard Howley (the second) with Susanna Loughlan, cousin of Baron Purcell of Loughmore and the

Graces of Brittas Castle. The children of Richard Howley (the second) and Susanna Loughlan were Richard (the third) (1716–1756), John (a priest), Michael and Judith. Richard Howley (the third) and his brother Michael married respectively Catherine and Bridget daughters of Mac Walter Burke of Curranaboola, cadet branch of the Clanricarde family. John Howley, who became a priest after concluding his studies in Rome is consistently described in various family genealogies as Rev. Dr. John Howley, Parish Priest of Fethard and Vicar-General of the Diocese of Cashel. State Papers, now destroyed but fortunately cited in Father Burke's *Irish Priests in the Penal Times*, describe him as ' William ' Howley. (op. cit. p. 359). Of the children of Michael Howley and Bridget Mac Walter Burke we may notice only two in this brief sketch : an elder son Richard, who entered the Austrian Service under Count D'Alton but later joined the East India Company, where he attained the rank of Lieut. Colonel of Artillery ; his brother John, who became a priest and died as Parish Priest of Clerihan in the diocese of Cashel.

To return to Richard Howley (the third) of Ballintoher, he had a numerous family by his wife Catherine MacWalter Burke. We need mention only the names of the sons : William who succeeded to the Ballintoher estate and died in 1796 ; Richard who had a distinguished career in America in the War of Independence ; John (1750–1825) founder of the Limerick branch of the family, a doughty opponent of the Union and protagonist of Catholic Emancipation, father of Serjeant Sir John Howley ; James, a doctor of Medicine of Paris ; Thomas, cadet of the East India Company. Of the foregoing, William, the fourth and last of the name of Howley to possess the Ballintoher estate, married Catherine daughter of Edmond Power (de la Poer of Gurteen). There were no sons by the marriage, and the Howley property passed by the marriage of the eldest daughter into the family of Latham. The Howleys of Ballintoher are but one of the frequent instances of Catholic families, whether Gaelic or Anglo-Irish, who by some curious coincidence managed to escape attainders and forfeitures under Cromwell and King William III and who, under the Penal Laws, were able to retain their lands along with their faith.

William Howley's younger brother Richard had an unexpectedly strange career. Like all the children of Richard Howley (the third) he was educated in France. Family records state that, after leaving Paris, this Richard Howley studied law in England and then proceeded to America, a few years before the outbreak of the War of Independence. The *Dictionary of American Biography* has this curious entry : " Richard Howley 1740-84, Revolutionary Patriot, is said to have been born in Liberty County, Ga. and to have studied law and practised in St. John's parish." Fortunately we are in a position to dispose of one blunder in the foregoing—viz. Richard Howley's birthplace. A copy of a letter of John Howley of Limerick, dated 4 March 1782, to his brother Richard

has survived. It was customary in the days of the sailing ship to prepare three or four copies of a letter for overseas correspondence. The tenor of John Howley's letter to his brother implies that they had been out of touch for some years. Consequently the news of events in the family are set forth at length for his brother's information. Howley continues :— " I did myself the honour of addressing a letter of inquiry after you to a very celebrated and admired American character, Mr. Henry Lauren, now at Bath. His reply was instant and particularly obliging, saying that he had not seen you since August 1780, then a delegate at Congress for the State of Georgia." Bearing in mind then that Richard Howley was brother of John Howley of Limerick and son of Richard (the third) and Catherine Mac Walter Burke, also that he was born in Ballintoher, Co. Tipperary and not in America as the *Dictionary of American Biography* supposes, we may trace briefly his career from this latter source.

In 1779 Richard Howley " became a member of the Georgia Legislature, established under the provisions of the Constitution of 1777, and in January 1780 he was elected Governor by the same body which also selected four men to serve as an executive council. On February 5 1780 the executive council met at Heard's Fort, requested Howley to take his seat in the Continental Congress to which he had been lately elected and vested George Wells, president of the council, and certain associate members with the executive functions. He set out for Philadelphia, accompanied by most of the civil and military officers of the Republican Government. Georgia was thereby left with only the semblance of a government and with ' scarcely a regiment of soldiers to defend its territory'. Howley took the archives of the State to New Bern, N.C. They were subsequently removed to Baltimore and remained there until the close of the revolution." For the rest we know that Howley resisted by voice and pen the proposed settlement by which England might retain Georgia, South Carolina and Florida. He insisted on the total expulsion of England from the North American Colony. Upon the conclusion of peace Howley was appointed Chief Justice of Georgia. He died in Savannah in December 1784 leaving an only daughter. Unfortunately none of Richard Howley's letters to his brothers have survived.

From the unposted copy of John Howley's letter to Richard of Georgia we know that the latter kept up an intermittent correspondence with another of the brothers, James Howley, M.D. Incidentally it may be remarked that Doctor James Howley and a sister had at this time taken up residence in Limerick. Family records as well as other references in John Howley's letter speak of Richard Howley as Governor of Charlestown prior to the outbreak of the War of Independence. So far as we know, Dr. James Howley sought betterment of his professional opportunities in America on the invitation of brother Richard. The youngest of the brothers Howley died in India, a gentleman cadet of the East India Company.

II

John Howley, third son of Richard (the third) of Ballintoher, entered on a business career in Limerick. Apart from any consideration of the disabling effects of the Penal Laws which allowed no other outlet to the ambitions of Catholics, it is quite possible that he would in any event have been forced by family circumstances to adopt the most convenient way of making money. It will be remembered that his father died in 1756 at the early age of forty, leaving a young family, four of whom were younger than John. He received a good education, however, and quite possibly he formed a plan of his future career when at school in France, where he may have met some of the sons of the Arthur family, Limerick's merchant princes. He set up in business in Limerick as a linen draper in 1769.

John Howley was only nineteen at the time and very shortly afterwards won the hand of a daughter of the great Catholic house of Arthur. We are not told whether his business prospects helped the alliance. But certain it is that his birth would have been a recommendation of the match. His wife died in September 1779. By this marriage he had three daughters, whom he sent to France to the care of his cousin Susannah Howley, daughter of his uncle Michael. By his second marriage with Amy Burke of Pallas, John Howley had two sons and two daughters : Leonora, Emily, John (subject this article) and William. On the death of his second wife, he married, thirdly, Catherine Roche cousin of Sir Philip Roche Bart. John Howley proved remarkably successful in business. In the closing decades of the eighteenth century his name could well be classed with those of the other great merchant princes of Limerick. The gradual relaxation of the Penal Laws gave him an opportunity to invest his money in land, and he made extensive purchases in Counties Clare, Limerick and Tipperary. His elder son John, after receiving his schooling at the recently founded college at Oscott, entered Trinity College, Dublin in 1807, but does not seem to have taken his degree. He was called to the Bar in 1815.

John Howley was to take an active interest in the promotion of Catholic claims even before the commencement of his legal career, but abandoned politics when Catholic emancipation was all but a *fait accompli*. With his father and brother William he was in the van of the opposition to the bigoted Tory Corporation of Limerick. Making due allowances for Ascendancy's misrule long after the Catholic Relief Act of 1793, the corruption and flagrant dishonesty of the Limerick Corporation, as well as its relentless persecution of Catholics, easily outstrips the record of any other such in the country. The Vereker family claimed the parliamentary representation of the city as an hereditary right. Their Corporation rigged elections so as to render any opposition nugatory. City property was sold by the corporators to themselves and, when there was nothing more to sell, they swindled one another. *Agents provocateurs* were sent

into public houses to induce the proprietors to sell drink before or after hours. Heavy fines followed : this was but one of many such means used by the Corporation to obtain revenue ! The growing discontent of the liberal Protestants no less than that of the Catholics came to a climax in the election for a member of Parliament in July 1817. This election was held as a result of the elevation of Colonel Vereker to the peerage as Lord Gort.

Major the Hon. John Prendergast Vereker and John Tuthill contested the vacant seat. Tuthill was ably supported by the Catholics, liberal Protestants and dissenting sects. These supporters represented the principal business interests in the main. John Howley had given up business long since to attend to the management of his landed property. His elder son John acted in the capacity of counsel for the independent candidate John Tuthill. The election lasted from July 2nd to the 23rd. Election proceedings were not held on Sundays. We can follow the proceedings day by day in the lengthy pamphlet of a hundred and forty pages published by the defeated candidate John Tuthill. All the old tricks of the Verekers were produced for the occasion. The title of every freeholder who voted for Tuthill was minutely challenged by the Tories, while at the same time their own electors came in droves from each of the provinces fortified by the franchise because born with or having had conferred on them the freedom of the city. It need not be stressed that innumerable retainers of the Verekers from Co. Galway enjoyed the franchise. To be a relative of a Vereker was to be a freeman of Limerick. Some idea of events may be gleaned from the lengthy speech of young John Howley on July 21st :—

> Can you be silent when the wealthy and respectable body of your city are denied privileges which have been granted, without reserve, to the human stock of Lord Gort's estate in another province ; when your charters have been violated ; when your freedom has been enslaved ; when the stream of justice within your city has been converted into a common sewer ; when every corporate train-bearer and every kettle-drummer . . . . are anointed with that franchise, which is withheld from the most respectable among you. . . ? It is now six years since I first raised my voice against the abuses which I saw to exist and against the monopoly which supported them. . . . Upon that occasion I was joined by a Noble Lord (Lord Glentworth) who lighted up the flame of his public affections from the sacred flame of liberty. We were both young, perhaps inexperienced, eager in the pursuit upon which we entered. . . . If our efforts were not directly useful, they were at least remotely successful. The call of boys roused up the exertions of men. . . . You have been taxed without a right, disfranchised. A large revenue has been granted to the corporation for the purposes of public utility ; for the repair of your streets ; for the foundation of charities ; for the ornament of your city ; for the support of your poor ; but it has been converted into pensions for the venal, into a bank every ready to assist the demands of bloated corruption. . . . For what great crimes have you been denied the right of elective franchise. The law of the land gave you that right ; the law of the corporation deprived you of it. The law of the land said that the magistrates should attend to register your freeholds, but the corporation said that it should not be so ; and the magistrates damned the law and obeyed the Corporation.

Counsellor Howley's father and brother William also took an active and vocal part in this amazing election. They were ably assisted by a large and influential circle of their own relatives, amongst whom we may name here Alan Francis O'Neill (of Liverpool and Limerick) brother-in-law of Counsellor Howley and John Hartigan father-in-law of William Howley. Vereker won the election—while, sad to tell, his opponent John Tuthill later went over to the Tory camp. The reform of the corporation was not secured until 1821, when a parliamentary commission declared that Vereker was invalidly elected and assigned the seat to Thomas Spring Rice, later known as the first Baron Monteagle. Spring Rice, while a staunch supporter of Catholic Emancipation, did not favour the repeal of the Union. For all that the Howleys and he remained life-long friends. To commemorate the overthrow of the corrupt Vereker-dominated Corporation John Howley caused a tower to be erected on his lands of Cahirnarry, on the old Cork road, about three miles from the city and overlooking the churchyard of Cahirnarry, where he is buried in the imposing mausoleum which he erected for himself and his posterity. The inscription on the tower reads :—

In memoriam libertatis Limericensis restitutae
hanc turrim posuit Joannes Howley.

Counsellor Howley throughout these early years, though a busy young barrister in Dublin, found time occasionally to visit his native city. Catholic emancipation and the repeal of the Union were amongst his favourite topics from the platform when he addressed large and wildly enthusiastic audiences. The Union he denounced in no unmeasured terms. One description may be recalled here : " That grave of Irish prosperity, the Legislative Union, gapes before my eyes with all its sepulchral horrors." He inherited the fighting spirit from his own father John Howley. It may be said here that Howley, though a supporter of Daniel O'Connell, did not agree in every detail with the plans of the rising leader and builder of Emancipation. According to Maurice Lenihan in his splendid obituary of this Catholic lawyer, Howley " was one of the Vetoists of the time, a party not popular indeed ; but he soon became identified on a broader basis with the struggles of his countrymen, and he gave efficient aid to his friend and relative O'Connell in his splendid campaigns for civil and religious freedom." There can be no doubt that, after Howley's conversion from the Vetoist position, his conception of Catholic emancipation was far in advance of O'Connell's.

The quintessence of Howley's political thought on Catholic Emancipation is found in his brilliant pamphlet entitled *The Question* and published in 1827 (Haliday Collection 1377/7). Already the price of Emancipation was under discussion—viz. the disfranchisement of the forty shilling freeholders. O'Connell was ultimately to surrender on the issue, and it is interesting by way of comparison to hear the views of Howley who began his political career amongst the Vetoists. " The late elections

in this country will, no doubt, form another topic of animated and angry declamation against us. But, after all, what does the delinquency of the Forty Shilling Freeholder amount to? Is it that he has exercised a constitutional privilege in a constitutional way? or that he has preferred a principle to the wish or injunction of his landlord?" Howley then goes on to prove that the landlord's claim to tenants' votes, as if secured to him by some law of limitations, is completely unconstitutional. He continues: "It [the franchise] may be a small privilege, but it is a great right and it would be much better to frame additional ties to bind the peasant to the State than to sever the only link that joins him to the constitution. Surely it will not be politic at present to give him a new motive for discontent."

In the same year, 1827, Howley gave up any further active part in politics. The previous year he married a Miss Sarah Roche, daughter of a respected and wealthy Cork family, by whom he had four children—all daughters. He was undoubtedly a man of considerable private means at this time. No further information is forthcoming to explain why he relinquished his undoubtedly bright prospects in a political career for the position that he held almost to the end of his life. O'Connell was anxious to place a number of his colleagues at the Bar in positions of public trust, and it may well be that at his suggestion John Howley, still a member of the Junior Bar, accepted the post of Chairman of the Quarter Sessions for King's County (now Offaly). The position, for all practical purposes, corresponded to that of Circuit Court Judge of today. Howley was to retain this post in Offaly until the summer of 1835. His experiences were not to be so eventful as later in Tipperary, where he was to spend thirty years. The State Papers contain a few references to the faction-fighting that was a feature of social life at the period. Howley dealt with it firmly in his court and quickly stamped it out. On his promotion to the same post in County Tipperary he received a presentation of an address and a gift of silver plate in recognition of his efforts to maintain tranquillity in the King's County. Howley has left on record his unfavourable impressions of the landlords of King's County at this time who were mostly absentees, but singles out for commendation the Earl of Charleville and the notorious hanging Judge Norbury as exemplary and humane landlords. In this connection it will be remembered that the informer Armstrong of Ballycumber, who hounded the brothers Sheares to their fate, was deeply mourned by his tenants at his death.

III

John Howley was called to the inner bar the year following his appointment to the chairmanship of Tipperary Quarter Sessions. The state of Tipperary was truly deplorable when he took up duty in the late Autumn of 1835. For many decades Tipperary had borne the unenviable name of

the ' murder county'. It is no exaggeration to say that the principal occupation of the inhabitants was faction-fighting. The Whitefeet and the Blackfeet, the Magpies and the Blackhens, the Shanavests and the Caravats —these were the *noms-de-guerre* of the combatants. The last mentioned, the Shanavests and Caravests, held the dubious honour of first place in numbers and ferocity. Occasionally the combatants went to battle bearing the names of their leaders. Noteworthy among these were the Dargans, the Sheas, the Holdens and the Ryans. Our principal sources of information on the matter of faction fighting are *The Report from the Select Committee of the House of Lords appointed to inquire into the State of Ireland in respect of Crime* (1839) and the brilliant series of letters from " The Tipperary Man to Lord Derby " published in the *Liverpool Mercury* from the autumn of 1859 until May of the following year. The letters number twenty-six in all. Let us hear the Tipperary Man on the origin of the Shanavests and Caravats :

Once upon a time, and that time, my Lord was some few years anterior to the present century . . . a farm and homestead changed owners by an eviction. Whether this eviction was brought about by conspiracy or otherwise, I cannot say ; but the result justifies the supposition that it was an act of injustice to the outdriven tenant. As usual, implacable hatred towards the new possessor was the consequence. A murder was committed and the public execution of the real or convicted murderer followed. A large multitude assembled to witness the killing of a man by law. The relatives and friends of both parties . . . that is to say of the new tenant and the evicted. . . mustered in large numbers ; one party grieved and humiliated by the tragedy about to be enacted, the other more or less exultant. When the executioner was fixing the rope upon the culprit's neck, a voice was raised in the crowd : it was that of an athletic, powerful-looking fellow in tattered garments. He said : ' I came a long distance today to see the cravat put upon that fellow's neck ; it becomes him well and will last him for life.' A friend of the doomed man replied : ' You are a . . . scoundrel. No one would compare him to you for if he had his liberty, he would sooner drown himself than appear in public in that old vest you wear.' *Cravat*, my Lord, is a tersely anglicised version of the Celtic word caravat derived from carabal (the throat or neck) ; and " old vest " means in the same dialect (sic) shanavest, the distinction being in the adjective only ; and here we have the original formation and designation of the famed Shanavests and Caravats of Tipperary County.

The strife waged by these two parties was the most widespread absorbing, terrific and lasting feud of the sort that ever disgraced any civilised country. It embraced within its fell scope the whole community except the clergy and the authorities. Sunday after Sunday the clergy admonished and wept from the altar ; but the authorities, ' unused to the melting mood,' enjoyed themselves and put their trust in Providence that all the tillers of the soil would not be exterminated in the conflict. This terrible agrarian war extended from one end of the county to the other. The man who worked with the spade for his daily hire and the man who carried a silver mounted whip with boots and spurs mounted on a hunter were heart and soul equally engaged in it. . . . These factions grew out of contentions for land and were stimulated and urged to perseverance in their folly by that prolific, ubiquitous source of mischief and shame. Whenever competition for a farm or an acre arose (and the under-agent was never idle) the parties engaged in it were sure to belong to either of the two factions and here a fresh stimulant was added to the existing frenzy, an effervescing ingredient thrown into the seething mass of popular fury.

Howley was to have his first real experience of the evil at his first sessions in Thurles, October 1835. A well-to-do farmer named Purcell was charged with causing a riotous assembly on the occasion of the previous fair. The two days previous to the fair had witnessed the gathering of the factionists' retainers. Peace negotiators from both sides failed to bring about a settlement. The fair became a veritable battlefield. The weapon employed was the " loaded butt," a stout stick hollowed at the extremity and filled with lead. In court the counsel for the defence of Purcell spoke of a ' fair fight ' of ' honorable principles,' and knowingly explained to " Barrister Howley " that what occurred was the *lex loci*. Howley was not impressed and sentenced Purcell to seven years transportation. His action made a profound impression upon the court. A new method of meting out justice had supplanted the old. In his evidence before the House of Lords Committee four years later, he related that the court procedure prior to 1835 seemed to be of set purpose designed to keep faction fights in existence. For instance, the swearing-in of the prosecutors was carried out not in open court but in the room of the court clerk. Faction-fight cases as a rule terminated by the chairman being notified of an " amicable " settlement. Maurice Lenihan, one of the ablest journalists of his day, describing a more serious case brought before the Assizes, informs us that a Tory Judge dismissed the case with the remark: " Let these savages fight it out amongst themselves."

Howley now doubled the time hitherto given to the Quarter Sessions. Hundreds of stiff sentences of imprisonment were issued by him on the ringleaders. At the same time he promised that he would obtain from the Viceroy a mitigation of the sentences in the event of an improvement in the conduct of those fortunate enough not to be brought to trial. The transformation in the behaviour of Tipperary was almost magical. The Viceroy, Lord Normanby, on Howley's advice released over four hundred prisoners in the following summer, 1836. Thus, after a half century of foolish strife and hooliganism (ably abetted from anti-Irish and anti-Catholic sources), the exploits of the Shanavests and Caravats became but tragic memories to be told by the firesides. The part played by Father Mathew's temperance movement in the general reform is not to be overlooked. But we might say that the beneficial effects of the temperance movement were rendered possible only because of the stern justice and firmness displayed by John Howley from the chair of the Tipperary Quarter Sessions. It was a proud day for Howley at the end of his first year of office to be able to announce that organised crime on the grand scale was at an end. His special charge to the Grand Jury was printed by order of the magistrates (Haliday Collection 1675/9), and it is said that he received the personal thanks of the English monarch of the day, William IV.

Howley's ability was now amply recognised by all classes of society. He was henceforth to be summoned frequently to participate in important

governmental commissions, such as the Lords' Committee of 1839 and the Commission on the Courts of Common Law 1841. About the same time he was appointed to inquire into the conduct of elections at Dungannon. Charges and counter-charges of corruption were hurled by the opposing parties. It says much for Howley's sense of fair play and good judgment that at the end of the inquiry, which lasted three weeks, he received the highest commendations from Protestants and Catholics alike. It was naturally expected that his elevation to the bench could not be far distant. Catholic judges at the time were however a tiny minority on the bench, and no lawyer of known repeal tendencies even in private life stood much chance of promotion. William Smith O'Brien voiced the discontent of the Catholics in the House of Commons on 4 July 1843 :—

> But even if I were to admit that they (the Government) could not be expected to raise to the bench such men as my rt. hon. friend the Member for Clonmel (Mr. Piggott), still there are many Roman Catholics in Ireland whose moderation in politics would have permitted their appointment to office by the present government. Amongst many whose names occur to me I shall only mention one, and I select him chiefly because his name is familiar to the house and because he has been often mentioned with commendation by gentlemen of the conservative party. . . . I allude to Mr. Howley, the assistant barrister for Tipperary. I find that in regard to professional standing . . . a point insisted on in a former debate by the rt. hon. baronet (Sir Robert Peel) . . . he was admitted to the Bar earlier than the present Attorney General, and his other professional qualifications would have justified his nomination to some of those offices which have been filled with persons whose chief merit appears to have been hostility to the Roman Catholic population of Ireland.

IV

On 6th September was issued the warrant for the appointment of John Howley to the post of Third Serjeant. The fact that a Catholic received a sergeant's coif was of course regarded in many quarters as a gesture from the government to allay the prevailing discontent. The post of Serjeant-at-law was customarily regarded as a certainty of elevation to the Bench. Howley's promotion received a mixed reception from the press. The protean *Freeman's Journal*, commenting on the appointment, raised a wail over the disregard shown for so many other able lawyers. It may be only a coincidence that these neglected men were all Protestants. With righteous indignation this newspaper showed how undeserving Howley was of the honour. He was not seen at the Four Courts for years ; his politics were not above suspicion ; he was a landed proprietor who might have left the position for some needy lawyer to fill, etc. It forgot to mention, however, that Howley was in the public service since 1827 and that his duties did not give him the time for visits to the Law Library. As a public servant, he could not, of course, come out openly on the side of any political party. The outburst of bigotry passed, however, in due course. Rumours of Howley's elevation to the bench continued throughout the next year.

But the elevation so fondly hoped for by his many admirers, rich and poor, never came. He was offered a prosecuting brief for the trial of O'Connell, but refused it as we might naturally expect. It must not be forgotten that it was the Howleys, father and sons, who first formed a Catholic public opinion in Limerick and prepared the way for O'Connell over thirty years before.

The remainder of John Howley's story may be briefly told. He remained in office as assistant barrister for Tipperary until 1865. With the exception of the brief brilliant period of the Young Irelanders, the twenty ensuing years from the release of O'Connell to the advent of Isaac Butt find emphasis in the social rather than the political history of Ireland. Tipperary did not share, immediately and in aggravated form, the effects of the Great Famine. This is not to say that hunger and privation were not experienced amongst the poor. Bread riots and thefts of food were reported in the urban centres. In too many cases this was the work not of the destitute but of able-bodied and well-fed men. Howley dealt severely with such cases, while at the same time pointing out patiently the necessity of maintaining order in the emergency to prevent even a worse state of things.

From this time forward until his resignation Howley's special charges to the Grand Juries continuously emphasise the ever-present effects of the Famine or the never-ending emigration from the country. Again and again he deplored the flight from the land and called upon the landlords to keep in mind their duties towards their tenants. He called attention to the wretched condition of the labouring classes who were not paid except in fine weather. Landowners he exhorted to study new and up-to-date methods of farming. It will be recalled, however, that the labourers in many parts of Tipperary rioted on the larger farms when farm-machinery was introduced.

Howley resigned the chairmanship of Tipperary Quarter Sessions on 25 March 1865, after the long tenure of thirty years. All the press of the day hastened to pay tribute to his distinguished service and efforts to uplift the people amongst whom he lived so long. Church and the civil authorities were unanimous in acknowledging the merits of this just and merciful lawyer. The Lord Lieutenant of the day, Lord Wodehouse conferred a knighthood upon him on 14 August the same year. In November a deputation of the leading citizens of the county of Tipperary awaited upon him in his house in Fitzwilliam Street, Dublin, to present him with an address and a splendid collection of silver plate. Sir John did not long enjoy his well-deserved leisure. He passed peacefully away, after a short illness, early in the morning of 13 February 1866.

FRANCIS FINEGAN

REVIEWS

Ancient Christian Writers

ARNOBIUS : *The Case Against the Pagans.* Translated by George E. McCracken, Ph.D. Vol. I, $3.50; Vol. II, $3.25. 1949.

ST. ATHANASIUS : *The Life of Saint Antony.* Translated by Robert T. Meyer Ph.D. $2.50. 1950.

(*Ancient Christian Writers* Series). Westminster, Maryland : Newman Press.

ST. AUGUSTINE : *The Greatness of the Soul,* and *The Teacher.* Translated by Joseph M. Colleran, C.SS.R., Ph.D. $3. 1950.

With these four beautifully-produced volumes the great enterprise of the Catholic University of America takes a further step on its long journey towards the complete presentation in scholarly modern form of the whole *corpus* of Early Christian literature. Each of the works under review is a model of intelligent and accurate editing and a substantial contribution to learning. Particularly praiseworthy are the introductions and notes in each case ; the whole literature on the text in question is skilfully summed up and the editors are never shy in giving their own verdicts on debated points, some of which have long been famous *cruces* of scholarship. As a result of these editorial contributions the value of this series is raised high above that of a mere library of translations, desirable as even so much would in itself have been. In many cases (such as those of the volumes under review) where the original texts are rather hard to procure, such scholarly editions have a very definite appeal both to specialists in patristic studies and to all serious students whether of Church history, theology, philosophy or in general of ancient civilisation.

It is perhaps invidious to single out any one contribution for special praise, but both the difficulty of the editor's task and the peculiar quality of the text render Professor McCracken's edition of Arnobius an event worthy of particular note. Arnobius of Sicca in North Africa was the teacher of the great Lactantius, the " Christian Cicero," and was himself called by Orelli " the Varro of the Latin Church." His seven books against the pagans were produced somewhere about 300 A.D. For the scanty and equivocal information we possess about his personal history and the occasion and purpose of his work we are chiefly indebted to St. Jerome's additions to the *Chronicle* of Eusebius. According to St. Jerome's account he was a pagan teacher of rhetoric who was converted to a belief in Christianity " as the result of dreams." His book was written in order to obtain admission into the Church from a bishop who had refused it because of his previous attacks. It is, as St. Jerome says, uneven, prolix and confused. His knowledge of Christian dogma was exceedingly sketchy, and a good deal of his criticism of pagan beliefs was clearly inspired by Lucretius, whose language he frequently echoes. He is " the only apologist who does not show close familiarity with Scripture and does not appeal to the authority of the prophets." Not only does he never quote from the Old Testament, but he seems to have been largely ignorant of it. Among Christian authors, his chief indebtedness is to St. Clement of Alexandria, Minucius Felix and Tertullian.

Professor McCracken provides us with a fascinating and authoritative guide through the many interesting problems raised by this rather odd apologia for a faith which the eloquent author only partly understood. Arnobius is of very little value for the history of Christian belief : his polemic against the immortality of the soul and his defence of Divine impassibility are clear marks of his Epicurean origin;

but as a somewhat unreliable source of information about the pagan cults which he condemns he takes rank with Firmicus Maternus, Hippolytus, and St. Augustine himself. Professor McCracken is to be congratulated on a solid contribution to a remote and little-frequented department of learning.

The little life of St. Antony by St. Athanasius is of course a minor classic. In it the characteristics of the ancient *encomium*, which goes back to Isocrates and Xenophon, are combined with the fervour of the pioneers of monasticism to produce the prototype of the vast and varied literature ever since devoted to the lives of the Saints. The author and the subject of the book were both among the greatest and most influential of men. No doubt Athanasius contributed to his glowing account of the famous Egyptian anchorite some elements drawn from his own struggles against Arians and other heretics and from his profound acquaintance with Greek philosophy ; but it remains one of the freshest and most edifying works of its kind and no scholar now questions its well-guaranteed authenticity. A special interest attaches to it because of the immense influence exercised by Egyptian monasticism, of which St. Antony was among the greatest leaders, on the type and character of that which later took such root in Ireland and contributed so much to the re-Christianising of Britain and Gaul and the conversion of Germany. Professor Meyer has performed his editorial task with exemplary scholarship and skill, and his book is sure to put generations of readers in his debt and that of the general editors of the series.

Three of St. Augustine's earlier and minor works have already appeared among *Ancient Christian Writers*. Rev. Professor Colleran now adds two more and edits them in accordance with the same high standard. The translation of the title *De Quantitate Animae* by " The Greatness of the Soul " is perhaps just a little misleading, for though the core of the book does treat of spiritual greatness its ostensible subject is a refutation of the materialism which had weighed so heavily on the Saint before his conversion. The treatise has great interest from several points of view : as a document for Augustinian psychology, as illustrating the Saint's dependence on and radical distinction from both Plato and Plotinus, and as giving the first brief exposition of his mysticism. *The Teacher* (*De Magistro*), a little later in date, while beginning with a discussion of words as signs, goes on to treat of knowledge as illumination, thus being a further contribution to St. Augustine's mystic doctrine, looking back to Plato and forward to St. Thomas and to Malebranche. Students of philosophy, as well as others will read Dr. Colleran's learned discussion of the problems to which it gives rise with very special interest.

MICHAEL TIERNEY

BIOGRAPHY

DESERT CALLING. The Story of Charles de Foucauld. By Anne Fremantle. London : Hollis and Carter. Pp. vii–xii, 343. 15s. net.

Desert Calling is not a film scenario, but a biography of Charles de Foucauld, which will probably long remain the standard life in English. The enormous significance which France to-day attributes to de Foucauld's work must give the book importance. In it two themes, two problems, are developed, one directly, the other indirectly, but not less fruitfully. The first is the elucidation of a character of unique quality ; the second is the inter-relation of missionary expansion and secular aggrandizement.

The character of Charles de Foucauld is certainly both extraordinary and baffling. Well-born, rich, talented, enslaved to base passions such as the grossest gluttony, lust and extravagance, he showed only gradually that he had the virtues of his defects. His fasts could be as phenomenal as his feasts. He would let nothing stand between

him and his desires, even when it was an unvisited oasis in the Sahara, or the mastery of a new and difficult language. From an ill-disciplined and irresponsible soldier, he became an energetic and daring explorer. Conversion followed : and it would be easy to read into his prolonged vigils, his beggarman's dress, his taste for outcast company and a diet that defied medical sanity, the mere reactions of his temperamental extravagance. There is something, no doubt, in such an explanation ; for we find co-existing with these traits others suspiciously familiar in such cases—a love of change, refusal to work under organised spiritual government, or indeed under any direction not inspired by his own will. Worse still was his failure to handle ordinary good folk. His harsh treatment of a Trappist monk of some years' standing, who foolishly attempted to share his manner of life and be his disciple, makes unpleasant reading. Without reproach and even with appreciation of his companion, the man passed from him to the holy oblivion of the Carthusian monastery but got in return from Charles nothing but criticism of his stupidity, spiritual cowardice, and lack of ideals or imagination.

Added to all this, we find the " hermit " not only incurably restless, but oscillating between austerity and bouts of self-indulgence—a long " holiday " in France, plenty of rich food and wine, a willingness to see and talk to every sort of visitor whom he could attract to his desert retreat. A life dedicated to silence and contemplation was frequently interrupted, in order to indulge in long hours of conversation with the officers of the French Occupation. Moreover, throughout all these years he kept up a correspondence so voluminous, that the many thousand letters to friends and acquaintances on every conceivable North African topic can have left him, one is tempted to imagine, scarcely time for a few aspirations !

Such a man was filled with dreams which came to nothing. He planned the conversion of the Touaregs, who, for all their years with him, gave him for baptism but a couple of slaves that he had bought from them (he had always a private income, and for all his " love of poverty " kept control of money to the end). He planned the foundation of several religious congregations, none of which emerged in his lifetime, and—but this is another story—he dreamed of and worked for an immense expansion of French power in North Africa—that dream came true. Finally, in spite of a constant expression of self-abasement and of self-annihilation, one reading of his impetuous and eccentric career would seem to give ample justification for his biographer's statement that " he cooked his accounts as we all do and boxed the compass of his resolutions." With greater charity, but in even worse English, she declares in another place : " The beauty of the goal to which he thought himself called would cloud everything else above all its own unrealizability." Certainly he was a master in the pitiful art of seeing God's will to be " that which we ourselves desire ; " and his pursuit of perfection sometimes reminds us of a child playing with complete naivety a game, the rules of which he himself invents as he goes along.

Though in some aspects the portrait of Charles de Foucauld is essentially unattractive, as, for instance, the readiness with which he yielded to the over-fastidious family-pride of his relatives, and abandoned his resolve to marry the lady of his heart's choice, there is another side to the picture. We read about long periods of contemplation, passionate self-effacement, humiliations endured in the spirit of a thoroughgoing medieval ascetic, simple adherence to the Faith and an uncompromising zeal for its propagation, above all a contempt of wordly standards without regard for personal interests or sensible consolation, a genuine sympathy for the very poor, the oppressed, and especially for sinners. Qualities such as these made a deep impression on saintly men and women who came in contact with him, and won for him the unswerving loyalty of such choice spirits as Mother Elizabeth

of Jerusalem, Mgr. Guérin, Abbot Martin and the Abbé Huvelin. " I can only love and admire," wrote the Abbé. The man whom they admired many people hope to see canonized.

The second interest in this remarkable book is the striking way in which it illustrates French missionary theory. Since the conversion of the Saxons by Charlemagne, the French have never hesitated to see their culture, introduced by conquest, as the almost indispensable condition for the establishment of the Faith. The idea of a spiritual *imperium* is foreign and repellent to the Irish mind, and seems even to run counter to contemporary Papal policy ; but the conversion of the Saxons, the Norsemen and the Huron all rested ultimately on armed protection and on the assimilation of French ideas. Charles de Foucauld, dealing with a people scarcely more neighbourly than the Zulus or the Iroquois, had no hesitation in lending his whole-hearted aid—even to the point of becoming, some said, an inspired information officer, others, a *mouchard* (informer)—to that strong-handed and determined group, Laperrine, Lyautey and their associates, who by force of arms added a vast African Empire to the Third Republic.

De Foucauld's death, at the door of the fortress he had built to preserve French and, as he would have said, Christian law in a war-threatened outpost, was not accidental. It is horrifying to learn that his friend, the French Governor, listed 103 men as responsible for this single murder, pursued them with ruthless patience, executed scores, including one who had only been a boy of fifteen, casually included in their company by the assassins. It is terrifying to think that Charles would have almost certainly approved. His views on the necessity of retribution are not in question. Irish readers will need to hold their prejudices in strict control, if they are to appreciate, even when they dissent from, de Foucauld's ideas of his spiritual and temporal responsibility and mission.

Unfortunately the book before us will not help much to a proper interpretation of the facts which it gives with commendable abundance and apparent accuracy. And this for three reasons of unequal importance. The first is a literary style curiously uneven. Lyautey's character is scarcely illuminated by saying that he had " the shrewdness of a courtesan." The Sheiks, with whom everyone who can read print are familiar, are pedantically disguised as Chiokh, while almost on the same page we read how the Vicomte, returning from a Moroccan exploration, was given " an absolutely colossal reception and a binge that lasted three days." The family motto : *Jamais Arrière* is translated, as it might be in First Year Inter. Cert., " Never Back."

More serious is the lack of historical sense. There are strange errors. Mme. de Maintenon appears as Louis XIV's " governess-mistress." The young men of St. Cyr, we are told, were trained only in time to share Napoleon's great defeats, among which Austerlitz finds a place with Waterloo. Mary Stuart is married to a son of Francis II. These are trifles, but they make us suspicious. It is disconcerting to find Oscar McCarthy, the great Cork man who inspired Charles' first serious desert adventures, quoted, not in the original, but second-hand from Bazin.

Still worse are the numerous philosophic generalities, which have nothing to do with a serious estimate of Charles and his work. " In Europe," we learn, " there is sex and getting married, and love has precious little to do with either." Of Charles' mistress, an ordinary type in whose brief career there is no record of unselfishness, it can therefore be said : " She really loved Charles. No wife could have loved him more. Many love less." A note of cheap sophistication is often struck. Describing the sins of the flesh into which Charles fell from his fifteenth year, the author is at pains to point them out as evidence that he " seems to have been sexually perfectly normal." Many of the obiter dicta are demonstrably false. " War," she

writes, " is always the Ruler's alternative to Revolution " ; or again : " It is impossible not to love real sanctity," a statement which would effectually dispose of all the martyrs and even make nonsense of the Crucifixion. There is a final folly so ridiculous, that it occurs, fortunately, at the end of a good book, as it might otherwise have put readers off the work. To what depths has hagiography sunk when a volume dedicated to the Vice-Postulator of Charles de Foucauld's cause can close with this travesty of spiritual interpretation :

" Since his mother's death [in his sixth year], Charles seems to have been obsessed by what modern psychologists would describe as a subconscious impulse to return to the womb. His constantly recurring emphasis on darkness, obscurity, death, burial, annihilation, abjection, his continually expressed desire to become as small as possible, his clinging first to his cousin Marie, then to the nuns, " his dear Mothers," are all clear, elementary. What no human agency can explain is how this commonplace " Mother-fixation " was slowly transformed into goodness."

But, indeed, the reader who allows such a passage to distract him from the mighty theme, *Gesta Dei per Francos*, and the life of one who would gladly have recognised himself in the company of Roland and Oliver, will miss a vital and worthwhile book.

M. BODKIN

SAN MARTÍN THE LIBERATOR. By J. C. J. Metford. Oxford : Basil Blackwell. 1950. 16s.

IN his preface to this book, the author says that " no visitor to the Republic of Argentina can fail to be impressed by the sincerity of the devotion which Argentines show to the memory of San Martín, the man who secured their existence as an independent nation."

This certainly was my own experience. Soon after my arrival in Argentina, I became quickly aware of the esteem in which San Martín is universally held. He is *par excellence* the hero of Argentina. His statue stands in the chief square in every town. The names of his victories are recalled everywhere in the names of streets. People's voices soften (and this is no mere figure of speech) when they speak of his heroism, his victories, his crossing of the Andes, his retirement from the supreme command at the greatest moment of his career, his death in exile. *The Saint of the Sword* Ricardo Rojas, the Argentine writer, called his famous life of Sant Martín, and there is no better summing up of his reputation.

Last year (1950) was the centenary of his death, and it is good that this competent life of San Martín has appeared in English ; in these islands all too little is known of him, as indeed all too little is known of the Spanish-American world.

San Martín's training was hardly what one would have considered suitable for the future Liberator of the Spanish-American colonies. He left America at the age of ten, went with his parents to Spain, and became an officer in the Spanish army. After twenty years of loyal service, and thirty years after he had seen his native land, San Martín resigned his commission with the intention of taking part in the struggle of the Spanish-American colonies for independence.

By then the revolutionary movement was well started. When San Martín arrived in Buenos Aires he was given a military post, though with some misgivings on the part of the revolutionaries, for after all, he had come from Spain.

A stern disciplinarian, he set about getting the army into shape, and a gifted tactician, he planned his campaign. It was this insistence on preliminary training, on not going into action until every detail had been worked out, that was the reason for his spectacular success.

His most outstanding military and strategic exploit was his famous crossing of the Andes into Chile, on the way to Lima, headquarters of the Spanish government. I have crossed the Andes by motor-car, and it was a terrifying experience. San Martín accomplished it on mule-back and on foot. More of his men were killed by *puna* (the mountain-sickness) even than by the cold.

While San Martín was consolidating his position in Chile, he learned that an independent revolution against Spain led by Simon Bolivar was taking place in the north of the continent. He saw that an alliance with Bolivar would be highly desirable, and a meeting took place between the two generals. No one knows what took place at the interview, but after it, San Martín was convinced that co-operation was impossible. Then and there he resigned his post as commander-in-chief of the forces and went into retirement, leaving Bolivar the task of finishing the war.

The after-years were full of disullusionment. It was difficult for him to live on in America : he was constantly suspected of trying to return to power. Finally he left for Europe, and was to die in exile in France.

The author has clearly sketched the background of these confused troubled times, traced the relations between Spain and her colonies, recorded the events leading up to the revolution as well as describing the revolution itself. He gives objective portrait of this restrained, uncommunicative man who was an enigma to all who knew him, and does no more than set down the facts concerning the much-discussed question whether San Martín retired from selfless idealism or from some ulterior motive, leaving the reader free to form his own judgment.

For those who like their history painted in vivid colours and surging with excitement, who like to see historical characters in the intimacy of ordinary life, this book does not cater. But it is thoroughly to be recommended to anyone who wants a detached, soberly-written, well-documented account of San Martín and his times.

There is a foreword to the book by Sir Eugen Millington-Drake K.C.M.G. and indeed it is thanks to him that the author, who is lecturer in the Department of Hispanic Studies in the University of Glasgow, was given the opportunity to visit Argentina. Sir Eugen has worked tirelessly to encourage cultural relations between Spanish-America and England. He as well as the author, is to be congratulated on the publication of this book.

ENA DARGAN

THE EPIC OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND

THE INHERITANCE OF THE COMMON LAW. By Richard O'Sullivan, K.C., Recorder of Derby, a Master of the Bench of the Middle Temple. London : Stevens & Sons. 1950. 8s.)

IN the Common Law mediæval England has left to posterity a monument *aere perennius ;* but the wayward heirs of a noble tradition have tarnished and impaired that splendid memorial of a Christian people by maladroit attempts to furbish and remodel the well-found edifice of better men. This reflection is suggested by a perusal of *The Inheritance of the Common Law,* a volume of 118 pages, reproducing lectures delivered last autumn, under the auspices of the late Miss Hamlyn's Trust, by Mr. Richard O'Sullivan, K.C. The lectures were composed with the scholarship and grace that characterize the writer and the work represents a labour of love in a domain that he has made his own.

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Mr. O'Sullivan contrives, within the narrow compass of four lectures, to sketch for the reader a vigorous polity broad-built on Christian foundations, with prince and people bound by the moral law and power divided between Church and State; he shows us the statesmanship of prelates, and then of laymen, elaborating for England through several centuries a system grounded upon the dignity and autonomy of 'the free and lawful man'; the sanctity of Everyman's home is recognised and the family is taken as the natural unit of society; he and it are protected by due process of law.

Then came the impact of the Reformation; then the impact of the Revolution of 1689; the Common Law withstood the shocks, but the price exacted for its survival was free play for the experiments of a succession of enterprising jerry-builders.

Writing on "The Common Law", Mr. Justice Holmes, of the American Supreme Court, the outstanding jurist of our epoch, stresses the intimate connexion between law and life in a memorable passage:—

"The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience. The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be governed. The law embodies the story of a nation's development through many centuries . . ."

In England, whence for most purposes we get our own Common Law, much of the old practical customary law has weathered the buffets of the new philosophies, but some major departures mark a grave deterioration from other days.

Mr. O'Sullivan shows us the State assuming complete control of the Church and superseding Canon Law. We see a growing indifference to the claims of the family and the progressive degradation of lawful wedlock until the status of marriage approximates to the condition of a tenancy-at-will. We see a background of material force, a stranger to morality, superimposed upon the religious and moral background of the Christian State and the royal power yielding after the Revolution to a victorious Parliament, wholly devoted to the great moneyed interests combined with the landed aristocracy. We see the metamorphosis of plain John Bull under the mastery of the bureaucrats, when the free and lawful man of the old Common Law is transformed into the contemporary plaything of statutes and statutory rules and orders, who "needs for the perfection of his mind and will the light of the anonymous gentleman in Whitehall which lighteth Everyman that cometh into the realm"; and, as the logical sequel to the omnipotence discovered at the Reformation for the Crown in Parliament, we see the emergence of the 'absolute despotic power' of a Parliament, which (so the public declaration of the law by the Attorney-General assures us) could "ordain that all blue-eyed babies shall be destroyed at birth." No Communist State could improve upon this travesty of law from "the Mother of Parliaments."

Appalled by that sad story of decadence, one realizes anew the value for a Christian nation of the solemn proclamation in writing of its democratic Constitution, under which the supreme authority can never enjoy even a theoretical licence to decree a "Massacre of the Innocents." But we have much to learn from the vagaries of constitutional pragmatism across the water, and in a State so prone as we have been since the Treaty to take new enactments ready-made from Westminister and Whitehall, the Legislature has good reason to be wary.

A short review cannot do justice to this very stimulating volume. Mr. O'Sullivan in his conclusion declares that the spirit and the tradition survive—in the courts and the community that gave to the world the inheritance of the Common Law; and,

if in these last times the faces of English men and women have not always been so directed as to receive ' the true Light which lighteth every man that cometh into the world,' . . . " yet we who are called upon in war and peace to defend the Christian civilisation of the West, may hope for a renaissance of faith and freedom ; and a restoration of the old Integrities of the Individual man ; of the Family ; and of the Political Community." In that eloquent prayer we can join whole-heartedly.

GEORGE GAVAN DUFFY

HISTORY

THE REFORMATION IN ENGLAND, i. " *The King's Proceedings.*" By Philip Hughes. London : Hollis & Carter. 1950. 42s.

It is almost half a century since Professor Pollard remarked the absence of an adequate and impartial history of the reformation in England. Whether scholars could agree on what constitutes ' an adequate and impartial history ' of such a controversial subject is open to question ; but at least we are nearer to agreement than in 1902. The labours of scholars like Gairdner, Gasquet, Pollard, Tawney and Chambers have not been in vain. No longer is the reformation regarded as a new Pentecost or the dawn of freedom. With the steady decline of Protestantism has followed a lack of interest in the theology of the reformers and to-day the average non-catholic scholar looks at the whole epoch with the same detachment as a doctor who dissects an organ of a corpse. Witness the recent judgment of Professor Feiling : " Before modern Britain—a united Kingdom, Protestant, sea-faring, and capitalist —could come into existence, a vast work of destruction had to be done. It is not given to the pure and lowly of heart to do such work, nor need we be surprised at the wickedness which accompanied Reformation."

Fr. Hughes's fine work comes at an opportune moment. Just twenty-one years ago Hilaire Belloc, looking back on the ' divorce ' of Henry VIII, wrote with prophetic vision : " Every wise man has desired the reunion of our civilization and has desired it in spite of increasing despair, for now four hundred years. Wise men are rare ; but the most foolish can see to-day that the reunion of our civilization is vital to its mere survival. For our disunion has reached a pitch in which we are capable of destroying ourselves in mutual combat to no purpose, nation against nation, each killing itself in the struggle ; after that class against class." *Wolsey*, p. 6.

It has taken a second world war and the shadow of another to bring home the urgency of the matter and it may be that men are better disposed now to study the origins of European civilization and its disruption. No one, without closing his mind, can read Fr. Hughes's masterly account of the enactment of the royal supremacy and its operation and fail to see how Henry hacked his country from the body of Christendom of which it had been part for a thousand years. Likewise, the technique employed to-day in attempting to set up ' national churches ' should have a familiar ring to all but the hopelessly prejudiced.

Another vital consequence of the revolt was the new concept of law and government which it fostered. A few months ago Professor Binchy remarked in these pages how the Common law of England is the only great legal system in the world whose origins are entirely and indisputably Christian. And he added " it was precisely because of his refusal to acknowledge that ' what has seemed good to the prince has the force of law '—or in other words that the king is *not* ' under God and the law '—that St. Thomas More mounted the scaffold to ' die in and for the faith of the Holy Catholic Church, the King's good servant, but God's first." Ever

since, slowly but steadily, the magnificent structure has sagged and grown lopsided. The ' sovereignty of Parliament ' has become a fetish before which more and more jurists (and alas, judges) have burned incense. The positivist jurisprudence of Bentham and Austin, which has long enjoyed a monopoly in the universities and law schools, has powerfully reinforced this totalitarian concept by insisting that the validity and authority of every legal rule is based solely on the ' command ' of the State.' Fr. Hughes develops the same idea at length and shows how Henry was influenced by the writings of Marsiglio of Padua in his new role of head of Church and State.

Fr. Hughes puts forth no new theories, makes no sensational revelations ; but he has read, understood and digested all the relevant material and his presentation of the sequence of events from the revolt of Luther to the consummation of the schism in England is sane and balanced, coherent and convincing. There is a dramatic quality about his narrative which makes his book eminently readable and we look forward to the second volume (now in the press) which will bring the story down to 1610.

Fr. Hughes has one particular qualification lacking in many historians of this period, namely, a wide knowledge of theology which he uses to excellent advantage in analysing the new heresies, in explaining the monastic ideal and in discussing the royal marriage problem. While he refrains from pinning the blame for the origin of the ' divorce ' on Henry or Wolsey or Anne Boleyn he shows that from the outset Henry was ' demanding that the pope should confirm his own judgment that he was not married and making very clear, from the first approaches to Rome, that no other decision would satisfy him, and he considers that objectively speaking Henry was a heretic already and that he had ceased to be a Catholic despite his attitude towards Transubstantiation and the Mass and other doctrines rejected by the reformers.

In a future edition a discussion of the origin, function and powers of Convocation would be a valuable aid to a fuller understanding of the Church in medieval England.

As the title of the book indicates it is confined to the reformation in England ; but it should be of considerable interest to Irish readers because the same policy was adopted towards the Irish Church with qualified and short-lived success. But that is another story.

The printing and finish of this handsome volume are worthy of its contents and it deserves a warm welcome.

JOHN BRADY

ITALY FROM NAPOLEON TO MUSSOLINI. By René Albrecht-Carrié. New York : Columbia University Press (London : Geoffrey Cumberlege). 1950. 27s. 6d.

THE events of the past ten years have made it permissible to once more ask the question whether Italy was not unified too rapidly. Dr. Albrecht-Carrié is perhaps prone to accept uncritically the view of the Italian ' reactionaries ' taken by their opponents. But he points out appositely the resemblance between the errors committed by the Northerners in the American South after the Civil War and those of the Piedmontese in Southern Italy in the years following unification. Piedmont was the least Italian of the Italian provinces. To its upper classes literary Italian was almost a foreign language. For they were wont to converse in French among themselves and in the Piedmontese dialect to their social inferiors. After unity had been achieved Italy committed the error of attempting a role in power politics

beyond that which her resources would have rendered prudent. In 1915 she was plunged into the First World War by an activist minority against the wishes of the majority of her inhabitants and of their elected representatives. In the light of this event her subsequent history must be read. Was Fascism inevitable? This question naturally occupies an important place in Dr. Albrecht-Carrié's book and his answer to it is perhaps too simple; for either an affirmative or negative reply needs much qualification.

On Oct. 28, 1922, he says "the Fascist cohorts might easily have been dissipated into the bubble of that which in large part they were ..." This judgement gives insufficient account to the undoubtedly large element of public sympathy which the *squadre* enjoyed and it is the opinion of competent observers that King Victor Emmanuel III could have counted on the loyalty of only a part of the army had he ordered it to suppress them. In such an eventuality a kind of civil war would have developed between a Fascist Government in Perugia and a Constitutional Government in Rome. Disorders on a larger scale than those of May 1898 there certainly would have been. Yet it seems unlikely that they would have reached the proportions of the Spanish Civil War and it can be argued that the King's capitulation before the Fascist threat of violence was a graver evil than would have been resistance to it. For had he taken the latter course the sufferings entailed could hardly have reached anything approaching the magnitude of those actually endured by the Italian population during the years 1943-45. Victor Emmanuel had this reason for capitulating to Mussolini. The Fascists desired to get rid of him, their right wing wishing to substitute for him his more popular, more energetic and less democratic cousin, the Duke of Aosta, while the Fascist left was avowedly republican. On the other hand Mussolini himself, an erstwhile republican, was willing to accept King Victor in order to gratify his impatience to seize power.

Dr. Albrecht-Carrié criticizes the Socialists for their inaction in the crisis. But they had lost popularity, as the public blamed them for the intolerable frequency of the strikes which had characterised the pre-Fascist years. Had the Fascists been effectively suppressed another Giolitti ministry would have been the immediate solution. But whether the Italian parliamentary system which owed perhaps too much to foreign inspiration could have survived for another generation must remain an open question.

Dr. Albrecht-Carrié is but little interested in Church history, a lack which is not an advantage for a historian when writing of modern Italy. For Italy's relations with the Papacy have entered deeply into both her domestic history and foreign policy. But economic history receives due attention, and the rise and fall of Italy's colonial empire is sketched. Italian colonisation in Africa which culminated in the short-lived conquest of Ethiopia began in an almost haphazard way when in 1869 the Genoese shipowner, Rubattino, leased from a local potentate the port of Assab on the western shore of the Red Sea. Would Italy's lot today be a happier one if she had never owned colonies? Not improbably it would. But empire-making was a fashion and it would have been difficult for her to take so unfashionable a course as to eschew it. Now, however, that the older colonial empires of Britain and France are in visible decay the author thinks that Italy would have made a wise gesture, if at the end of the war, she had declared her wish to be rid of colonies. Attention may be drawn to two small errors. On p. 70 and again in the index the Russo-Turkish war which began in 1877 is referred to as taking place in 1876. On p. 98 the name of Count Benckendorff, the Russian ambassador in London, is incorrectly spelt "Beckendorff."

HUMPHREY J. T. JOHNSON

IRELAND

THIS IS IRELAND: ULSTER. By Richard Hayward. London: Arthur Barker. 1950. 15s.
ULSTER. By Hugh Shearman. London: Robert Hale. 1950. 15s.
MY IRELAND. By Lord Dunsany. London: Jarrolds. 12s. 6d. net.

WHEN first Partition appeared to be inevitable, some Ulstermen tried to find consolation in the hope that the setting up of a provincial parliament in the North would turn the eyes and minds of the Unionists there inward to their own country. In some measure it would de-anglicise the next generation and would give their instincts a natural, Irish bias. This would lead inevitably to the discovery that they were Irishmen. How far has this hope been justified? How far has a local patriotism developed?

The two beautiful volumes before us give a heartening answer. It is safe to say that they never could have been written—the masses of local history and tradition within them gathered and valued, the fine art-work executed—if the Six Counties had not been given a centre of loyalty (however unsatisfactory in its character) on Irish soil. Mr. Hayward and Mr. Shearman write of all Ulster, not of the partitioned corner of that Province alone; for the artificial and absurd border-line breaks down as soon as a Northman thinks of the land that reared him. Their books turn their people's thoughts, first into the Six Counties and then to the ancient frontier of Ulster, kingdom of the O'Neills.

No Ulsterman living away from the Northland should get these books, unless he can steel himself against nostalgia. Their pictures, wrought by a black-and white artist in one book and by brilliant photographic art in the other, bring home a hundred scenes, from the grandeur of MacArt's Fort, high over Belfast, to the dear glens of Donegal; from the Erne that rivals Killarney to the cottage homes of Tyrone. Here are antiquities, shipyards, looms, castles, rivers and lochs and cathedrals—all, with the people who dwell among, presented with such racy vividness that the possessor longs to go away to Collan water or to tread the streets of Newry town. Only an intensive local patriotism could produce such work.

Mr. Hayward's book lacks the faults and merits of his earlier volumes on the Shannon and the Corrib; he has tied himself to geographic fact and has produced a satisfactory, if not very brilliant, guidebook and reference work. He is to be commended on his care to give the original Gaelic (with some inevitable slips) of the place-names of all nine counties; indirect testimony of the absolute Irishness of every corner of the separated land. His map of the "Black Pig's Dyke," shewing the retraction of the Ulidian frontier in stages in prehistoric times, is one of many valuable contributions to knowledge, for the sake of which we can forgive some rather regrettable political passages. It is ill-luck for him that his book appears simultaneously with one larger and more solid and more ably written.

For Mr. Shearman's volume is a veritable classic. It will stand for long as our amplest and most thorough survey of Modern Ulster—all the more valuable for its author's candour and personal charm. At the same time, it has a note of perversity which has drawn much criticism. An effort to prove that the Six County area, or Ulster itself, never was part of the Kingdom of Ireland, but that it was, from remote times, a distinct country or nation, is forced and rather silly. To take the mighty Dorsey fort, built before recorded history in the Gap of the North, as justification for Sir Basil Brooke's *régime* is like digging up the history of the Pentarchy and arguing that modern England ought to be broken into five states. Again, Mr. Shearman's contrast between modern Belfast and Dublin, in manners and customs, as an excuse for Partition would entail that Galway and Cork ought not to be in the

same State as Dublin; or that Lancashire ought to be separated from Cornwall and Dorset.

The ancient provincial differences long since have yielded to a common, although varied Irishness; and Mr. Shearman's book disproves its own thesis by its portrayal of a country, a people and a tradition dear to the heart of every Irishman whose Primatial city is Armagh and whose patron saint is he who watched on Slemish, set up his See in the North, and lies buried there, though his name is synonymous for " Irishman " throughout the earth.

The Mansion House Committee would do a good work if it were to circulate Mr. Shearman's volume throughout our thirty-two counties. This would kindle such a love of the lost Counties that we never would rest until our State embraced them. The author's prejudices, his lack of understanding of some spiritual things that his people have been denied for four centuries, his perverse ignoring of the part played by the Northern Protestants in the winning of Emancipation, and in such heroic deeds as the battle of Ballynahinch—these are shortcomings that shew us what we have to overcome in such minds as his before we win them. That is our task. The beauty of his book helps us towards its accomplishment. We see here a vital, integral part of the total Irish heritage. This we have to assimilate in the nation of the future, or Partition will last for ever.

After thirteen years, the second edition of Lord Dunsany's book of discursive essays reads as freshly at the first—it has not " dated" nor has its charm decayed. The Palesman with a Martyr's surname discourses now on legendary antiquity, and calls up memories of Tara of the Kings, near by which he dwells; and now he discourses on the wild creatures of our land, with love of the huntsman who is also a naturalist. He tells of his friends—Russell, Gogarty, and that lovely poetry whose patron he was, Francis Ledwidge—or recounts countrymen's droll sayings. He paints the Irish scene in delicate words, and we feel rain in the face and see the high autumn skies. When he writes of woodcock, it is not the sportsman who alone is interested, but the poet; for his mind goes out to far lands of the migratory flight, and brings home wonders.

This is his Ireland, and thirty splendid photographic studies translate it into another medium. The book was written for a series in which other authors write of other lands—few, we suspect, with half the racy, wholesome, happy variety of this volume. One wishes that it could be extended in another direction: that is to say, that half a dozen other authors would write, not of Australia and Spain and Wales, but of our own country, so that we might see how much diversity Ireland can show in other minds. Peadar O'Donnell's Ireland, Daniel Corkery's, and St. John Ervine's—these would give us a little library with scarce one page in common, yet all as true as Lord Dunsany's.

Aodh de Blacam

Literature

ELIZABETHAN RECUSANT PROSE 1559–1582. By A. C. Southern, Ph.D. (Lond.). London: Sands. 1950. Pp. xxi and 553. 42s.

It would be difficult to overestimate the importance of this valuable contribution to literary and historical scholarship. For too long it has been a commonplace with historians of English literature that from the Reformation onward English literature was Protestant. It was with scholarly discernment that the late Professor

J. S. Phillimore, in *The Dublin Review* (July 1913) suggested another theory of the literary history of English. However, no re-reading of literary history resulted from his words : " The true main-stream of English tradition in prose was in the line of Persons, Campion, Allen and the translators of the Douai and Rheims Bible. These are the inheritors of More. But these admirable writings, proscribed and destroyed by the Government of Elizabeth, have remained . . . unknown . . . " Professor R. W. Chambers in his momentous study *On the Continuity of English Prose* (1932) confirmed and amplified these words of Phillimore, lamenting while so doing that " this neglect has continued far too long." With the advent of Dr. Southern's book the era of neglect is happily past. No longer may we ignore the influence of the Elizabethan Catholic Recusants on English literature.

It is indeed difficult to explain the oblivion which has been the lot of these writers. In intellectual stature they were equal to, if not head and shoulders above their contemporaries. Men like Allen, Stapleton, Campion or Persons need no apology. As scholars they rank with the greatest; as makers of literature we have seen their merit hinted at by Phillimore—to know the whole story one should read Dr. Southern. Their one liability—which has pursued them down the years—is that they are Catholic, and we are reminded by Dr. Southern that " Catholic scholars themselves must shoulder some of the responsibility for the prevailing ignorance of these Elizabethan authors." Dr. Southern's manifest aim is to stimulate interest in these writers. He stresses " the preliminary nature " of his investigation. " It has first been our endeavour to put at the disposal of the scholar an *apparatus criticus* which may enable him, if he so will, to pursue further the subject of our discourse. Secondly, we have tried to suggest the value of such further pursuit by copious quotations from our authors, indicating thereby that they hold a not unimportant place in the history of our English prose."

This modest statement of his aim, gives little indication of the varied richness of Dr. Southern's *apparatus criticus*. He gives us far more than we have hoped for. There is for instance, among other things, an interesting chapter on " Publishers and Presses." Most of the Recusant books were printed abroad, Antwerp and Louvain being the two great publishing centres. Books issued also from places such as Douai, Rheims, Rouen and Paris. Readers of the life of Blessed Edmund Campion know a little of the daring venture of the secret Catholic presses in Elizabethan England. Dr. Southern completes the exciting story. The ruses employed by printers and publishers of Recusant works, whether Continental or English, to throw the Government off the scent make engrossing reading ; at the same time they help us to appreciate the difficulties that lie in the path of modern scholars such as Dr. Southern in their endeavours to trace the publishers of these books. All was not plain sailing for a Recusant author when the printing problem, with its attendant financial difficulties, was solved. Not only had the books to be shipped to England, but it was necessary to smuggle them in under the nose of a vigilant and suspicious government. Naturally enough, informers plied a brisk trade, and not a few Englishmen suffered for being " common conveyers . . . . of naughty books over the seas." Nevertheless, despite the incessant watchfulness and severe punitive measures, we read that before the year 1580 " not less than 20,000 of these books were imported into England and secretly sold." How far-reaching was their influence ? Dr. Southern shows it seeping through the strata of English society. These books found their way not only into the hands of Catholics but into those of people such as Robert Greene, the dramatist, who ascribes his death-bed conversion to reading Persons' *Resolution*. Their effect on Ascham was a hardening in the other direction. It is significant that both Persons' and Hopkins' devotional works were pirated by contemporary Protestant writers.

Both bibliographers and students of English literature will find Dr. Southern's comprehensive bibliography of Recusant authors invaluable. The amount of painstaking research and precise scholarship, evident everywhere but more particularly here, is immense. We hardly need the reminder that this book is the fruit of years, not hours, of hard if gratifying labour. Nearly thirty years ago Father M. C. D'Arcy, S.J., suggested the subject of this study to Dr. Southern. Ten years later he started his Ph.D. research under the supervision of the late Professor Chambers. This book is an abridged form of that thesis. Dr. Southern limits his work to the year 1582. We will await eagerly his promised second volume. Perhaps a third dealing with unpublished Recusant sources will follow? For Dr. Southern confines himself here to printed books.

Irish readers will find Dr. Southern's critical and historical treatment of the " Histories " of Campion and Stanyhurst of especial interest. They will be grateful also to see a facsimile folio from Campion's MS. among the admirable illustrations which enhance the value of this book. Outstanding among these illustrations are copies of the very fine Cardinal Allen portrait at Ushaw and of a peculiarly striking seventeenth century Dutch engraving of Edmund Campion. The facsimile page from Heskyn's *The Parliament of Chryste* is delightful.

Delightful, too, is the Recusant translation of the hymn *Jesu Dulcis Memoria*; more rugged and homely, it is true, yet immeasurably more devotional and ' immediate ' than the version that has found its way into our hymn-books.

It is to be hoped that Dr. Southern's book will eventually effect a modification in our methods of teaching the history of English literature and stimulate further research into the writings of these neglected Elizabethans.

HELEN CLARE

A HANDBOOK TO DANTE STUDIES. By Umberto Cosmo. Translated by David Moore. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 1950. 15s.

UMBERTO COSMO died comparatively recently and we may therefore justly expect the present volume to embody the final fruits of a lifetime's study. We are indeed indeed explicitly told as much in Signor Autonicelli's preface How, then, may we account for the undeniable feeling of disappointment which remains on completing the reading of the book?

We may rule out immediatley the hypothesis that the fault lies with the translator. Mr. Moore has given a faithful (some might say a too faithful) rendering of Cosmo's somewhat pedantic Italian prose style. Nor can we blame that style itself for the nebulous impression which the book finally leaves; it is true that we have nothing here to compare with the astringent sharpness of Gibson's reasoning or with the sustained and provocative argumentation of Bruno Nardi; but we do not expect these qualities. Cosmo's objective was avowedly more modest; he wished to provide especially for the " young student " (his own constantly-used phrase), a reliable survey of the main achievements and problems of Dante studies, past and present. It is by his success or failure in reaching this target that his *Handbook* must be judged.

A little learning is a dangerous thing; but a super-abundance of it can also have its disadvantages. Umberto Cosmo knew the literature of Dante and on Dante with a thoroughness in which few can hope to rival him; but this very fact may have disqualified him from attaining as easily as a less scholarly mind to an essential understanding of the interested beginner's position *qua* beginner. We think that his " young student " will find the allusiveness of much of the discussion very bewildering; the writer seems to take so much for granted and is so often content to refer the young Dante-lover without further ado to the exhaustive (and indeed

exhausting) bibliographies appended to each chapter. This is very well; but is it in accordance with Cosmo's declared terms of reference! He has undertaken to give an introductory stimulus to the study of Dante; but in fact he has substituted what is in effect a blueprint for the labour of a long lifetime. When his "young student" has mastered all the equipment which Cosmo declares to be essential for the mere approach to Dante studies, he will, we fear, no longer be young. One imagines that the baffled tyro might find writers like Charles Williams or (even in 1950) Dean Church to be less erudite but more understanding guides for the early stages of his quest.

Perhaps the chief point of interest for the more advanced student in Cosmo's cautious ventures at interpretation will be his hypothesis on Dante's own conception of his character and destiny. Cosmo sees an almost Kafka-like ambiguity in the poet's make-up. We are presented with a personality torn between the sensualism which could produce the "Madonna Pietra" *canzoni* or the *tenzoni* with Forese Donati, and the simultaneous conviction of a divinely-appointed mission of poetic prophecy. The pilgrim of the *Divine Comedy* is Dante as he yearns to be and as he would wish us to see him, not as he actually is. This would seem to be a fruitful explanation and one wishes that Cosmo had made more use of it in his discussion of such writings as the "mountain *canzone*" (p. 73) where he makes a hardly convincing attempt to allegorise a all too earthy passion. It is, however, in the bibliographies (certainly unrivalled for completeness by any others accessible in English) that the value of the *Handbook* chiefly lies: Cosmo's judicious, if brief, assessments of the work of other critics will be read closely and attentively by those about to venture into the *selva oscura* still surrounding so much of the background and personality of Catholic Christianity's greatest poet.

JOHN B. MORRALL

PHILOSOPHY

NATURAL LAW. By A. P. d'Entrèves, M.A., D.PHIL. London: Hutchinson's University Library. 1951. Pg. 126. Price 7s. 6d.

THERE is to-day a noticeable revival of interest in the doctrine of Natural Law, even outside the schools of the Catholic Church where this doctrine has never fallen into oblivion. This re-awakened interest is due, perhaps chiefly, to the search for a solid theoretical basis for the persuasion that man has certain indefeasible personal rights—a persuasion whose validity modern Totalitarianism has challenged both in theory and in practice. Heinrich Rommen has noted this recall to Natural Law in his comprehensive book *The Natural Law* (English translation 1947). Indeed the fundamental issue in the world to-day is the recognition of Natural Law as the source of validity of human laws. After a century of legal positivism, lawyers and jurists are beginning to wonder if they were wise in banishing from their law schools, as erroneous, or at least as irrelevant, a teaching and a tradition which have endured for more than two millennia. Very opportunely, therefore, Professor d'Entrèves gives us the present volume, commemorating the achievements of the theorists of Natural Law and pointing out the contribution this doctrine can make towards the solution of certain modern problems which arise out of the study of jurisprudence. As the sub-title indicates, this book forms a fitting Introduction to Legal Philosophy.

Professor d'Entrèves criticises the opinion, often propounded, that there is one continuous, uniform tradition of Natural Law teaching, stretching in an unbroken line from Sophocles to the present day. Natural Law doctrines have differed. But they have done so chiefly by emphasising (sometimes, over-emphasising) different aspects of a complex theory. This is illustrated by three chapters which

analyse the doctrine of Natural Law in Justinian's famous *Corpus Juris Civilis*, in St. Thomas and the Scholastics, and finally in the American and French constitution-makers of the end of the eighteenth century. Time and again the doctrine of Natural Law has fallen into disrepute and been cast out by the jurists. But it always re-appears. In Gierke's picturesque words : " If it is denied entry into the body of positive law, it flutters around the room like a ghost and threatens to turn into a vampire which sucks the blood from the body of law." At present, as has already been observed, we are witnessing another such ' come back ' of the theory. What is the reason of this inexhaustible vitality ? Professor d'Entrèves answers in the second half of his book, by showing that the doctrine is true and necessary —necessary in any adequate philosophy of law, necessary, indeed, in order to answer the very first question of legal philosophy : *quid jus*, what is law ? For, in the first place, this doctrine shows law as essentially a product of reason, and hence refutes all " voluntarist " notions of law such as the doctrine of sovereignty (law essentially implies the subject-superior relationship), or the Nominalist conception of morality as depending on the arbitrary Will of God, or Rousseau's doctrine of the General Will. " Natural Law is a plea for reasonableness in action. But it is also an assertion that only inasmuch as action can be measured in terms of reason does it properly come under the heading of law " (p. 78). Secondly, the doctrine of Natural Law has enabled its exponents correctly to apprehend the relation between law and morals. True they sometimes moralized law by confusing legal with moral obligation. But they were saved from the error, so common among modern jurists, of so stressing the differences between the legal and the moral as to deny any association between the two. Finally, Natural Law is the ideal standard by which the validity of all positive law systems is ultimately to be judged. Positivistic jurisprudence, in its attempts to give a satisfactory account of the ultimate binding-force of laws without appealing to such an ideal standard, has failed signally. And this, in spite of its notable achievement during the last hundred years in elaborating a science of law. We may see here another proof of the validity and necessity of the Natural Law idea.

The author modestly ranks his excellent book with the type of writing that is superciliously called " tertiary." Be that as it may, I, for one, found it not only learned and informative, but subtle and penetrating in argument and limpid in style.

MICHAEL CONNOLLY

PSYCHOLOGIE RÉFLEXIVE. Par André Marc, S.J., 2 tomes. Paris : Desclée de Brouwer. 1948. pp. 382, 422.

THIS long, closely-reasoned and courageous work on metaphysical psychology merits the careful and appreciative study of all who are interested in modern Scholastic Philosophy. Traditionally under the inspiration of Aristotle (*De Anima*), Scholastic psychology dealt with a metaphysic of life in the three degrees in which it is found in this material universe of ours : plants, animals and man ; with the inevitable result that man was considered as a being verifying in himself three stages of life : the vegetable life of the plant, and over that the sensitive life of the animal, and over that again the intellectual life which distinguishes man from the other living things on the face of the earth. The essential unity of his life, biological, sensitive, and intellectual was obscured ; and the analogy between vegetative and sensitive functions in man and in plants and animals tended to be treated as univocity. The privileged position of man as the one object we know from within and the measure of our analogical knowledge of lower and higher degrees of being was neglected.

Fr. Marc proposes not a metaphysic of life, but a metaphysic of man ; and not a study of man as an object among other objects viewed from the outside, but as the subject of his conscious activity penetrated from within by a reflexive psychology. In a short chapter concluding the second volume of his work, he analyses for us the method which he followed in his long study—the method of reflexive analysis. Starting from a specifically human act immediately given, the act of signifying, the act of language, the author intends by successive stages to seize this activity in its source, and to discover the conditions of its possibility and its value. This reflexive analysis, seizing the activity in its source, is the fruit of the reason alone, in no way intrinsically conditioned by the senses or by instruments which prolong the senses (p. 404). The analysis proceeds, then, in the third degree of abstraction : the domain of the purely intelligible, which does not fall under the senses or imagination ; and its findings are expressed in terms of act and potency, the purely intelligible principles of being. By such a method, Fr. Marc hopes to refind the traditional truths of psychology in the Philosophia Perennis, truths deepened and appreciated by the shock of personal discovery, like Chesterton's discovery of Brighton. The method is fascinating, novel and worthy of the highest praise.

As his starting point, Fr. Marc consecrates a whole section to a telling analysis of language, limited however to discovering the rôle of signifying in our mental development : that personal initiative of the subject seizing and expressing his thought or desire of something other than himself. The essentially successive material elements of the sign and the inner supra-temporal act which unifies and gives signification poses the problem of the duality and unity of matter and spirit. The author does not treat of the volitional and emotional elements also united in the unity of the act of language—an analysis of which would have widened his starting point by placing vividly before us the complex unity of our specifically human activity which imposes on us the problem of man. There follows a suggestive analysis of our cognition in general, discovering its essential law, as the identity and opposition of the knower and the known in the lucidity of their common act. Then Fr. Marc applies this law to sensation (necessarily given in us by reason of the discursive nature of our knowledge : implying dependence on reception from without through quantity). Here Fr. Marc devotes many pages to a splendid analysis of the function (ignored by so many Scholastics) of our internal sensibility in actual sensation : the *sensus communis* synthesizing the impressions of the different senses in what is deeper than the actual qualities which alter the senses, namely quantity. The inner movement of the *sensus communis*, synthesizing in space, is itself unified in time by the sense memory, which prevents the past becoming past and holds it for the service of the present. He then studies the differentiation of the senses, utilizing the acute observations of Louis Lavelle and Jean Nogué. The author next devotes a long section to the objectivity of sensation, defending the objectivity of both the primary and secondary qualities. The principle he relies on is the implications of the sense of need and of the sense of defence of the animal, which necessarily demand the " *in se* " of the sense object. Surely here Fr. Marc is false to his method ? He is treating sensation as if it were given to us in its pure state, whereas we have no sensation that is not informed by intellection : our sensation enters consciousness in the objectivity of intellection. The objectivity of sensation in itself is a false problem. We do not know, and we cannot know, the objectivity of the cow's knowledge of the grass it is about to chew ! Indeed this separation which the author makes between our sensation and our intellection becomes more startling when, treating of the act of attention, he writes : " [It is this opposition between movement and immobility] which is the reason why the two awarenesses (les deux consciences), intellectual and sensitive, whatever may other-

wise be their union, must yet be perfectly distinguished." (p. 181). In man there cannot be a double awareness, if he is to be a being one in himself.

The author's treatment of intellection is full and inspiring: his pages on abstraction, on the schematism of the imagination, and his discussion of the value of the *verbum mentis* as a *signum formale*, should be read and reread. His analysis of the three degrees of abstraction and the differentiation of the sciences, based on the penetrating remarks of Fr. Scheuer, contains many flashes of great insights. For instance, he writes: "But it is remarkable that the most absolute knowledge, metaphysical, is at the same time that which is most separated from matter and rests entirely within the spirit. The more the intelligence, in metaphysical knowledge, is interiorly transparent to itself, the more does it penetrate into the real. It cannot reach down to the sources of the real without touching its own depths." (p. 350).

The second volume of his work is devoted to a study of the will and the human spirit. It is surprising and regrettable that in his treatment of the will not a word is said about the sense appetite. The will and the sense appetite mutually condition one another. There is in us a sensitivo-rational appetite, just as there is in us a sensitivo-rational cognition (all our direct knowledge is sensitivo-rational). No treatment of the human will can be complete if its natural union with and conditioning by the sense appetite is passed over in silence. Fr. Marc's study of love and his analysis of freedom, profound though they be, suffer as a result of this separation. His pages on the destiny of liberty and especially his chapter on habits are the finest section of his work. In passages of lyrical splendour he shows how the growth of habits effects the true liberation of the human spirit, the unification of its acts in a given direction, the growth of self-possession and the growth of mastery of the universe—true culture. These pages, original and penetrating, bring to the surface truths neglected or scantily indicated in most works on metaphysical psychology.

In the last part of his work, which deals with the human spirit, Fr. Marc, following the order of most of the manuals, treats very fully of the reality and nature of the human soul: its substantiality, its simplicity, its spirituality, and its immortality. It is only then that he considers the human composite—the soul as the substantial form of the body. Such an order is surely contrary to his reflexive method. The fact of language, the union in complexity of our activity which it reveals, argues first and foremost, as its ultimate explanation, a substance which is composed of soul and body. Only subsequently can one logically consider the nature of the human soul itself, as a principle of the composite, and the possibility of its survival. To reverse the order is to minimize the difficulties of immortality, which difficulties nevertheless Fr. Marc very clearly and very fully answers. A final chapter of his work shows that man, composed of body and soul, is a person, and therefore *sui juris* and absolute, and simultaneously an individual, and hence a member of society. Man therefore is for society as an individual, and society is for man as a person. We are led to the threshold of a treatment of personal and social ethics.

Fr. Marc's monumental work is the fruit of ten year's study and reflexion, ripened by the experience of teaching metaphysical psychology first in the Jesuit Scholasticate of Jersey, and during the war years in that of Mongré. His *Psychologie Réflexive* shows a breath of vision and a vastness of erudition which is amazing. All the great philosophers from Plato to the Pre-existentialists are pressed into service to throw light on the perennial problems of man. One sees under the lucidity of Fr. Marc's pen the same problems engaging the attention of the human mind down the centuries, and one esteems more highly the value and the balance of Fr. Marc's solutions, so truly and so vitally scholastic.

FRANCIS P. O'FARRELL

SPIRITUALITY

THE SPIRITUALITY OF SAINT THÉRÈSE. By L'abbé Combes. Dublin: M. H. Gill and Son. 1950. 10s. 6d.

THE COLLECTED LETTERS OF SAINT THÉRÈSE OF LISIEUX. Translated by F. J. Sheed. London. Sheed and Ward. 1949. 15s. net.

STORM OF GLORY. By John Beevers. London: Sheed and Ward. 10s. 6d. net.

THE MESSAGE OF THÉRÈSE OF LISIEUX. By M. M. Philipon, O.P. London: Burns, Oates and Washbourne. 1950. 5s.

IN 1947 an event unique in the annals of hagiography took place. A Congress of Theologians met in Paris to examine the theological bearings of the spirituality of St. Thérèse of Lisieux. It was unique because no Saint had hitherto been honoured by such a Convention, and, perhaps still more by the fact that Thérèse had never written a line of theology, and had claimed no other outlook on the spiritual life than the "Little Way of Spiritual Childhood." Indeed, within the cloister, her life seemed so ordinary that the kitchen sister wondered what aspect of it could be of interest in the obituary notice.

It appears, however, that the "ordinary" in her life was so extraordinary as to offer a new message to ascetical experts; so new that Père Philipon believes "the spirituality of St. Thérèse to have restored to prominence one of the most dynamic —and most misunderstood—of Christian virtues, the theological virtue of hope" (p. 79); and the Abbé Combes that: "Just as when first a student reaches a full realisation of St. Thomas's teaching concerning pure being and concerning the work of divine grace, which consists, not in destroying or supplanting nature in its proper sphere, but in restoring and perfecting it, he undergoes a mental revolution; so, in the domain of spiritual things, it seems that St. Thérèse has produced a revolution no less complete and no less fundamental. We hesitate to define its full importance, but it clearly is a proof of the genius of this humble nun, and it will demand from theologians a clarification of some of their teaching." (p. 160).

If these words fell from the lips of an over-enthusiastic preacher, we should smile; in fact they come from professional theologians. The abbé Combes is a professor at the Institut Catholique de Paris, where, after the Congress, he gave a series of lectures, published in a volume of 500 pages: *L'Introduction à la Spiritualité de Ste. Thérèse de l'Enfant Jésus,* of which this English edition forms the first half. Fr. Philipon spent ten years quietly studying the relevant documents. Both writers might justify any apparent excess of language by appealing to Pope Pius XI who, in proclaiming her universal patroness of the Missions, called her "the star of his pontificate," a "living Word of God" in the world, and the herald of a "new message" of holiness.

None of the great Saints and Doctors can claim to have had, within fifty years after their death, a similar library built up about them of authors revealing their "Secret", "Spirit", "Spirituality", "Message", "Mission", "Spiritual Renascence," to pick out a few of the titles putting St. Thérèse in the limelight. We are naturally curious to find out what she has done. The four books under review supply an answer. Different as the approach may be, the answer is the same: she has *done* nothing, but she *was* something. She was fully Herself in the plan of Divine Providence; just what God intended her to be. From childhood she realised that the fashioning of a soul is the work of God's love. She let it work, making herself small to be receptive of its most delicate touches: "O Jesus, my Love, at last I have found my vocation: *my vocation is love!* . . . In the heart of the Church, my Mother, I shall be love! Thus I shall be everything." (Autobiography, ch. xiii).

The answer seems simple until we begin to ask how one is to " be love " ? Fr. Philipon finds in her spirituality these " negative characteristics which distinguish it from other types of holiness apparently more classical," namely " absence of extraordinary mystical states, absence of method in prayer, absence of unusual deeds." On the positive side is " the fundamental dogma of the divine Fatherhood, inducing a life in intimacy with the Father with the soul of a child."

The Abbé Combes is more precise. She mapped out her way in six successive steps : 1. Never to become discouraged ; 2. God could not inspire desires that cannot be fulfilled, so sainthood is possible ; 3. She clearly saw her imperfections as an obstacle to achieving greatness ; 4. Surely there must be a " lift " to bring little souls up the heights ; 5. There was ; Scripture offered it : " Whosoever is a little one, let him come to me " (Prov. 9, 4). With children, He took the initiative ; He made the efforts. She had no need to search further ; she had made her discovery : " Thine arms, O my Jesus, are the lift which must raise me to heaven ; " but a consequence followed, perhaps too easily overlooked by the apostles of the " little way for all," 6. she should endeavour to " grow more and more little." It is just here that would-be imitators too often baulk ; for this involves a groundwork of humility, emptying out every trace of self-seeking. The popular imagination has been captured by the picture of the little hand scattering roses. If they examined the hand more carefully, they would find plenty of blood stains caused by the thorns which enabled Thérèse to scatter the roses. The Saint of the " Little Way " was heroic, as every canonized saint must be ; and we may well ask whether it is easier to practise self-imposed macerations, which do not necessarily wound our self-esteem, than to welcome cheerfully the daily pin-pricks of those whose thoughtlessness, or indeed want of delicate charity, wound us in our deepest feelings. The " Little Way " of St. Thérèse was built up on this " Great Way " of unending generosity. So she seems to have attained what St. Bernard calls the highest point of love : to love one's self only for the love of God.

The four books—and all are worth reading—will complete one another, and show the riches of a soul seeking to be great in love by being little in itself.

It is a pity that Fr. Philipon and Mr. Beevers are not acquainted with St. Ignatius's real teaching on prayer, and that both, in eagerness to emancipate from " method," contrast Thérèse's way with " the rigid, systematic, strict discipline of the will and imagination " (so Beevers, p. 193) of the Saint who especially commended a " loving attention to the presence of God within us, during the day." Is not this travelling up by St. Thérèse's lift ?

GEORGE BYRNE

THE PRIEST AT HIS PRIE-DIEU. THE NUN AT HER PRIE-DIEU. Robert Nash, S.J. Dublin : M. H. Gill and Son, Ltd. 1950. 12s. 6d. each.

IN giving a name to his work an author can choose a title that is vague but attractive in the hope of increasing his sales ; or, if he is less calculating, he can select one that describes in a general way the contents of his book. Fr. Nash has chosen the second alternative. In one way his titles do him a disservice. The words " Nun ", " Priest " and " Prie-dieu " seem to imply an exclusiveness, to hint that what is for nuns will not be of use for priests. Such is not true. Much of the contents of both of these books will be helpful for priests, nuns and lay people. This is not surprising because their doctrine is simply that which Christ Himself gave to all men. Their author would not have it otherwise ; he has no desire to be anything more than " an echo of the voice of Christ ". How careful he is to keep this in mind is evident to anyone who pages even rapidly through the books. Every page abounds with phrases and sentences from the Scriptures.

Owing to his long and wide experience of giving retreats to priests and nuns Fr. Nash has an intimate knowledge of their life, ideals and problems. Thus it is inevitable that he should aim at combining together the theory and practice of the spiritual life. Theory is not much without practice ; yet without good theory practice is not worth much for it is neither fruitful nor enduring. The task of blending the two is formidable. A completely theoretical treatise often leads to nothing more than vague and empty resolutions ; to dwell too much on practical points is discouraging, it becomes little more than a long catalogue of faults to be amended. It is here that the special value of Fr. Nash's method is seen. The blending is done by each individual on his knees at prayer. In prayer one comes to know and love God, to see in their true setting the faults and virtues treated of in each meditation. Most important of all one gains the grace to put into daily life the lessons learned at prayer. Fr. Nash wants his books to be prayed and not merely read. In his Introductions he gives details on this point : he thinks of each meditation as material for a week's daily prayer. Used thus the books avoid the charge of giving too much space to the pointing out of faults and the encouraging of certain practices which, though good in themselves, are only a means to holiness. Fr. Nash would be the first to admit that holiness consists in a love for God and in a consequent increase of sanctifying grace ; his details are nothing more than helps to this primary object.

The presentation of each meditation is admirable. Each opens with a preparatory prayer, usually a short scripture text. Then follows a setting or scene which aims at giving actuality to the ensuing meditation. After the usual three points we are given a brief summary of the meditation and a *tessera* or tag to recall during the day the subject of our prayer. We are in no way bound to use all this apparatus, but we cannot say that Fr. Nash has not given us all the possible helps to pray well. The contents of the meditations follow more or less the chronological order of the events of Christ's life. Some things in these books may not appeal to all, especially Fr. Nash's outspoken views on penance. But in this he is merely repeating the appeals of Pope Pius XI and the unending requests of our present Holy Father during the Holy Year.

We think it a pity that references are not given to the passages from scripture. The publishers are to be congratulated on the excellent production of the books, wide margins, 300 pages of good paper, at a most reasonable price.

KEVIN QUINN

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

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

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

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